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Introduction  9 
 
 
There is no memory that sinks more deeply into the mind of a young boy or a 
young girl than the memory of a poor widowed mother struggling hard, week 
in and week out, to make ends meet. […] she will have a lonely life and a 
hard lot, and the least we do for her is to keep her from having to depend on 
odd jobs or on the cold hand of charity. 
18th November, 1914.  Parliamentary debate. War in Europe: naval and 
military services, pensions and grants debates 
 
On the second instant several hours were of necessity spent in a careful 
endeavour to ascertain whether or not there was any local story connected 
with this woman’s re-marriage, but in spite of unofficial conversations with 
certain neighbours there was no suggestion of gossip or that the marriage was 
one of convenience. 
Police report on Rosina Allen, 23
rd March, 1935. PIN26 17200.  
 
This thesis will explore the discourses surrounding British widows of men who died 
as a result of the First World War.  In particular, discourses of nationalism, morality 
and social welfare will be the main focal points.  Critical discourses analysis 
(Fairclough, 1989, 1995; Wodak, 1999, 2002) will be used to unpack these 
discourses in a variety of texts, although the main focus will be on texts relating to 
two widows who did not receive war widows’ pensions, but for very different 
reasons.  The pension claimed by these women was the first State-funded, 
(financially) non-contributory pension in Britain and as such offers the chance to see 
emergent discourses of social welfare in the early part of the 20
th century as this 
newly-devised system was developed and implemented.  The two case files will be 
analysed in detail, using discourse-historical analysis (Wodak, 2002) as a framework 
in an attempt to uncover how interdiscursivity operates within a patriarchal ideology 
and nationalistic concerns surrounding the eugenics debate, alongside underlying 
parsimoniousness. 
  This introductory section will set out my argument for the need for such 
research, arguing that this is a relatively unexplored facet of this ‘war to end all 
wars’.  We will look at the social construction of widowhood and why this particular 
social category is interesting in terms of the gendered assumptions that came to be 
written into law for the group of women who form the focus of this study: war   10 
widows.  Whilst the First World War continues to generate a lot of popular and 
academic interest, war widowhood has been largely unexplored yet is a rich area for 
academic analysis. 
  The complex nature of the data that forms the corpus for this thesis will be 
summarised, with reference to the various sources as well as the challenges of 
collecting it, not least the diverse media in which this data exists.  Whilst much of 
the data used in this thesis comes from National Archives at Kew, comprising 
private correspondence between bureaucrats and with widows, there are also texts 
from the public sphere (Habermas, 1987) which will be used to help contextualise 
those from the private sphere.  The selection of the data will be discussed below, 
explaining why the cases of two widows in particular have been chosen for more 
detailed case study analysis.   Finally, this section will briefly detail the theoretical 
approaches that will be used to analyse this corpus of data in ways which will prove 
a useful addition to our understanding of women in a given context. 
Both of the extracts at the beginning of this Introduction relate to widows of 
men who died in the First World War.  The first is taken from one of the early 
parliamentary debates, as recorded in Hansard, when State pensions for widows 
were first discussed.  Here, the widow is being positioned as a figure of pity, her 
husband’s death in service of king and country potentially leaving her in a state of 
poverty and unhappiness.  The ‘we’ in this extract are the members of parliament 
and, by extension, the country, who will step in as beneficent guardians to protect 
the poor, defenceless widow.  In reality, as the second extract indicates, these 
women were subject to a great deal of distrust in terms of their sexuality and 
morality.  Their position as women without a male head to the household had 
rendered them as a potential threat to the moral stability of the nation.  As such, they 
were open to public scrutiny from neighbours, the police and the State to ensure they 
remained worthy of their state-funded pension.  My argument will explore their 
representation and experiences to show how these apparently contradictory frames 
of pity and distrust relate to two specific widows.  Underpinning this analysis will be 
an understanding of the cultural representation of women, in particular working-  11 
class women in Britain in this period, and this thesis seeks to fill a gap in existing 
knowledge about them.    
  As Threadgold (1997), drawing on Fraser (1995) has argued, one of the 
effects of 20
th century social welfare reforms on the public sphere is that these 
reforms render many aspects of the domestic, private sphere public.  In this case, 
what Threadgold refers to as discourses of Care and Protection are used to deploy 
patriarchal rule, invading the innermost reaches of the private sphere to make public 
and masculine what was once private and feminine.  As we shall see in the course of 
this study, discourses of morality include sexual behaviour and child-care matters, 
issues which were transformed from the private sphere to the public by the social 
welfare reforms which affected war widows in the 20
th century.  
Since the 1970s, there has been much academic interest in the history of 
women in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, particularly how the ‘two spheres’ 
ideology of the 19
th century shifted in the course of the 20
th to evolve into second 
wave feminism.  The First World War is often described as marking a pivotal 
moment in the women’s movement in the West, starting at the height of the militant 
women’s suffrage campaign and ending in the same month as women were granted 
the vote in Britain (eg, Marwick, 1963; Lewis, 1984).  Historically the view of 
women has been framed largely by the 18th century Enlightenment’s conception of 
the ‘two spheres’: the rational and public masculine sphere and the irrational, private 
female one.  Macdonald (1995) has observed that the discursive division of the 
social universe into the separate spheres of ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
 
has had powerful practical consequences in suppressing women’s pay, 
muting their cries for childcare provision, and constructing domestic violence 
as a purely ‘private’ matter.  These consequences stem from a conceptual and 
ideological framework that view the public sphere as inherently ‘masculine’; 
the private as intrinsically ‘feminine’.  (1995: 47) 
 
The concept of biological essentialism contributed to exclude women from many 
areas of life such as education, sport and politics until very recently.  The ‘Women 
of Britain’ recruitment poster, which will be looked at in more detail later (page 53), 
firmly places the weaker members of society – women and children – within the   12 
safety of the domestic environment.  However, this is a view that is strongly class-
based.  For working class women, as will be discussed further in the chapter on the 
historical background to this period, it was expected that they would go out to work 
until they were married, and even after the birth of children it was not unusual for 
them to be in paid employment (Lewis, 1984).  Although professions such as the 
civil service and teaching continued with female ‘marriage bars’ for many years, the 
employment opportunities afforded to working class women generally offered few 
such restrictions.  
The ideology which had confined ‘respectable’ women to the domestic 
environs was irrevocably altered by the First World War.  Vera Brittain’s 
autobiographical account of this period, Testament of Youth (1933), reveals how her 
‘respectable’ middle-class upbringing required a young woman to be chaperoned 
when in male company or else out of the house.  After volunteering to be a VAD in 
the nursing service in 1915, she observes the changes in her life that the war had 
brought, not least of which was a relative freedom to travel without a chaperone.  
This Victorian practice was largely removed by the war, but the public unease with 
this is probably most noticeably seen in the treatment of the young, unmarried 
woman of the 1920s – the ‘flapper’.  The ‘public’ life of the flapper involved sport, 
dancing and, with the advent of affordable day trips and holidays, unchaperoned 
travel, mostly funded by employment in the public arena of the office or shop.  No 
longer tied to domestic service, the expectations and liberty of the young female in 
the 1920s was shockingly public to an older population who were, as Light (1991) 
has indicated, in other ways trying to return to the ‘good old days’ before the war
1.   
In her study of literature between the wars, Light coined the phrase 
‘conservative modernity’ to described the Janus-faced nature of British society at 
this time, as it chose to return to the certainties of the past, no matter how much this 
was hated, whilst being ‘reluctantly and forcibly propelled into new ways of living 
after the war, and that it is this traumatised relation to modernity which produced 
new kinds of conservative as well as radical response’ (1991: 11).   
                                                 
1 The 1918 Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act was primarily responsible for the expulsion of 
women war workers from the posts previously occupied by men, but has far wider social 
consequences which will be discussed in the Historical Background section.   13 
This can be clearly seen in the case of the flapper.  Her overt femininity, 
despite cropped hair and the quite androgynous fashions of this period, was 
emphasised in popular culture by a portrayal of her as flirtatious and coquettish, 
through plays and popular tunes.  The hedonistic world of the 1920s was her 
playground, but her perceived enjoyment of the ‘jazz age’ was used by the media to 
devalue her role in society, particularly her political status (Macdonald, 1995).  
When the franchise was eventually extended to include women on the same grounds 
as men in 1928 under the terms of the Equal Franchise Act, the press referred to the 
legislation perjoratively as the ‘Flapper Bill’, drawing on images of flappers as 
capricious and self-indulgent.  The very femininity that the Pankhursts had been 
using as a positive strategy to gain acceptance for women’s suffrage rights a quarter 
of a century earlier was being re-appropriated by the media to malign women once 
they were legislatively accepted into the public sphere.  Thus the construction of 
women at all levels in society was bound up in a moral discourse that sought to 
confine them to the domestic sphere within a dominant patriarchal ideology.   
 
The construction of widowhood 
The distrust of women outside of the domestic sphere mirrors that of women outside 
of direct patriarchal control, in particular, the widow.  This section will briefly 
explore the social construction of widowhood then focus more specifically on war 
widowhood. 
At a micro-text level, the etymology of the label widow reveals something of 
the society in which it has been constructed. Mills, in Womanwords, traces its 
origins: 
 
Old English widewe or widuwe originated in the Indo-European root 
widh- or wiedh-, meaning to be empty, to be separated, as in the Sanskrit 
vidh, meaning be destitute or lack.  Hence the Latin viduus, meaning 
bereft, void or widowed, and dividere, meaning divide.  (1991: 259) 
 
As in the original Sanskrit root of the word, ‘lack’ has been the defining 
point for widows throughout history.  In the modern English usage, the use of widow   14 
relates to a woman whose husband has died.  A man in the position of his spouse 
dying is a widower, reflecting the more common factor that women are more likely 
to outlive their spouses, and thus widow is one of the few roots of a noun which is 
modified for use for a man.  However, for the widower, society is far more tolerant 
of his moral behaviour, as it is of men’s behaviour in the world in general. 
It is not only through lexical choice that women are differentiated from men.  
The distinction can be shown through grammatical analysis.  Much critical linguistic 
research has shown that the least powerful in society are most frequently rendered 
less powerful through grammatical strategies such as passive voice, linking with 
intransitive verbs and negative naming practices (eg Wodak, 1999, 2000, 2003).  
The group most commonly found to fall into this category is women (see for 
example Spender, 1985; Cameron, 1995; Talbot, 1998).  Through the use of close 
linguistic analysis, I hope to uncover the widows’ roles in terms of power in the 
extant textual materials available, both in their own words and the writing of others.    
Perhaps the least powerful woman, and therefore an interesting case study 
into how language might operate to rescue these relations of power, is the working-
class widow who is the main focus of this study.  As Yalom has found, even from 
ancient times widows were commonly expected to exhibit fidelity to a dead spouse 
(2001: 40).  Without a male guardian in the form of a husband, the widow is 
expected to continue to behave as if she was still married, and remain loyal to his 
memory and indeed to her marriage vows.  This set of assumptions about widows is 
based on the common fact that usually most widows are older.  However, in the case 
of war widows, it is highly likely that they are much younger.  As we saw in the 
quotations at the beginning of this Introduction, these were women who were ready 
to re-marry, or else were still able to have full and productive lives.  The gendered 
performance of widowhood is written into the pension legislation with little 
allowance for the age of the widow.  As will emerge from the more detailed case 
studies, the widows themselves often refused to perform the subject position of 
passive widowhood that society required of them.  Their resistance to the discursive 
construction of widowhood is remarkable but ultimately largely ineffective. 
   15 
War widowhood 
The unprecedented number of men who died as a result of the First World War is 
just one of the factors that makes this war one of the most studied, although the fate 
of their widows has received little academic attention.  Much academic research has 
been conducted into the First World War throughout the 20
th century, with the 
official history of the war being written whilst it was still in progress (indeed, the 
Imperial War Museum was set up in 1916 to collect artefacts and documents).  Some 
excellent research has been carried out more recently, such as De Groot’s Blighty: 
British society in the era of the Great War (1996) and Jay Winter’s numerous works 
seeking to explore the various aspects of the war.  Perhaps best known is Fussell’s 
The Great War and Modern Memory (first published in 1975), which, like most 
other studies, explores the war from an androcentric perspective.   
More recent work has sought to remedy this gender imbalance to some 
extent.  Women’s experiences and contributions to the war have been studied in 
works such as Woolacott’s On Her Their Lives Depend: munitions workers in the 
Great War (1994), Thom’s Nice Girls and Rude Girls: women workers in World 
War 1 (2000), and Grayzel Women and the First World War (2002).  These studies 
look at the women, most of whom were working class, whose lives were changed 
during the course of the war as they took up well-paid jobs in munitions.  Beddoe’s 
Back to Home and Duty (1989) looks at the longer-term fate of such women in the 
inter-war years.  The experiences of middle-class women are most commonly 
recorded in novels and memoirs, perhaps most famously by Vera Brittain in her 
wartime diaries and longer memoir, Testament of Youth, which was first published in 
1933 and emerged out of the glut of (male) war memoirs that appeared from 1928 
onwards.  With one or two exceptions, the memoirs published in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s were all from a middle-class perspective, where the more erudite and 
literate writers were able to offer a contribution which Fussell (1975) ascribes to 
making the First World War the most literate in history.  However, whilst there are 
several excellent studies on these issues, and there are novels and memoirs which 
look more closely at the experience of war widowhood (such as Young’s novel from   16 
which the title of this thesis emerged), there has been little academic interest in this 
area of female experiences of the First World War.   
  Of previous research into widows of this conflict, one of the first was by 
Thomas in her PhD thesis ‘State Maintenance’ (Sussex, 1988).  This study is largely 
concerned with the wider issues of State support for servicemen’s families 
throughout the 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  Without access to the data in the 
individual pension case files that will form the basis of the case studies in my 
research, Thomas’s study focuses on the historical development of charitable and 
State assistance.  Lomas, in her PhD thesis ‘War widows in British Society: 1914-
1990’ (Staffordshire, 1997) builds on Thomas’s work but includes more detailed 
reference to the widows themselves.  Her data is largely from the individual letters 
held in the Iris Strange Collection at Staffordshire, letters written by war widows in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s as the British War Widows’ Society finally came to 
fruition.  Whilst these letters provide fascinating information about the widows’ 
lives, they are mainly in the form of retrospective narratives, coloured by the 
expectation of State support, particularly in the wake of the development of the 
Welfare State after the Second World War (something we will come across in the 
second case study in this thesis).  Lomas’s argument about inadequate support for 
war widows is backed up by the reports of the Ministry of Pensions which she cites 
extensively.  However, without access to individual case files, her chronologically 
wide-ranging data tends to offer only the official Ministry of Pensions accounts of 
contemporary attitudes, with the voices of the widows only appearing in retrospect.   
The first use of individual case files from the Ministry of Pensions appears 
just after this documentation was released for public scrutiny in 1999.  James’s PhD 
thesis, ‘“To keep me all my life”: policy, provision and the experience of war 
widowhood, 1914-1925’ (Cambridge, 2000) makes use of 500 individual case files 
as well as similar data to Lomas’s, such as letters and diaries held in the Vera 
Brittain archives.  Whilst James uses examples from the case files which also form 
the main analysis of my research, she has concentrated on the synchronic experience 
of war widowhood in the years immediately after the war.  Like Thomas and Lomas, 
she focuses on the development of State maintenance for war widows, the widows’   17 
voices appearing to support her argument that these women were politically engaged 
at a level not previously suspected.  My own selection of data, as will be discussed 
in detail later, allows for an in-depth exploration of the discourses surrounding 
widowhood for two different groups of war widows.  The use of critical discourse 
analysis, unlike the historical methodologies employed by Thomas, Lomas and 
James, allows for a more detailed discussion of war widowhood, revealing the 
closely intertwining discourses of social welfare, nationalism and morality that is 
merely implicit in previous research. 
  To return to Light, whilst she is looking specifically at English literature of 
this period, the same conservative modernity can be found in legislation and social 
attitudes which sought to return to the pre-war certainties (however falsely 
remembered) whilst forging ahead with modernity.  She goes on to point out that, 
with a shrinking global empire, imperialist ideology became increasingly 
domesticated (1991: 211).  Before 1914, the concept of British nationality was pre-
eminently masculine, but after the war (particularly after 1918 and full suffrage in 
1928), a new State recognition of women came to see them as citizens in their own 
right, as national citizens at that.  Light points out that this recognition can be seen as 
a double-edged sword.  Whilst women were able to form a ‘self-conscious social and 
political constituency’ (ibid) and were able to represent their country in a way never 
before seen (such as in parliament and in military uniform), they were also expected 
to carry more of the imperialistic burden (see also Skeggs, 1997).  Thus the 
responsibility for continuing the heroic memory of dead servicemen husbands fell on 
war widows to be morally responsible for upholding this memory as well as 
providing the serviceman’s children with a stable, respectable upbringing.    
As most of the widows were working class, the amount paid in terms of their 
widows’ pension and dependants’ allowances for their children was minimal.  These 
allowances permitted the State to be seen as beneficent provider for the dependants 
of dead heroes who had given their lives in the service of ‘their’ country.  However, 
as we saw in the introductory quotation from Hansard, such allowances also ensured 
that large numbers of women and children were kept out of the workhouses which 
were vastly more expensive to maintain.  As we shall see, discourses of nationalism   18 
were linked inextricably with those of social welfare, the pension scheme being an 
extension of the pre-war concerns over the future of the empire in terms of its moral 
well-being and imperial might whilst being framed by parsimony.   
  Drawing on Foucault’s earlier work in Discipline and Punish (1977), 
Walkerdine (1985:206) also points out that the State’s relationship with the family 
became increasingly intrusive as the ‘aim to produce citizens who would accept the 
moral order by choice and freewill rather than coercion or through overt acceptance 
and covert resistance’ gathered momentum in the course of the 19
th century.  As 
Billig (1995) comments, this is closely linked to the development of the idea of the 
‘nation-state’ around this time.  In this way, the social legislation of the pre-war 
years which positioned women as guardians of the country’s future came to be more 
visible in the socially prestigious but contingent label of war widowhood.  The 
widows themselves are complicit in this as they fought to be acknowledged by the 
State as war widows.  As we shall see, the actual amount paid to such women as 
‘approved’ war widows is only part of the argument they present in support of their 
appeals.   
Rendered economically vulnerable and politically without a voice, there is 
little formal recognition of a collective working-class female identity at this time.  At 
a local level, there was some organisation.  Beddoe (1989) cites the Welsh women 
hunger marchers of the early 1930s, and the first female Labour MP, Ellen 
Wilkinson was instrumental in organising the Jarrow Crusade at the same time. 
However, these are exceptional cases and there is little evidence of a collective, 
publicly acknowledged identity for war widows who did not organise themselves 
until well after the Second World War
2.  Instead, they would approach male-centred 
organisations such as the British Legion (formed in 1921 to help the veterans of the 
Great War, but also providing legal advice to war widows), the YMCA (which 
provided legal advice), the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross and Order of St 
John (which offered financial and material support to widows who were awaiting the 
result of pension appeals), and various other veterans’ and regimental organisations.   
                                                 
2 The British War Widows Association was not formally established until 1972.   19 
However, this does not mean that war widows lacked a sense of identity.  In 
the contemporary world, constructions of identity derive from a multiplicity of 
sources: from nationality, ethnicity, social class, community, gender, sexuality, or 
marital status.  Woodward points out sources may ‘conflict in the construction of 
identity positions and lead to contradictory fragmented identities’ (1997:1).  Our 
sense of identity is important to us in positioning ourselves in the world and in 
providing a link between us and the society in which we live.  Sampson notes that 
the social construction of identity is essential in that ‘selves, persons, psychological 
traits, and so forth, including the very idea of individual psychological traits, are 
social and historical constructions, not naturally occurring objects’ (1989:2).  
Personhood is not an autonomous construction: it is created in relation to and with 
others.  Culture shapes identity through giving meaning to experience and, as 
Rutherford argues: 
 
identity marks the conjuncture of our past with the social, cultural and 
economic relations we live in now […] identity is the intersection of our 
everyday lives with the economic and political relations of subordination and 
domination.  (1990: 19-20) 
 
In forming a social identity, we are constrained by culture in our social relations and 
in the limited variety of possibilities offered through symbolic representations and 
contemporary discourse, manifest through language. 
The subject positions described above are formed in discourse, the positions 
ascribed within various social and institutional structures.  Throughout our lives, we 
all enter into a wide range of subject positions: daughter, student, employee, partner, 
all of them invented relations of power of some kind or another.  As Talbot 
comments, ‘an individual’s subjectivity is not fixed, invariant and “unitary”; it is 
diversified and potentially contradictory’ (1998:154).  Widows, and particularly war 
widows, are forced into a gender identity by the death of their husbands, a position 
that imposes restrictions on them, not least in their sexuality which can often be at 
odds with the lifestyle that is more typical of their age and social class.  This subject 
position carries with it assumptions about age, passivity, moral guardianship of the   20 
‘sacred’ memory of the deceased and, as we shall see, is perceptively more fixed 
than other subject positions. 
 
Data collection 
Data gathered in the corpus for study in this thesis come from a wide variety of 
sources.  This section will contextualise these sources and associated data to give a 
better understanding of the texts that will be analysed later. 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
The greater part of my corpus comes from the files held in the National Archives, 
Kew.  Of these, the files catagorised under the coding PIN26 form the bulk of my 
data, and were released for public examination in 1999.   These are the individual 
case files held in the National Archives, relating to widows’ pension claims
3 from 
the First World War.  Although I have mainly looked at only the first 200 of these, 
the archive itself holds a total of 22,756 under this code.  This total represents 2% of 
the total pensions dealt with by the London Region of the Ministry of Pension.  
There were three regional administrative divisions for war pensions: ‘London’, 
which also covered the large industrial centres such as the Midlands; ‘Provincial’, 
which covered smaller urban communities; and ‘Rural’, which covered the non-
urbanised communities.  These districts reflect those of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ 
Families Association on which the infrastructure of the war pensions scheme was 
initially based.  Of these three regions, only files from the ‘London’ area remain. 
These files were selected for archiving by War Pensions staff, who retained every 
15
th file from a total of 1,137,800 for that region.  The sample can thus be regarded 
as being quite random.  This is borne out in the files I have examined.  Some of 
these contain just one or two sheets of paper relating to claims; others are several 
inches thick and contain a variety of documents ranging from the soldier’s 
enlistment papers to correspondence with the widow that stretches into the late 
1960s.  
                                                 
3 The National Archive catalogue actually states that these are pensions awarded, but my data show 
that this is far from the case and, in fact, covers a much broader range of case files to include those 
relating to women whose claims for a pension were not accepted as valid.    21 
Although there is now only one file per person, these are often the result of 
several other files being merged, such as a man’s army medical records, his service 
records, disability documentation, letters to and from the widow or her 
representative, and internal Ministry of Pensions memoranda.  What is missing from 
this assortment of papers is much of the documentation relating to the Special Grants 
Committee (SGC) of the Ministry of Pensions, which had the power to suspend, 
reinstate and withdraw pension allowances.  The individual case files for this 
committee have not been retained.  Information relating to the SGC now comes from 
files coded under PIN15.  These contain policy documents, annual reports and 
internal memoranda, as well as some examples of individual letters relating to 
specific cases which seem to have been retained as exemplars.  Because of the 
comparatively small number of individual files retained under PIN26, it has not been 
possible to trace the very few named individuals from the SGC papers held in 
PIN15, not least because the files held in PIN26 are in alphabetical order by the 
serviceman’s name, whereas the cases revealed under PIN15 tend to only give the 
widow’s name.   
Other PIN-coded files show the internal workings of the Ministry of 
Pensions, but do not deal with specific named cases.  PIN26 therefore is the main 
source of information on which my case studies will focus. 
 
Charity records 
In addition to National Archives data which deals exclusively with State funded 
assistance for widows, I will also be looking at some of the extant charity records 
held in various archives in an attempt to analyse continuity of discourses across 
various agencies.  Individual case files have not been found, many charities 
reporting that they had not retained such records since the 1950s.  In other agencies, 
locally-held records had been centralised in the late 1930s, but in the case of several 
charities (such as the ROAB and British Legion) these had been destroyed in 
Luftwaffe raids during the Second World War.  However, charities such as the Red 
Cross and Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Families Association have retained 
annual reports in their head offices in London.  The common membership of these   22 
organisations’ committees can be seen as an extension of the State’s own 
committees, as we will see.  These organisations form a link between the older 
philanthropic charities of the 19
th century and the newfangled welfare state of the 
20
th and are thus a useful source of data in the course of this analysis when tracing 
discourses of morality, nationalism and social welfare. 
The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Families Association (SSFA) was renamed 
Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Families Association (SSAFA) in 1924, but is one 
of the oldest charitable associations which helped war widows.  It was established in 
1894 to care for the dependants of servicemen who had died in colonial service.  The 
largest charitable organisation, it had a nation-wide network of offices which the 
government was able to use in 1914 to pay out separation allowances and later 
widows’ and dependants’ pensions, a system which continued until 1916 when the 
scale of the payments required a different approach and the State took over direct 
management of this, using local post offices in a precursor to the way in which State 
benefits would be paid for much of the rest of the 20
th century.  The founder of 
SSFA, James Gildea, wrote a history of the charity in 1916, and there are also annual 
reports of SSFA/SSAFA up to 1924 when financial help for war widows was moved 
solely to the Joint Committee of the Red Cross and Order of St John. 
The Joint Committee of the Red Cross and Order of St John (hereafter Joint 
Committee) was formed in 1920, when the two charities merged resources under the 
umbrella of various Emergency Help Committees to help ex-servicemen.  In 1921, 
this was extended to war widows.  Again, there are no individual case files, but the 
annual reports for most of the 1920s and 1930s give examples of anonymised case 
studies detailing the sort of help offered in each year.  The reports relating to widows 
and dependants generally focus on amendments to the regulations under which help 
was given, as well as the financial reports of the committee.  By the time of the 
Second World War, paper shortages had reduced the physical size of the pages from 
foolscap to something closer to A5.  Paper quality was poor and ink was consumed 
with care, and the reports feature almost exclusively the financial information, the 
previous inclusion of pages of the ‘good works’ of the committee detailed through 
case studies vanishing.     23 
  In an attempt to find out if other organisations had specifically helped 
working class women, I visited the archives of the Women’s Cooperative Guild, 
held at Hull University Library.  Whilst there are no individual case files, the various 
documents held in this archive provide background information about the working-
class feminist movement in the post-war years, particularly the ‘white poppy’ 
campaign that attracted such negative publicity, and the pressure the organisation 
was able to put on the government in an appeal for maternity benefit. 
 
‘Public sphere’ texts 
The public sphere, as described by Habermas (1987) is the realm of public life in 
which discussion of matters of general interest take place and from which ‘public 
opinion’ emerges.  Here, I will be talking broadly about ‘public discourse’; that is, 
texts which are placed into the public realm with the intention of influencing public 
opinion.  The public sphere is generally set against the private sphere, which is 
where personal duties of family are performed.  
  In this thesis, the ‘public realm’ texts such as personal columns and letters 
pages of national and local newspapers will be studied in addition to more 
mainstream media reports.  In particular, the debates about war widows which were 
conducted in the letters columns of The Times in 1914 will prove interesting in how 
they engage with influencing opinion about widows and their entitlement to State 
funding.   
  Newspaper reports about war widows and associated moral panics in the 
inter-war years will also be drawn upon.  As we will see, the widows themselves 
were often prompted to write to the Ministry of Pensions in response to media 
reports about changes in pension legislation or in reaction to media ‘moral panics’ 
about other State benefit recipients.   
  Additional texts from the public sphere, such as recruitment posters will 
prove useful in exploring the representation of war widows, in particular where they 
have been used intertextually. 
  Finally, the parliamentary debates as recorded in Hansard are invaluable in 
exploring the discursive construction of war widows by the State.  The public   24 
representation of these women, as found in the debates of 1914, presents the case for 
widows to be granted pension in light of their perceived need, reflecting the State’s 
assumption of a patriarchal role.  The actual terms of the Royal Warrant allowed for 
the State’s intervention in the private sphere in a way that sits uncomfortably with 
the liberal ideals espoused in the public forum of parliament. 
  The use of public discourses in the private correspondence, particularly the 
Ministry of Pensions letters to widows, will be studied.  In particular, these will be 
explored in relation to Fairclough’s (1989) discussion of increasing 
conversationalisation in official texts, contributing to what Sarangi and Slembrouck 




The data which form the basis of my analysis are therefore mainly from the National 
Archives.  Early on, it was decided to select just two of the 200 case files studied.  
This is partly because the arguments found and discourses used in these files were 
(surprisingly) of a fairly uniform nature, even if each individual case provided often 
very different sets of circumstances.  The very nature of the data contained within 
the individual case files meant it would have been very difficult to carry out a 
corpus-based linguistic analysis.  In particular, the idiosyncratic orthography of the 
widows’ letters themselves offered an insight into wider issues such as education 
and income which would have been lost had the data been electronically 
standardised for corpus analysis.  Added to this, the sheer volume of data contained 
within the small sample I chose would have proved impossible to transcribe fully 
and present in a standardised form.  The files are not removable from the National 
Archives, and much of the data they contain is not photocopyable (which is also the 
case for much of the data found in the SSAFA and Red Cross archives, largely 
where the paper is too fragile).  Much of the data I shall refer to is based on my own 
handwritten transcriptions from the case files, although where possible scanned 
images of photocopies will be placed in an appendix and referred to accordingly in 
the course of the analysis.     25 
The two case files which will be the main focus of the case studies were 
selected for the quality of the data contained therein, but also because of the typical 
nature of these cases.  One case, that of Louisa Bayliss, presents the opportunity to 
explore synchronically the experiences of one widow whose pension started during 
the war, so did not entail the problems found by many of the post-war applicants, but 
was stopped at various points on moral policing grounds which were typical of many 
other women’s cases.  The other case file, Florence Bayliss, offers the chance to 
explore diachronically a typical case of a woman who was refused a war widow’s 
pension in the post-war years for the common reason that her husband’s cause of 
death in 1930 was perceived by the State not to have been directly related to the war. 
These two case files offer the chance to explore two very different but highly typical 
sets of circumstances war widows found themselves in.  
Because of the relatively small sample of 200 files I have looked at, the 
surnames of the women to which they refer are often similar or, as in the case of 
Louisa and Florence, identical.  For this reason, rather than for any lack of respect 
for these women, I have chosen to refer to them by their first names wherever 
possible.  Similarly, there is no intentional employment of the Li’l Abner Syndrome 
(Preston, 1985) in my presentation of data relating to the widows
4.  The Li’l Abner 
Syndrome, as described by Preston, is such that non-conventional transcriptions are 
used to assert a hierarchy of dominance where the analyst assumes power over the 
analysed.  As we will see, the non-standard orthography found in their letters (which 
can be found as complete copies of the originals in the appendix) has been repeated 
in my typewritten transcriptions of them within this thesis.  In no way is this 
intended to be patronising, but to attempt to show the ‘authentic’ voices of working 
class women of this period as being equally valid as the official, standardised 
orthography found elsewhere. 
 
The case studies 
As described above, this corpus of data gives the opportunity to develop two case 
studies to look in greater detail at the discourses surrounding two sets of widows.  In 
                                                 
4 Thanks to Michael Higgins for pointing this out to me.   26 
the interwar years, there was a general perception that war widows had been 
adequately provided for by the State.  As Holden (1996, 2004, 2005) has shown, 
they were held up as an ideal model on which other pensions could be based, and 
indeed provided the background to the interwar campaign for a spinsters’ pension 
scheme.  As late as 1938, at the height of that campaign, the Bradford MP William 
Leach made a speech in which he cited the example of war widows as having an 
enviable status: 
 
The law has helped the mother and the father of the dead soldier. The law 
had helped his children and his widow. Even his unmarried ladylove has 
been helped but it never occurred to any of us to help his sweetheart, 
although her whole life may have been tragically altered by his death. (cited 
in Holden, 2005: 389) 
 
Thus we can see that the war widow’s position is perceived as being fortunate in its 
State funded allowance, her sacrifice recognised and recompensed by the public.  
However, as we shall see in the case studies that form the basis of this thesis, the 
widows themselves were in a position that was far removed from the comfortable 
subsidising that appears to have been their public representation. 
The first study, featuring Louisa Bayliss, will explore the case of widows 
whose husbands had been killed in action and thus were entitled to State support.  
However, their more pressing personal circumstances were largely ignored as the 
State evoked discourses of morality to deny them this financial support.  For such 
widows, their moral behaviour became the focus of intense scrutiny for a variety of 
agencies, all of which worked to ensure that such women were ‘worthy’ of 
allowances from public funds.  Their behaviour was judged on the basis of largely 
middle-class, Victorian ideals which reflected the ‘angel in the house’ ideology of 
the previous century that was still very much in the minds of the men who drew up 
the pension legislation of 1916.  This ideology and its distance from the reality of 
working-class cultural life is found the legislation of the pre-war years when 
Edwardian Liberalism formed the basis of what would become the British welfare 
state.  The moral judgements which influenced the drafting and implementation of   27 
war widow pension legislation are seen to spread to the working classes themselves 
as they became involved in the monitoring and surveillance of widows.   
To refer back to Care and Protection discourses, the ‘angel in the house’ 
ideology can be clearly traced in the positioning of woman as carers, irrespective of 
financial and social circumstances, but as previously mentioned, this carried 
sanctions to ‘protect’ the nation’s future.  Many widows had young children who 
were (largely) eligible for a dependant’s allowance which would usually be paid 
until they were 16 years of age.  Whilst children were not subject to the same level 
of surveillance as widows
5, as we shall see in the more detailed individual case study 
of Louisa, the guardian (usually the mother) was open to surveillance which reflects 
the development of the early 20
th century concerns over the fitness of mothers to care 
for their children.  It was up to the SGC to decide whether a mother was a suitable 
guardian, and they could remove her children from her care and place them in 
orphanages without her consent.  A less draconian but nevertheless humiliating 
measure would be the decision to place the children’s pension allowance into 
‘administration’, whereby the money would not be paid directly to the widow but 
dealt with on behalf of the children by a local pensions agency.   
As we shall see in the second case study (Florence Bayliss), for many other 
widows, the status of war widowhood is something that was denied them through no 
fault of their own, yet was something which they continued to strive for in the 
decades after their husbands’ deaths, even when other allowances were available to 
them.  The Royal Warrant of 1916, under which pensions were issued to war 
widows, was drawn up after much debate and with typical parsimony, and had 
decreed that pension would only be payable where a man had died as a direct result 
of his war service.  This required the widow to provide extensive documentation to 
certify the details of her husband’s illness and death.  Fairclough’s notion of ‘orders 
of discourse’ (1989, 2003) is particularly useful here, as many widows found that the 
only evidence accepted by the Ministry of Pensions would be largely that which was 
officially sanctioned by the State, particularly armed forces medical documentation.  
                                                 
5 Although later the female children would be open to moral surveillance, this was never applied to 
their brothers.   28 
As these men died in the decades following the war, the case files of their widows 
provide a valuable opportunity to show the changing relationship between State and 
citizens over the course of the 20
th century through shifting orders of discourse  
(Fairclough, 1992).   
To return to the identity of the widows in my data, what appears as a 
common claim is the reiteration on their part that they are a ‘war widow’, not simply 
a ‘widow’.  The prefixing of the abstract noun war rendered as an adjective onto the 
marital category of ‘widow’ is one which links to the woman’s status to something 
many regarded as being hierarchically superior to the traditional widow.  The 
granting of a pension to this group of women sets them apart from others, and the 
‘right’ to a war widow’s pension is one that is hard-fought by many women.  This is 
more than a fight for financial support: as we shall see in relation to the detailed 
analysis in the second case study, after 1928, many of these women would have been 
eligible for a comparable State pension under the contributory widows’ pension 
scheme.  The prestige attached to the prefix war is one which seems to have offered 
women a perceived social status that was highly desirable.  The empty tragedy of 
widowhood seems to have been rendered less so by the relationship to a man who 
had died ‘for king and country’, whose name might even be etched in stone in the 
very public space of the local war memorial.  However, unlike other widows, the 
war widows became public property in receipt of financial assistance from the State 
and were open to public scrutiny in regards to their behaviour and that of their 
children in a way that no other widow would be.  The very nature of war 
widowhood, therefore, renders it more visible than other forms of widowhood and 
thus is a fascinating area of study, drawing on Habermas’s work on public and 
private spheres in relation to lifeworld discourses (1987). 
The widow’s pension scheme is firmly rooted in the conservative, patriarchal 
ideologies of the early 20
th century, complete with its moral and patriotic discourses.  
Yet in its very inception, the idea of the State caring for the families of deceased 
servicemen reflects the modernity that underpins the social welfare reforms of the 
time.  Therefore Light’s term ‘conservative modernism’ is very apt to describe 
British society that encompasses the period of my data.   29 
Theoretical approach 
In order to explore the representation and experience of the women in this study, 
detailed case studies will be conducted using critical discourse analysis.  Critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) is informed by the works of Foucault and Halliday and is 
an interdisciplinary branch of linguistics that can be used to explore the ideological 
workings of language in representing the world.  It begins from the determinist 
premise that language is not a neutral or transparent medium that unproblematically 
reflects an objective reality (eg Fairclough, 1989, 1995, 2003; Wodak, 2002).  As 
Benwell and Stokoe put it, CDA takes language as a form of ideological practice 
that ‘mediates, influences and even constructs our experiences, identities and ways 
of viewing the world’ (2006: 44).  The development of this over-arching 
methodology will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis before it is 
employed more systematically in the analysis of the data that comprises this corpus. 
The documents which form the corpus of this study are primarily in a written 
form, whether that be handwritten manuscripts such as the widows’ letters to the 
Ministry of Pensions, the official type-written Ministry of Pensions reports, or more 
‘public’ documents such as newspaper reports and war-time recruitment posters.  
CDA provides a theoretical approach to analysing these texts.  As Van Dijk has 
observed, 
 
Beyond description or superficial application, critical science […] asks 
further questions, such as those of responsibility, interests, and ideology. 
Instead of focusing on purely academic or theoretical problems, it starts from 
prevailing social problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of those who 
suffer most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are 
responsible, and those who have the means and the opportunity to solve such 
problems.  (1986: 4) 
 
As such, this approach is particularly useful in the investigation of the discourses of 
morality, nationalism and social welfare which help form the experience and 
representation of the war widows who are the basis of this thesis.  Regarding 
‘language as social practice’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997), Wodak (2000) goes on 
to extend this approach to take into consideration the context of language use   30 
through a model which allows for the analysis of a wider range of texts.  The model 
she has developed, discourse-historical analysis, has been used to analyse texts that 
deal with racism and xenophobia, reflecting the fact that this model emerged out of 
the involvement of linguists such as Riesigl and Wodak (2001) at the University of 
Vienna in research into latent anti-Semitism in the wake of the so-called ‘Waldheim 
Affair’ in Austria in 1986.  Their triangulatory approach is well suited to the nature 
of the data in this study, although as we shall see, the diachronic and synchronic 
analyses require a further extension of this model owing to the diversity of data 
within this corpus.   
As discussed above, the war widows’ pension scheme emerged out of a 
complex mixture of charitable and newly-developed State systems of social welfare.  
The resultant emerging bureaucratic system also has an unprecedented number of 
applications to deal with, as well as various amendments to the legislation which 
meant that women who were not entitled to a pension under one Act could be found 
eligible under a later amendment or completely different Act.  Sarangi and 
Slembrouk’s (1996) work on bureaucratic language therefore provides a framework 
for a very interesting analysis of how the State’s relationship changed over time in 
respect of war widows, as with citizens in general.    
 
Conclusion 
Beginning with a detailed account of the theory and methodology that will be 
employed in the analysis of this corpus, this thesis will then move on to provide 
details of the historical context to the data that will be analysed in the two case 
studies that follow.   
The very private experience of widowhood came to be propelled into the 
public sphere as war widows were granted State-funded pensions in the course of the 
First World War.  In highlighting the cases of two widows, this thesis will explore 
the wider representation and experience of war widowhood in terms of the 
intertwining discourses of morality, nationalism and newly-emergent social welfare 
over a period of 60 years in a way that will provide lessons for our understanding of 
women in a given context.  The methodology employed will show how useful   31 
critical discourse analysis can be in looking at how discourses are played out across 
bureaucratic and personal correspondence traversing historical contexts in the 20
th 
century.  




Theory and methodology 
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In this thesis, I will be using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the main 
analytical model.  This has developed as an area of linguistic analysis under such 
theorists as Kress (1989), Fairclough (1989) and Fowler et al (1979) to explore areas 
of social activity and the complex relationships between language and social 
practice.  The more dialectic view this approach to research affords allows for the 
investigation of language as reflecting and also shaping and maintaining social 
realities.  In their introduction to the first edition of Critical Discourse Studies (vol 
1, no. 1, 2004), Fairclough, Graham, Lemke and Wodak draw attention to the uses 
and purposes of critical social research in addressing social problems, particularly 
‘those aspects of the structure, organization and functioning of human societies that 
cause suffering, injustice, danger, inequality, insecurity, and self-doubt’ (ibid: 1).  
Their position is evangelical in character, arguing that ‘the critical objective is not 
only to identify and analyze the roots of social problems, but also to discern feasible 
ways of alleviating or resolving them’ (ibid).  Whilst most current work in the field 
of critical social research concentrates on the most important social problems of the 
day, the theories and approaches developed by these theorists are nevertheless 
relevant to my own research.  Whilst my study will concentrate on the past, 
exploring discourses employed by people long since dead, the spirit of critical 
analysis, particularly critical discourse analysis, emphasises the continuities and 
sequelae in discourses and societies which link the past, the present and the future. 
As developed by Fairclough, CDA is heavily influenced by Marxism and, in 
particular, the impact of Foucault’s work on power and discourse is significant.  As 
Hall observes, in the Marxist conception of power, it is ‘always radiating in a single 
direction – from top to bottom – and coming from a specific source – the sovereign, 
the state, the ruling class and so on’ (1997: 50).  CDA’s explicitly political agenda 
seeks to raise awareness of the ideological frameworks that inform language choice, 
and the construction, representation and positioning of its subjects in discourse.  This 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
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Discourse, ideology, power 
The definition of discourse is open to several different views.  Although highly 
influential in the development of CDA, Foucault infamously failed to provide his 
own clear definition.  In the early development of CDA, Fairclough and Wodak 
argued that  ‘discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it 
constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and 
relationships between people and groups of people.  It is constitutive both in the 
sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that 
it contributes to transforming it’ (1997: 258).  This argument shows that there are 
important issues of power involved as a social consequence, and this in turn may 
have major ideological effects in that discourses ‘can help produce and reproduce 
unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and 
ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent 
things and position people’ (ibid).  This definition broadly encompasses the analysis 
of textual form, structure and organisation from the level of phonology to generic 
structure.  Within linguistics, different approaches have tended to focus on specific 
levels.  For example, in French discourse analysis, the focus is on lexical semantics, 
whilst in critical linguistics the focus is on grammar and lexis.  However, as Riesigl 
and Wodak point out,  
 
[w]hether analysts with a critical approach prefer to focus on microlinguistic 
features, macrolinguistic features, textual, discursive or contextual features, 
whether their angle is primarily philosophical, sociological or historical – in 
most studies there is reference to Hallidayan systemic functional grammar. 
(2001: 8) 
 
Texts  function  within  ‘discourses’.  In  so  defining  discourses  within  the 
Foucaultian  tradition,  they  are  historically  constituted  bodies  of  knowledge  and 
practices that shape people, giving positions of power to some but not to others.  
Wodak expands on this, claiming that ‘power does not derive from language, but 
language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power 
in the short and long term’ (2002: 11).   
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Ideology 
The term ‘ideology’ has been used in many different ways by social theorists, 
largely owing to the way in which ideology has been applied to answer very 
different questions.  As Williams has observed, the concept of ‘ideology’ is an 
‘important concept in almost all Marxist thinking about culture’ (1994: 175), 
although its origins precede Marxism itself.   
According to Frow, in Power/Knowledge Foucault argued against ‘the 
normativeness of any conception of ideology’ (1994: 295), choosing to focus on a 
description of the determinations according to which discourses have historically 
been distributed between the true and false’ (1994: 296).  Whilst rejecting the notion 
of ideology in his earlier works, for Foucault, power does not function in the form of 
a chain of effects, rather it is ‘deployed and exercised through a net-like 
organisation’ (Foucault, 1981: 98).  Whilst Foucault sought to demonstrate that 
those in a position of hierarchical power, such as the lawmakers and the sovereign, 
may have positions of dominance, he transferred our attention ‘away from the grand, 
overall strategies of power, towards the many, localised circuits, tactics, mechanisms 
and effects through which power circulates’ (Hall, 1997: 50), the ‘micro-physics’ 
referred to above. 
  Foucault’s model, however, is attempting to ‘sideline ideology’, as 
Macdonald asserts, and ‘reduces the possibility of distinguishing between different 
types of power.  The charge of relativism, or treating as equal operations of power 
that are very different in their consequences, seems difficult to refute’ (2003: 36).  I 
would agree with Macdonald that, whilst Foucault’s work on discourse is useful for 
the insight it provides to the operation of power through symbolic forms, the term 
‘ideology’ still has currency when evaluating relations of power.  It is still necessary 
to remain attentive to those regimes of influence that centralise power and employ it 
in relations of dominance. 
This requires a broad and inclusive definition of ideology.  Broadening the 
concept of ideology from its Marxist inception, as Eagleton comments, moves us 
away from conceptualising ideology simply as ruling belief systems that seek to 
preserve the status quo but to refer to ‘any kind of intersection between belief   36 
systems and political power […] whether this intersection challenged or confirmed a 
particular social order’ (1991: 6).   
  For the purposes of my research, I shall be taking it to mean a ‘set of beliefs 
or values that can be explained through the (non-cognitive) interest or position of 
some social group’ (Elster, 1982: 123).  As Mepham explains, in this way ideology 
is structured discourse, and is ‘directly or indirectly, based on or generated by a set 
of mutually interdependent categories’ (1994: 215).  As adopted by Eagleton and 
Macdonald, this reformulation of ideology does not deny how ideology operates 
through ‘such devices as unification, spurious identification, deception, self-
deception, universalisation and rationalisation’ (Eagleton, 1991: 222).  It would 
appear that Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is useful to theorise how ideology works 
in this way.   
  Gramsci claimed that dominant groups rule by consent and that ‘in order to 
win consent, the dominant group cannot count on the power and material force 
which such a position gives in order to exercise political leadership’ (1998: 210) but 
must rely on a ‘multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities which 
form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the working classes’ 
(ibid: 215).  The dominant ideologies are not imposed on our consciousness, but 
rather they dovetail into ways of thinking that seem to make sense, or even be 
viewed as being common sense.  Such a model, whilst it ‘captures the effectiveness 
of forms of appeal that speak to our senses of expediency while masking their 
tendentiousness’ (ibid) also recognises that ideology is only ever encountered in 
what Bennett (1998) refers to as a ‘compromised form’: one which is not static but 
forever shifting through the constant negotiation and contestation of differing and 
shifting social and political circumstances.  This model therefore acknowledges the 
agency of social subjects to make (limited?) choices depending on their cultural 
positioning instead of being reduced to being merely the effects and vehicles of 
power. 
  In relation to my research, patriarchal ideology is most evident in the 
positioning of war widows as dependent on male guidance and control, in this case 
through the role of the State acting in the place of the absent husband.  Such female   37 
dependence on male provision is clearly seen in the case studies that follow, where 
the most authoritative ‘voices’ are those of male protagonists, and those of the State 
and the law are the most authoritative of all.  Largely unchallenged, this reflects a 
hegemonic acceptance of patriarchal ideology by citizens who regard this as being 
common sense.   
Texts and social structures 
Texts can be very useful in assisting in developing an understanding of how 
discourses, ideology and power operate in society.  As Fairclough has commented, 
they can be seen as ‘sensitive barometers of social processes, movement and 
diversity, and textual analysis can provide particularly good indicators of social 
change’ (in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 204).  They provide evidence of these 
ongoing processes, and thus offer a rich source of data for research.  A much-
criticised aspect of Foucault’s hugely influential work on discourse is that he failed 
to provide specific and detailed evidence of texts to support his historical studies of 
discourse.  In spite of this, the specifically linguistic analysis of texts provides 
support to Foucault’s underlying genealogical methodology for analysis.  Habermas 
claims that ‘language is also a medium of domination and social force.  It serves to 
legitimise relations of organised power.  In so far as the legitimations of power 
relations, […] are not articulated, […] language is also ideological’ (1977: 259).  
This is a claim that would probably be endorsed by most critical discourse analysts. 
Commenting on the usefulness of textual analysis in this area, Fairclough states that 
 
[it] is increasingly through texts […] that social control and social 
domination are exercised (and indeed negotiated and resisted).  
Textual analysis, as a part of critical discourse analysis, can therefore 
be an important political resource. 
(in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 205)   
 
As Wodak (2002) explains, a fully ‘critical’ account of discourse requires a 
theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which leads 
to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which 
individuals or groups as social historical subjects create meanings in their interaction   38 
with texts.  Consequently, three concepts feature in CDA: the concept of power, the 
concept of history, and the concept of ideology.  If we accept that discourse is 
structured by dominance, then the history of a given discourse is tied up with the 
history and development of those system of dominance.  In other words, it is situated 
in time and space, and the dominant structures are legitimated by ideologies of 
powerful groups.  CDA makes it possible to analyse pressures from above and 
possibilities of resistance to unequal power relationships that are made to appear as 
societal conventions.  According to this view, dominant structures stabilize 
conventions and naturalise them.  Explicitly, the effects of power and ideology in the 
production of meaning are obscured and acquire stable and natural forms: they are 
taken as ‘given’.  Resistance is then seen as the breaking of conventions, of stable 
discursive practices in what Fairclough (1993) refers to as acts of ‘creativity’. 
To the extent that much of social science shares a concern with the 
relationship between text, practice and relations of dominance, CDA provides a 
generally useful resource.  Because of the dominance of text in this study, CDA is 
especially useful in looking at bureaucracy and social control, as employed in 
research by Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996). 
 
The development of CDA 
Critical Discourse Analysis grew out of the work of British and Australian pioneers 
of Critical Linguistics, particularly Fowler and Kress, in convergence with the 
approaches of British discourse analyst Norman Fairclough and the Dutch text 
linguist Teun Van Dijk.  CDA has produced the majority of the research into media 
discourse during the 1980s and 1990s, and ‘has arguably become the standard 
framework for studying media texts within European linguistics and discourse 
studies’ (Bell and Garrett, 1998: 6).   
In the tradition of critical theory, CDA aims to make transparent the 
discursive aspects of societal disparities and inequalities.  CDA in the majority of 
cases takes the part of the underprivileged and tries to show up the linguistic means 
used by the privileged to stabilise or even to intensify inequalities in society.  Most 
frequently, CDA has an explicit socio-political agenda, a concern to discover and   39 
testify to unequal relations of power which underlie ways of using language in a 
society, and in particular to reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or 
challenging socio-political dominance.  It also offers the potential for applying 
theoretically sophisticated frameworks to important issues, so is regarded as being a 
particularly useful tool for researchers who wish to make their investigation socially 
active.  Work in Australia in the 1990s, initially in the field of educational 
linguistics, has led to what Martin terms ‘Positive Discourse Analysis’ (Martin and 
Wodak, 2003: 4) ‘to characterise ideologically orientated research and intervention 
that examines positive developments with which to make the world a “better” place, 
and draws on these to intervene in related sites – as a mode of inquiry 
complementing CDA’s focus on language in the service of abusive power’ (ibid).  
This continuity of explicit political intent underpins the approach’s on-going concern 
with a theory/practice dialectic.  One of the strengths of CDA is that it bases 
concerns with power and ideology in the detailed linguistic analysis of texts. 
Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996) employed CDA to research bureaucratic 
networks of social control, in particular where the private sphere is brought into the 
public through bureaucratic demands.  Hacking (in Hoy, 1986) pointed to the 
‘avalanche of printed numbers’ which emerged through the increasing bureaucracy 
of 19
th century Europe and which Foucault comments on indirectly in his early work.  
As he noted, European societies have developed a bureaucracy which seeks to 
control citizens in ever-increasing ways.  This has led to an intrusiveness into private 
life and a demand that citizens ‘play the game’, following bureaucratic rules which 
are often left implicit.  In relation to ideology and lifeworld discourses, this also 
relates to research by Mumby (1987, 1988) and Helmer (1993), looking at discursive 
practices of storytelling in bureaucratic organisations.  Helmer makes the argument 
that storytelling can operate ideologically by ‘creating and sustaining symbolic 
oppositions that enable members to position themselves and others in the 
organisation’, and as such narrative ‘serves to strategy the organisation along lines 
of power, authority, gender and ethics’ (1993: 34).  In particular, Helmer makes the 
point that women are forced to ‘play the patriarchal game’ in order to gain some 
form of economic and political advantage when they are disadvantaged both   40 
politically and economically.  In relation to my own data, I will show how widows 
adopted behavioural and discursive practices that are deferential to the middle-class 
moral values built into such official regimes as the Royal Warrant in order to gain 
economic capital.  (This argument will be dealt with in more detail in the individual 
case studies later in this thesis.) 
The model that Fairclough developed for CDA is useful for researchers who 
share  his  concerns  with  language,  discourse  and  power  in  society.   Fairclough’s 
model has three components (see Figure 1 for the diagrammatical representation): 
 
1.  The first dimension is text or discourse, which includes micro texts 
(eg vocabulary, syntax) and macro levels of text structure, as well as 
interpersonal elements in a text.   
2.  The second is analysis of discourse practices.  This looks at how a 
text is constructed and interpreted, and also how it is distributed. 
Analysis of discourse also considers the discourse practices of 
different social domains (such as political discourse).  Fairclough 
calls these ‘orders of discourse’.  
3.  The third dimension is analysis of social practices, focusing in 
particular on the relation of discourse to power and ideology.  
 
  One criticism of CDA has been that the definition of a text is so narrowly 
defined in that it would not reveal the wider social and discursive practices to be 
found in other objects for study.  However, as Fairclough acknowledges, the wide-
ranging cultural studies definition of text ‘can obscure important distinctions 
between different types of cultural artefact, and make the concept of a text rather 
nebulous by extending it too far’ (1995:4).  For example, I would argue that it is not 
appropriate to attach the same level of importance to Vera Brittain’s war-time diary 
as to the style of a woman’s hat
6.  Both are essentially cultural artefacts, yet their 
                                                 
6 Brittain’s diary offers a detailed account of her experiences as a VAD in the First World War, 
including reflections on shifting attitudes towards ‘patriotism’ and morality.  A study of war-time 
fashions would reflect the changing roles of women, as well as reflecting historical changes such as 
the Russian Revolution, after which Cossack-inspired headwear fell out of favour.     41 
significance may be of very different importance to the analyst.  Nevertheless, as 
Fairclough goes on to say and to explore in more detail in his subsequent work, the 
broader definition of text is useful in contemporary society as ‘texts whose primary 
semiotic form is language increasingly [have] combined language with other 
semiotic forms’ (1995: 6).  Yet even this has a number of dimensions of meaning. 
Written texts can be multisemiotic, for example, in the typographical design and 
inclusion of graphics.  The co-presence of other semiotic forms within a primarily 
linguistic artefact interact to produce multisemiotic texts.  We will see later that my 
own data includes war-time recruitment materials (such as the 1915 ‘Women of 
Britain say “Go!”’ poster, page 53) which combine words and visual images to 













Figure 1: Fairclough’s model of CDA (1995) 
 
  What emerges is a multifunctional idea that texts can be viewed as social 
spaces in which two fundamental social processes occur at the same time.  This 
involves the analysis of ‘the cognition and representation of the world, and social 
interaction’ (Fairclough, 1995:6).  As Fairclough points out,  
 
Text 
Processes of production 
Social conditions of production 
Processes of interpretation 
Discourse practices 
Social conditions of interpretation 
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[t]exts in their ideational functioning constitute systems of knowledge 
and belief (including what Foucault refers to as ‘objects’), and in their 
interpersonal functioning they constitute social subjects […] and 
social relations between (categories of) subjects. 
(1995: 6) 
 
So this view of texts helps to bring about a practical demonstration of Foucault’s 
(1981) claim about the socially constitutive properties of discourse and text. 
My own data includes texts which can be categorised under several different 
genres.  As Fairclough had argued, a ‘genre’ may be characterised as the 
conventionalised, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a 
particular activity, as a ‘socially ratified way of using language in connection with a 
particular type of social activity’ (Fairclough, 1994: 14).  However, Threadgold 
points out that genres can be more flexible, unpredictable and heterogenous 
(Threadgold, 1989).  As we will see in the case studies, the writers’ own perceptions 
of which genre their letter belongs is frequently contested.  For example, Florence’s 
response to an official Ministry of Pensions letter is to return it with her own 
comments written in any available white space.  Her appropriation of this text shifts 
the genre from that of official, impersonal letter of rejection to an impassioned and 
highly personal refusal to accept the ‘official’ version of her narrative.  The 
effectiveness of widows’ letters of appeal is highly limited as they do not tend to fall 
into the category of ‘approved’ missives: they do not comply with the ‘order of 
discourse’ constructed by the State.   
  Foucault’s concept of ‘orders of discourse’ (1985) differs in its use by 
different CDA practitioners.  It is taken by Fairclough to ‘refer to the ordered set of 
discursive practices associated with a particular social domain or institution […] and 
boundaries and relationships between them’ (1995: 12).  In general terms, orders of 
discourse are the ways in which power relationships are enacted, where one 
participant is positioned in a more powerful position than the other.  The more 
powerful participant evokes this hierarchy of power through language choices, for 
example through choosing to accept or reject a contribution or through evoking 
certain discourses.  The boundaries of these discourses are not clearly defined in 
many cases, and are constantly shifting, reflecting orders of discourse as mediation   43 
between the linguistic and the social.  For example, in my own data, the State’s 
evocation of discourses of patriotism as part of their recruitment drive in the war 
years is continued by the widows in the interwar years, but for the State, this is no 
longer seen as being relevant in the former way.  Fairclough (1995) regards these 
changes in the order of social discourse as being in themselves part of wider 
processes of sociocultural change.  Official, expert knowledge serves as a means of 
building up structures of ‘truth’ or ‘normalisation’, regulating what can be said and 
what can’t be.  Populations can be carefully controlled through the associated 
disciplinary structures, where certain discursive practices are legitimised and others 
(usually those of the least powerful) are delegitimised.  As Threadgold puts it, such 
‘expert knowledges thus discursively produce the objects of which they speak and 
simultaneously exclude those categories which cannot be accounted for within the 
established “truth”’ (1997: 137).  As we will see in the case studies, the differently 
positioned writers and readers across a range of texts that have been produced 
drawing on differing knowledges and discursive practices will allow for an 
exploration of aspects of identity and culture in relation to British war widows. 
Drawing on Foucault’s earlier work on discourse, Fairclough argues for the 
place of CDA, suggesting that it 
 
ought in contemporary circumstances to focus its attention upon 
discourse within the history of the present – changing discursive 
practices as part of wider processes of social and cultural change – 
because constant and often dramatic change affecting many domains 
of social life is a fundamental characteristic of contemporary social 
experience, because these changes are often constituted to a 
significant degree by and through changes in discursive practices, and 
because no proper understanding of contemporary discursive 
practices is possible that does not attend to that matrix of change. 
(1995: 19) 
 
Orders of discourse are thus viewed as domains of hegemony and hegemonic 
struggle.  This may be within institutions such as education as well as within the 
wider social formation.  In this process, the ideological investments of particular 
discursive practices may change.  This is found in my own data, most of which was 
produced in the early 20
th century at a time when the role of charitable organisations   44 
and the vestiges of Victorian philanthropy were being replaced by greater State 
intervention in the wake of Edwardian Liberal ideals.  Specifically, within the 
context of this study, I hope to show that the evolution of the Welfare State in the 
mid-20
th century brought about a change in the discourses surrounding war widows, 
both in the State’s attitude towards them (although still anchored by the original 
1916 Royal Warrant) and of the women’s changing perceptions of the State’s 
obligation towards them as they recognized the ‘cradle to grave’ philosophy of the 
Welfare State. 
Fairclough’s work on conversationalistion and personalisation (1989) in 
various forms of bureaucracy in public sphere texts in the late 20
th century is relevant 
to this thesis in view of the timeframe of the data, particularly the second case study 
which extends to the late 1960s.  Fairclough refers to these bureaucratic strategies 
employed in this increased State intervention (particularly in questionnaires, official 
forms, and examinations) as discourse technologisation, which he further defines as 
‘types of discourses which involve the more or less self-conscious application of 
social scientific knowledge for purposes of bureaucratic control’ (1989/2001: 175).  
Whilst the ‘avalanche of paper’ which emanated from and descended upon the 
newly-formed Ministry of Pensions provides a very interesting source of material for 
analysis, particularly when Sarangi and Slembrouk’s research in late 20
th century 
bureaucracy is taken into account, it is unfortunately too vast an area to be the focus 
of detailed attention in this thesis.  However, increasing trends in 
conversationalisation and personalisation in bureaucratic texts will prove worthy of 
note in the diachronic analysis of discourses surrounding war widows.  Decreasing 
levels of formality and deference in bureaucratic texts reflect social changes in the 
ways in which the State’s relationship with its citizens changed, especially from the 
mid-1960s.  These strategies contribute to what Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996) 
refer to as ‘de-bureaucratisation’, which they define briefly as being ‘the means that 
bureaucratic strongholds strive to appear non-bureaucratic by resorting to certain 
modes’ of communication (1996: 19).  Despite these changes, as we shall see, these 
texts continue to be sites of contention.   45 
As Wodak (2002: 11) comments, an important perspective in CDA is that it 
is very rare for a text to be the work of any one person.  In texts discursive 
differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power which are 
themselves in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre.  Texts are 
often sites of struggle, showing traces of differing discourses and ideologies 
contending with the dominant power.  It is not only the notion of struggles for power 
and control, but also the intertextuality and recontextualisation of competing 
discourses that can be revealed by CDA.   
The three dimensional framework for CDA as outlined by Fairclough 
includes the analysis of discursive practices.  This relates to the processes of a text’s 
production, distribution and consumption, and ensures that a text is not isolated from 
the institutional and discoursal practices within which it is embedded.  Within the 
scope of this piece of research, this would mean that the Royal Warrant of 1916 
would be reviewed not only within the context of its production via the processes of 
the Houses of Parliament and Civil Service, but also the circumstances and practices 
of its reception in the hands of the civil servants who administered its procedures 
and the women who were directly affected by these procedures.  Thus the text can be 
reviewed with reference to the diverse ways in which it could be interpreted and 
responded to.  This approach to text analysis owes much to Morley’s work on 
audience reception in media studies (1980), extending this from examining the 
moment of reception to consideration of how texts are taken up and transformed in 
various spheres of life (such as the family, work, leisure activities, etc).   
In this model of CDA, the Gramscian theory of hegemony (in analysis of 
sociocultural practice) is combined with the Bakhtinian theory of genre (in analysis 
of discourse practice – defining genre as discourses, narratives, registers, etc).  
Bakhtin’s work on text and genre (in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999) argues for the 
inclusion of intertextual analysis as a necessary complement to linguistic analysis in 
the studying of texts, as such an approach draws attention to the dependence of text 
on society and history in the form of the resources made available within the order 
of discourse.  According to Bakhtin, genres ‘are the drive belts from the history of   46 
society to the history of language’ (ibid, 1991: 123).  This dynamic conception of 
intertextual analysis highlights how texts can transform social and historical 
resources, and how genres can be mixed within a text. 
 
Intertextuality 
The term ‘intertextuality’ was devised by Kristeva in relation to Bakhtin’s 
discussion of the transposition of sign systems of carnival, courtly poetry and 
scholastic discourse into the novel (Threadgold 1997: 66).  Her use of this term 
closely follows that of Foucault, although Foucault himself did not use this label, 
instead describing how statements can only exist in connection with other statements 
(1972: 98).  At its most fundamental level, as Bakhtin observes, intertextuality is 
inherent in language as part of its comprehensibility.  The speaker 
 
is not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of 
the universe.  And he [sic] presupposes not only the existence of the 
language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – 
his own and others’ – with which his given utterance enters into one kind of 
relation or another (builds on them, polemicizes with them, or simply 
presumes that they are already known to the listener).  (1986: 124) 
 
Bakhtin’s writings on text and genre (1986) argue for intertextual analysis as 
a necessary component of linguistic analysis, an argument that has been taken up by 
Kress and Threadgold (1988), Thibault (1991), Talbot (1995) and Fairclough (1992, 
1995, 2003).  The use of the concept of intertextuality in linguistics has been 
particularly important in relation to the development of CDA. In this model, as 
Threadgold states, ‘[t]exts are now understood to be constructed chunk by chunk, 
intertextually, not word by word, and there can thus be no link between text and 
context except through the intertextual resources of this discursively produced 
subjectivity’ (1997: 3). 
Fairclough expands on this, arguing that intertextuality is used to draw 
attention to the dependence of texts upon societal and historical discursive 
formations in the form of the resources made available within the order of discourse 
(Fairclough, 1995: 188).  The concept of cultural capital, as explored by Bourdieu   47 
(1991), is relevant here as access to the range of texts from which interpretation may 
be drawn is not equally distributed.  Culler (1981) and Barthes (1970/1975) expand 
intertextuality to include the reader as a constituent component.  Culler described 
intertextuality as the general discursive space in which meaning is made possible 
and intelligible (1981: 103).  Thus, for Fairclough, 
 
Discourses and texts which occur within them have histories, they belong to 
historical series, and the interpretation of intertextual context is a matter of 
deciding which series a text belongs to, and therefore what can be taken as 
common ground for participants, or presupposed.  […] Discourse 
participants may arrive at roughly the same interpretation or different ones, 
and the interpretation of the more powerful participant may be imposed upon 
others.  (1989: 152) 
 
So the intertextual resources each person has available to them can be limited, 
leading to a restricted understanding.  This link between intertextuality and power 
makes it an important part of Fairclough’s three-part model for CDA.  As he argues, 
‘intertextual analysis crucially mediates the connection between language and social 
context, and facilitates more satisfactory bridging of the gap between texts and 
contexts’ in his three-part model, whereby intertextual analysis occupies a mediating 
position (1995: 198).   
  Holquist relates Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic nature of intertextuality to 
power, arguing that ‘a word, discourse, language or culture undergoes 
“dialogization” when it becomes relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing 
definitions for the same things.  Undialogized language is authoritative or absolute’ 
(1981: 427).  As Holquist suggests, there is a difference in the degree to which texts 
may be ‘dialogic’.  Fairclough (2003: 47) offers a general summary of the effects of 
the dialogicality: 
 
Most dialogical:  Attributes, quotes 
      Modalized assertion 
      Non-modalized assertion 
Least dialogical:  Assumption 
           48 
With reference to the case studies to come, if we understand this model as 
‘less dialogicality’ carrying with it consensus, with a ‘normalisation and acceptance 
of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences in meaning and 
norms’ (Fairclough, 2003: 42), then it is perhaps unsurprising that the vast majority 
of correspondence from the Ministry of Pensions to widows contains very few 
quotations or statements attributed to named agencies.  The Ministry of Pensions 
letters do contain intertextual elements which form a direct link back to the text of 
the Royal Warrant.  The widows themselves make use of forms of intertextuality in 
drawing upon those discourses of national identity and patriotism to be found in 
wartime recruitment posters to support their appeals for war widows’ pensions.  As 
we will see, widows also employed intertextual strategies such as direct and indirect 
quotations to intensify their claims for pensions, although the attributed quotations 
tended to come from sources which the Ministry of Pensions failed to accept as 
recognised authorities. 
On other occasions, my data also shows evidence of individuals using state-
gathered information for their own means.  For example, many women applied for 
pensions after their husbands’ deaths in the 1920s and 1930s.  They often reported 
that their husbands had returned from the war as ‘broken’ men, their health 
destroyed by the conditions under which they had to fight.  To support their cases 
further, these women often cited evidence from enlistment forms, stating their 
husbands had been classed ‘A1’ fit for active service.  This form of resistance to 
Ministry of Pensions bureaucratic refusals is not unusual in the cases files I have 
studied and shows how even the least powerful in society can demonstrate resistance 
to those in authority.  As Foucault noted,  
 
power and resistance to power are not conceivable as opposites, statically 
ranged against each other, but as fluid force relations that group together, 
temporarily and uneasily, in oppositional formulations […] Where there is 
power, there is resistance, and yet or rather consequently, this resistance is 
never in a position of exteriority to power. (1981: 34) 
 
Yet this appearance of resistance is something Abu-Lughod has argued that 
we ought not to romanticise, arguing rather that ‘we should learn to read in various   49 
local and everyday resistance the existence of a range of specific strategies and 
structures of power’ (1990: 53).  In identifying and exploring the manifestations of 
‘resistance’, we can see in greater detail the complex workings of power relations.  
For example, if we take the example of widows using information amassed by the 
State on army enlistment, it is possible to see that the State was exercising power not 
only through the terms of the Royal Warrant, but from a network which stretches 
back to official documentation relating to a man’s initial application to ‘join up’: had 
he not been classed A1 fit, then he would not have been involved in active service. 
  The use of dialogical elements in a text allows for other ‘voices’ to be heard, 
and is at its most dialogicalised in this development of intertextualisation.   This can 
be analysed in terms of power relations: whose ‘voice’ is allowed by the text’s 
producer, what are they allowed to contribute, how is this being contextualised?  
This ‘editing’ process of dialogicalisation can be used to exclude as well as include 
other voices.   My own data reveals very little evidence of contributions from 
widows in Ministry of Pensions correspondence, and where their voices do appear, 
attributed as active agents, then the utterance generally carries a negative effect for 
that widow.  This silencing of the widows is a noticeable feature of the documents I 
shall be analysing later.  
 
Presupposition/assumptions 
Just as the intertextuality in terms of both discourse and texts relies upon the 
producer’s knowledge, their interpretation also relies on the reader’s awareness 
(either consciously or subconsciously) of the intertextual context.  To refer back to 
Fairclough’s diagrammatic representation of the dialogism in texts (above), where 
there is no explicit use of intertextuality in the form of quotations and assertions, the 
least dialogical texts rely on presupposition and assumptions for their interpretation. 
Presuppositions and assumptions are both aspects of intertextuality which 
assume prior knowledge on the part of a text’s audience.  Assumptions, or otherwise 
entailments, involve there being a logical consequence to the sense of the actual 
utterance.  They are more nebulous than presuppositions and are more to do with 
logic and practices of sense-making than pragmatic concepts.  The common   50 
elements between intertextuality and assumptions are that they both rely on claims 
that the assertion exists elsewhere.   
  As with assumptions, the text producer has the power to determine what 
presuppositions are used.  As Fairclough explains, ‘as in the case of a situational 
context, discourse participants may arrive at roughly the same interpretation or 
different ones, and the interpretation of the more powerful participant may be 
imposed on others’ (1989: 152).  In her discussion of Levinson’s Pragmatics, Talbot 
stresses that presuppositions ‘always take place as part of an interaction’ (1987: 
184), and it is the dialogical nature of them that is most important in their 
interpretation, as the cues within the text direct the audience to an understanding.   
Potential presuppositions can be ‘triggered’ (Levinson, 1983) by cues within 
the text.  Depending on the trigger, they can be identified under a number of 
different, largely pragmatic, categories.  For example, existential presuppositions 
can be triggered by definite noun phrases such as the war, his children.  These noun 
phrases commit the writer or speaker to the existence of the named entities.  Factive 
presuppositions can be triggered by the use of certain verbs and adjectives such as 
regret, realise, that-clauses and be-verb constructions such as be aware and be 
granted (Seuren, 1998: 740).  Here, the presupposed information following the verb 
can be treated as a fact.  Yule (1996) adds the sub-category of non-factive 
presuppositions which are triggered by verbs such as dream, imagine and pretend.   
Categorical presuppositions are highly reliant for semantic and pragmatic 
understanding of speaker and audience.  For these, the meaning ‘is conventionally 
interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted) meaning is 
understood’ (Yule, 1996: 28).  Categorical presuppositional triggers may involve 
verbs such as stop, remain and the adverb still.  With categorical presuppositions, 
the use of a particular lexical item is taken to presuppose another, unstated, concept.  
This differs from factive presuppositions in that in the former category ‘the use of a 
particular expression is taken to presuppose the truth of the information that is stated 
in it’ (Yule, 1996: 28).   
It is not only words and phrases which can trigger presuppositions: there are 
also structural presuppositions.  More common in spoken language than written,   51 
constructions such as found in wh-question conventionally presuppose that the 
information after the wh- form is already known.  For example, ‘where were you 
married?’ presupposes you are married.  The use of question structures in written 
documentation is quite rare in my data.  This is likely to be because this tends to be a 
feature of what Fairclough refers to a conversationalisation of official discourses 
which is a characteristic of later in the 20
th century than most of my data covers. 
The intertextuality and interdiscursivity of my own data is highly relevant in 
the exploration of the construction of war widowhood.  The widows’ pension files 
held in the National Archives offer a unique opportunity to examine the views of the 
widows themselves as they initiated correspondence with the Ministry of Pensions 
and other agencies of the State in an attempt to justify their perceived rights to a 
pension under the terms of the Royal Warrant.   
The corpus of data which has been gathered for this study incorporates a 
great variety of materials in terms of genre and source, spanning more than half a 
century, building up a set of discursive statements not available for analysis 
elsewhere.  It is true that Fairclough’s somewhat rigid model for CDA is ideal for 
the analysis of a small number of texts.  However, as Meyer has also observed, 
 
although there are no explicit statements about this issue, one might assume 
that many CDA studies (with the exception of Teun van Dijk and Ruth 
Wodak) mostly deal only with small corpora which are usually regarded as 
being typical of certain discourses.  (2002: 25) 
 
One of the most common criticisms of CDA is that it tends to be fragmentary 
and/or unrepresentative (see Widdowson, 1995a, 1996, and Stubbs, 1997, for 
example), and thus fails to produce a rounded argument.  The basic Whorfian claim 
of CDA is that languages or language use implicitly classify experience, and that 
these categories influence a person’s view of reality.  It therefore becomes essential 
to provide additional, non-linguistic evidence of patterns of belief and behaviour. 
Early in the development of CDA, Fairclough (1995: 1) stated the importance of 
studying ‘how texts are produced, distributed and consumed’ if CDA research is not 
to be dismissed as disconnected or incomplete.  However, Stubbs (1997) is strongly 
critical of the frequent concentration of corpus linguists on analyses restricted to   52 
isolated data fragments.  Smith (1993: 3) extends this argument to point out that 
texts need to be analysed as more than ‘inert extra-temporal blobs of meaning’, the 
wider context in which they were produced being lost in the analysis. 
The three-part model of CDA goes some way towards producing a theory of 
the relation between cognition and the textual representation of reality.  However, 
my own data is far more extensive than Fairclough’s model would comfortably 
allow for analysis.  The widows are often drawing on enhanced patriotic discourses 
found in war-time army recruitment posters, the patriotic rallying calls to arms 
recurring in the post-war letters of widows such as Louisa Bayliss.  In the case of 
Florence Bayliss, her letters span nearly 40 years and reflect changing attitudes 
towards the Welfare State and the State’s attitudes towards such claimants.  The 
contrast between Florence’s and Louisa’s letters in terms of their relationship with 
the State is something that is also of great interest to me.  There is a great contrast 
between the highly individual voices that are found in the letters written by widows 
to the Ministry of Pensions, and the formal, impersonal letters and documents of the 
Ministry itself.  To focus on just one or two texts would, for me, lose traces of these 
two women’s individual voices and as a consequence their narratives.  A modified 
approach is needed. 
 
The discourse-historical approach 
Recent developments in the field of CDA at the University of Vienna have proved 
timely for my own research.  The discourse-historical approach to CDA was initially 
developed by Wodak et al (1990) in order to discuss anti-Semitism in Austria during 
the 1986 election campaign of Kurt Waldheim.  Whilst there has been research on 
historical topics such as questions of identity and political discourses in various 
countries (eg, Billig, 1995; Wodak et al, 1999; Wodak and Van Dijk 2000), there 
was a general neglect of detailed grammatical research on narratives about the past 
which Martin and Wodak (2003) sought to remedy in a recent edited collection.  
This collection sought to ‘deconstruct the re/packaging and re/evaluation of 
[historical] events from both functional linguistic and critic perspectives’ (2003: 2), 
drawing on a range of texts such as political speeches, television talk shows,   53 
newspapers, and the bureaucracy that surrounds official and state planning 
processes.  The multimodal and multidisciplinary nature of this approach to CDA 
has proved useful in the analysis of my own data which is drawn from a large variety 
of sources, the greatest part of which comes from the case files held in the National 
Archives, and includes the multimodal nature of the widows’ letters as well as more 
public documents such as wartime recruitment posters. 
For example, a recruitment poster from 
1915 carries the text ‘Women of Britain say 
“Go!”’
7.  The intertextuality of the text offers a 
direct attribution of the directive ‘go!’ to the female 
population of Britain, thus putting women in the 
active role of ordering (implicitly) men to volunteer 
for armed service.  In this way, there is a direct 
gender division between the unanimous voice of 
the ‘women of Britain’ and the unnamed object of 
the directive: the opposite masculine polarity.  
Interestingly, oral histories reveal posters such as 
this also positioning women to assume a more 
active role.  In a recent collection of oral histories, (van Emden and Humphries, 
2003: 118), one interviewee reports that she was inspired by this particular poster to 
become a VAD nurse.  She read the underlying message that by encouraging the 
men to go off and fight, by implication women were saying that they were willing 
and able to look after the country whilst the men were away.  The picture on this 
poster shows what appear to be three generations, comprising two women and a 
young boy who are firmly placed within the domestic sphere, their intertwined arms 
and upturned faces indicating a vulnerability which emphasises their need to be 
protected, implicitly by men.  The heroism of the women remaining is highlighted 
by the youngest figure on the poster, the male child, who is towered over by the two 
women.  In this discourse of morality based on virtuous females,  
 
                                                 
7 Imperial War Museum archives; E.V. Kealey   54 
It is the men who are seen as giving their lives so that the community is 
protected – and women who are seen both as being protected and obliged to 
await the return of men, whether as memory or as homecoming hero. 
Needless to say, the waiting women are assumed to be waiting in a state of  
virtue, otherwise the sacrifice will be sullied and de-sacralised.   
(J. Davies in Clark, 1993: 121) 
 
But this is not the only discourse in action in this poster.  There is a very strong 
sense of national identity which links the text (it is women of Britain) with the 
image of England’s mythical rolling green hills.  The text of the patriotic hymn 
‘Jerusalem’ is much-quoted for the phrase ‘England’s green and pleasant land’, and 
is one of the most commonly evoked images in relation to a particularly English 
national identity.  Interestingly, the setting of part of Blake’s exploration of the 
sublime (see de Luca, 1995) in his poem ‘Milton’ to Parry’s score was originally 
prepared for use by the suffragette movement in the early 20
th century, where its 
aspirational and uplifting message is read as the female quest to build a ‘New 
Jerusalem’ (Hartman, 2003).  The use of this hymn by the suffragette movement was 
quickly extended to encompass the whole nation, both genders, and the dominant 
patriotic discourses of the time, where it has remained ever since. 
Therefore we could say that this recruitment poster is interdiscursive in that it 
is drawing on two different discourses – morality and national identity – as well as 
intertextually drawing on other texts such as popular songs to support and endorse 
its message.  The readings of it in different contexts, such as that of van Emden and 
Humphries’ interviewee, show how different social conditions can lead to different 
processes of interpretation.  The representation of the virtuous female who is 
indebted to the valorous servicemen came to be evoked through discourses of social 
welfare, in addition to the morality and national identity that are shown here.  
Indeed, the very public nature of these recruitment posters is linked to the public’s 
ownership of war widows, and the women’s assured claim that the country is 
indebted to them, is a feature of the data that forms the basis of this thesis, as will be 
explored through the triangulatory approach to discourse analysis Wodak has 
developed.   55 
Because of its concern with variables such as ideology, power, hierarchy and 
gender, CDA has been used to inform studies relating to gender, racism, media 
discourses, political discourses, and identity.  The greatly differing analytical 
techniques employed in various CDA studies, as well as the disputed definitions of 
such key terms as discourse, critical, ideology and power, has meant that CDA is not 
viewed as a holistic or closed paradigm.  Wodak and Martin (2003: 5) stress that 
CDA should be thought of ‘as a “school”, or a programme, which many researchers 
find useful and to which they can relate in terms of their research goals’.  CDA does 
not constitute a well-defined empirical method but rather a cluster of approaches 
with a similar theoretical base and similar research questions: there is no typical 
CDA way of collecting data.  Indeed, many studies don’t even mention method of 
data collection. 
Wodak (2002: 64) argues convincingly that CDA ‘must be multitheoretical 
and multimethodological, critical and self-reflective’.  Advocating a pragmatic 
approach to CDA which would go a long way towards countering the arguments of 
critics of CDA such as Stubbs and Widdowson (above), she states that such an 
approach ‘would not seek to provide a catalogue of context-less propositions and 
generalisations, but rather to relate questions of theory formation and 
conceptualisation closely to the specific problems that are to be investigated’ (ibid).  
In other words, seeking to move away from problem-orientated science, this 
approach tries to find the most useful linguistic research strategies to explore the 
texts and contexts in question.  As discussed above, the Foucaultian notion of 
‘power’ in CDA is based around the view that texts are often the sites of struggles in 
that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and 
struggling for dominance.  Wodak stresses the view that it is not only the realisation 
of power through grammatical forms within a text, but also by an individual’s access 
to and control of a social occasion by means of the genre of a text.  In this way, she 
argues for the importance of genre as it is ‘often exactly within the genres associated 
with given social occasions that power is exercised or challenged’ (2002: 11), an 
argument that builds on Fairclough’s stress as to the importance of intertextuality.   56 
Again drawing on the work of Foucault, the notion of ‘power’ in CDA for 
both Fairclough and Wodak is based around the view that texts are often the sites of 
struggles in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending 
and struggling for dominance.  In common with other CDA theorists, Wodak and 
Martin (2002: 6) emphasise that discursive differences in texts are negotiated, 
‘governed by differences in power which is in part encoded in and determined by 
discourse and genre’.  They go on to point out that, in relation to the recording and 
retelling of histories, ‘[p]ower comes visibly into play as soon as the various 
narratives of the past are confronted with each other and elites select one of the 
competing narratives and naturalise it as the “past” (what “really” happened)’ (2003: 
8).  The histories offered by widows of First World War soldiers are particularly 
relevant in this respect, as they are the personal accounts which were disallowed by 
official agents of the State, and later by historians of the period.  
Countering the criticisms of CDA by Stubbs, Widdowson and others, Wodak 
proposes a method of CDA that is based on the principle of triangulation, using a 
variety of empirical data and it is this that makes the historical-discourse approach 
more effective (2002: 65).  Wodak’s triangulatory approach seeks to explore the 
connections between discursive practices and extra-linguistic social structures.  This 
approach combines various interdisciplinary, methodological and source-specific 
analytical approaches.  The texts I have selected for this study vary in terms of 
discourse, genre and topic, as well as chronologically.  Wodak’s own studies are 
smaller scale, but the basic model holds together in my own research.  However, my 
use of the historical-discourse approach will differ from Wodak’s model in that she 
chose to focus extensively on genre.  Whilst this was suitable to the data she was 
analysing in her corpus, I am very aware that this emphasis would be detrimental to 
my own aim of giving a ‘voice’ to the individual widows that form the basis of my 
study.  In addition, the main part of my data comes from the letters exchanged 
between the widows and the Ministry of Pensions, limiting the range of genres that 
are relevant, contrasting with the larger variety of genres that formed Wodak’s 
studies.  This is not to say that genre is irrelevant to my study, but that the emphasis 
is more appropriately focused on intertextual references that will reveal more of the   57 
voices that reside with the texts here for study as well as the contrast between public 
and private spheres that will be apparent.   
The triangulatory approach that is used within Wodak’s model of discourse 
historical analysis includes the exploration of different discursive strategies.  This 
section will discuss briefly the discursive strategies that are most relevant to the 
subsequent analysis of my own data, as detailed above.  It is important to point out at 
this stage that not all of the strategies are employed in all of the texts that form the 
corpus under analysis, but what follows is a discussion of the most relevant 
strategies that are utilised. 
 
Argumentation strategies 
Wodak’s discourse-historical approach to analysing texts within the CDA 
framework endeavours to investigate historical, organisational and political topics 
and texts by attempting ‘to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about 
historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which 
discursive “events” are embedded (Wodak, 2001: 165).  This model is 
multimethodological, including the application of the argumentation approach.  
According to van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1997: 209), there are 
two characteristic features of argumentation which are central.  Firstly, there is a 
proposition put forward as a claim, to which are added other propositions (or 
reasons) which aim to justify or refute this claim.  The second feature is that 
argumentation involves two opposing sides of a debate.  In the case of dialogic 
interaction, the protagonist puts forward the claim which an antagonist either 
contradicts or otherwise withholds assent.  In monologic texts, the protagonist 
provides proof of their claim to an imagined or projected doubtful audience.  
However, as Fairclough (2003: 42) points out, even in monologic texts the concept 
of difference is no less central.  
For Wodak, the ‘common ground’ is articulated through a series of topoi.  
She suggests that 
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within argumentation theory, ‘topoi’ or ‘loci’ can be described as parts of 
argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable 
premises.  They are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which 
connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim.  As such, 
they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion. 
(2001: 74) 
 
Assumed meanings and topoi are of special ideological relevance in relation to 
constructions of common sense, as it can be argued that ‘relations to power are best 
served by meanings which are widely taken as given’ (Fairclough, 2003: 58).  Using 
Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony as the conceptualisation of power and the 
struggle for power in society through consent or acquiescence rather than physical 
force, we can uncover how ‘common ground’ is articulated in dialogical and 
monological texts.  If we are to accept that all texts are not equally dialogical (as 
argued by Bakhtin 1981, Fairclough 2003, Holquist 1981), then the different 
orientations to difference and the power struggles which lie behind these, can be 
‘unpacked’ using argumentation theory within a CDA framework. 
Hamblin’s (1970) study of fallacies was built around seeing argument as a 
dialectal process organised around arguers’ efforts to convince one another of their 
own personal standpoints.  Van Eermeren et al (1997: 215) suggest that the more 
important features of Hamblin’s approach are 
 
the emphasis on rules defining speaker commitments and regulating 
interactions moves rather than an emphasis on logical forms as the 
generative mechanism for argumentation as well as the recognition of 
the self-constituting and self-regulating character of argumentation. 
 
This trend towards a more dialogical approach has been accompanied by an equally 
influential trend towards functionalisation and contextualisation. 
Drawing on a concept similar to the classic logic premise, Toulmin (1970) 
proposes that the question of what a speaker has ‘to go on’ can be identified as the 
‘grounds’.  These grounds are justified by a ‘warrant’ or ‘inference licence’, which 
is understood as a reasoning strategy or rule that is other than the premise.  This 
‘warrant’ is supported by a ‘backing’ in the form of substantive information which is 
similar to the ‘grounds’.  This structure is termed the ‘Toulmin model’, focusing not   59 
on formal relationships as with classical models of description, but on the functional 
relationships within the argument.  A dialogical approach means that we must take 
into account elements which are not actually stated but which are nevertheless 
necessary to represent a speaker’s reasoning.  Fairclough (2003: 82) draws attention 
to the CDA approach to argumentation, where the ideological work that the text is 
doing in its usage of assumed or implicit elements is taken into account.  For 
example, implicit or assumed elements which are somehow contentious or 
questionable can be presented as being ‘common sense’. 
Moves towards a functional, interactional view of argument are taken 
through the pragmatic argumentation theories such as the pragma-dialectical theory 
of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984; 1992), and Walton (1989, 1995).  This 
approach incorporates elements of speech act theory (Searle, 1969), and Grice’s 
(1989) theory of conversational implicature.  As with Kress (1985) difference is the 
‘motor that produces texts’.  With this approach, the starting point is the assumption 
that the purpose of argumentation is to resolve a difference of opinion.  Here, the 
important defining feature of argument is that ‘it occurs as a means of addressing – 
and attempting to resolve – a difference of opinion by means of exploring the 
relative justification for competing standpoints’ (van Eemeren et al, 1997: 218).  
Thus, the writer pictures an audience ‘to be persuaded by means of arguments 
offered to support the writer’s views or to refute the audience’s own views’ (ibid).  
In spoken interaction, the interlocutors allow one another to put forward their 
respective positions in response to a succession of interactional moves.  Whether 
spoken or written, the organisation of the argument ‘depends on one party’s effort to 
convince another of a standpoint by answering doubts and objections and by 
grounding conclusions in mutually accepting starting points’ (1997: 219).   
Argumentation theory will be useful in the analysis of my data, particularly 
in the correspondence between widows and the Ministry of Pensions, in order to 
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Formulations and reformulations 
Heritage and Watson (1979) first applied the term formulation to describe the 
strategy of rewording an utterance in a conversation to check for understanding, or 
to render it less ambiguous.  However, as Thomas (1984, 1985) points out, Heritage 
and Watson were more concerned with surface meaning in terms of ascertaining the 
facts of what was uttered rather than any underlying pragmatic meaning.  Thomas 
(1983, 1985) developed this work in the field of pragmatics to explore the strategies 
speakers use to clarify communicative intent (1985: 773).  She distinguishes 
between what she terms upshots and reformulations in that the dominant speaker 
will tend to ‘present the hearer with an upshot (a brief summary by the dominant 
speaker of a long contribution by the subordinate)’, and a reformulation as the 
dominant speaker’s tendency to present the hearer’s utterance in unambivalent 
terms, ‘in response to which [the hearer] is required to make clear or simply to 
confirm the intended pragmatic force of his/her utterance’ (ibid).  In my own data, 
the fact that the vast majority of it is not based on face-to-face interaction means that 
the institutional power of an interactant in the form of a bureaucrat from the Ministry 
of Pensions should generally be regarded as being in the dominant role.  Thomas 
comments that: 
 
Interactions within institutions are premised upon a high degree of shared 
knowledge and beliefs, among these believes about what are and what are 
not allowable contributions and concerning the rights and duties associated 
with particular institutional roles.  (1985: 776) 
 
My data is largely taken from Ministry of Pension files, most of which were 
compiled before 1948 and the universal provision under the British Welfare State 
was in place.  This means that the widows writing to the Ministry were having to 
adapt the rules and hierarchies of other institutions with which they were more 
familiar.  Whilst there is primarily a recognition of an institutional hierarchy, the 
widows often draw on their own authority as mothers and carers to employ upshots 
and reformulations of Ministry assertions, as they attempt to state their case in 
support of their pension appeal.  For example, the standard response of the Ministry   61 
of Pensions to Louisa’s letters would be along the lines of ‘it has been decided your 
pension shall remain suspended’.  Louisa herself frequently uses upshots to 
challenge this response: ‘Dear Sir Wood you be so kinge and let me have my 
Pension paumont of My Money’.  In this way, Louisa reframes the pension from a 
legally-authorised State grant, the payment of which was decided by committee, to a 
personally authorised allowance paid to her on the basis of need, a decision reached 
on compassionate grounds (‘would you be so kind…’).   
Thomas points out that the subordinate in an interaction will generally ‘back 
down rather than violate the norms (usually politeness norms) of an institution’ 
(1985: 778).  In the case of the correspondence between widows and the Ministry of 
Pensions, it is unusual to find more than two or three letters in a sequence, and it is 
more usual that any reformulation of a widow’s contribution will be unchallenged by 
her simply by virtue of the fact she did not get to see it, this document remaining 
within the files of the Ministry of Pensions.  The bureaucratic gaze is overwhelming 
in this respect.  However, where sequences of letters do appear, particularly in the 
case studies to be examined in more detail later in this thesis, reformulations can be 
traced, both in the correspondence involving the widows and that which was internal 
to the Ministry.  As we will see, although institutionally powerless, Florence does 
not necessarily see herself as subordinate to the bureaucrat who reformulates her 
narrative to such an extent that it becomes factually inaccurate.  Florence’s response 
to the letter in which this occurs is to return the letter with her own, irate, comments 
written in all the available white space as she ‘corrects’ the reformulation.  This 
would follow the less common occurrences, as Thomas explains, when ‘upshots and 
reformations are used on someone who does not perceive her/himself as a 
subordinate, they may well “throw back” at the speaker’ (1985: 778).   
Fairclough (2001: 113-14) follows Thomas in defining (re)formulations as a 
means of clarifying an utterance: 
 
A formulation is either a rewording of what has been said, by oneself or 
others, in one turn or a series of turns or indeed a whole episode; or it is a 
wording of what may be assumed to follow from that has been said, what is 
implied by what has been said.  Formulations are used for such purposes as   62 
checking understanding or reaching an agreed characterisation of what has 
transpired in an interaction. 
 
As Wodak has observed in relation to political news reports, for these to 
make the message clearer, ‘linguistic reformulations must be augmented by more 
extensive background information as well as detailed knowledge about politics’ 
(1996: 177).  Thus in my own data, the early letters from the Ministry of Pensions 
lacked clarity in their reformulating of the widows’ appeals as they did not engage 
with the same frame of war widowhood as the widows themselves were.  By 
frequent intertextual reference to the terms of the Royal Warrant, the Ministry of 
Pensions failed to answer the more pressing requests for money that often appear in 
the widows’ letters.  This meant that, as media coverage of pension reforms 
appeared in the inter-war years, many widows were led to believe (usually 
erroneously) that they must be eligible for a pension after all, and thus contacted the 
Ministry reformulating their earlier appeals in the futile hope that this would be in 
line with some new regulation or other.  The ambiguity of the original refusal to 
grant a pension lay in its refusal to deal with specific individual cases in any detail, a 
failure which would lead to an increased amount of unnecessary paperwork for the 
Ministry in later years and dashed hopes of a pension on the part of widows.  As 
Fairclough terms the most important parts of a text’s message in reformulation is the 
gist (2001: 115), the most important part of the message as decided by the Ministry 
of Pensions is the fact that the widow would not be eligible under the terms of the 
Royal Warrant for a pension rather than the more immediate and personal longer 
term effect in terms of income that is the widow’s concern.  The Ministry of 
Pensions is, therefore, more concerned with the State’s financial expenditure than 
with the widow’s future. 
Fairclough goes on to highlight the more power-based uses of 
(re)formulations, which ‘are also used for purposes of control […] as a way of 
leading participants into accepting one’s own version of what has transpired, and so 
limiting their options for future contributions’ (2001: 114).  The way that an 
utterance is reformulated can be read to discover the underlying power structures of 
an interaction by seeing who is the benefactor of the reformulation.  Even allowing   63 
for politeness strategies such as hedging employed stylistically in bureaucratic 
language found in Ministry of Pensions documents, the level of reformulation found 
in my data often renders the widow invisible or else silent, and is worthy of analysis 
in the course of my case studies. 
For the purpose of analysing my data, I plan to use the term reformulation to 
cover both of Thomas’s terms upshot and reformulation.  This is owing to the nature 
of my data, the vast majority of which is in written form and therefore renders 
Thomas’s distinction less appropriate.  This use will be in line with that adopted by 
Wodak (1996, and in her discourse-historical approach found elsewhere), and echoes 
Fairclough’s occasional and interchangeable use of it in his later work. 
 
Frames 
The concept of framing communication was originally developed by Bateson (1972) 
and further developed by Goffman (1974).  Framing has been defined as a ‘kind of 
metanarrative that influences interpretation but is not part of the content’ (Stahl, 
1989: 49).  Yule (1996: 86) suggests that ‘a frame shared by everyone within a 
social group would be something like a prototypical version’.  Clair further explains 
that ‘frames devices are rhetorical/discursive practices that define or assign 
interpretation to the social event’ (1993: 118).  
Tannen and Wallat (1999) point out that frames can be separated into two 
basic categories of usage by different disciplines: 
 
Frames of interpretation, which characterise the work of anthropologists 
and sociologists such as Frake (1977) and Gumperz (1982), in addition to Goffman’s 
early work in sociological use (1974).  Here, frames are used ‘as a definition of what 
is going on in an interaction, without which no utterance (or movement or gesture) 
could be interpreted (Tannen and Wallat, 1999: 348).  Within the frame of 
interpretation, Wodak (1996: 22) describes how a frame ‘focuses on the definition 
which participants give to their current social activity – to what is going on, what the 
situation is like, and to the role that interactants adopt within it’.  In this way, the   64 
interactants need to know which frame an utterance has been made, such as whether 
a joke or an insult.   
The second main way in which frames are used are as schema.  Here, the 
participants’ expectations about people, objects, circumstances and events are 
negotiated by the interactants (Tannen and Wallat, 1999: 349).  Linguistic semantic 
scholars such as Fillmore (1976) point out that utterances can only be understood by 
reference to an already-known pattern.  Frames are critical to disguising the deep-
level power structures that sustain a dominant ideology.  As Fairclough describes, 
within the understanding of frames as schema they can be representative of 
‘whatever can figure as [the…] subject matter, or ‘referent’ within an activity’.  As 
such, fames can ‘represent types of person or other animate beings (a woman, a 
teacher, a politician, a dog, etc), or inanimate objects (a house, a computer, etc), or 
processes (running, attacking, dying, etc), or abstract concepts (democracy, love, 
etc).  They can also represent complex processes or series of events with involve 
combinations of such entities’ (2001: 32).  Schemata are, therefore, ‘a chunk of 
unconscious knowledge’ (Fowler, 1991: 43) which is shared by groups of people 
who use these to draw on in order to make sense of the world.  A frame is essentially 
a stereotype of a particular object or event.  At a more detailed level as cognitive 
frames, according to Minsky (1975), these characteristics comprise those which are 
essential, those which are variable, and those which our past experience has shown 
are likely to be present.  In terms of war widows, the ‘essential’ element includes a 
dead husband who was an armed serviceman.  The other elements are more 
culturally dependent, and as we shall see shortly, were formulated in the terms of the 
Royal Warrant around the experiences and expectations of a middle-class, male 
authorship.    
In terms of frames of interpretation, most of the widows’ letters within the 
data for analysis within this thesis can be described as being framed as letters of 
appeal or else request for a pension.  Within these frames can be found others such 
as apology and complaint which serve to underpin the claims for a pension.   
As schema, frames incorporate ideas of stereotypes which are produced by 
the dominant discourses and ideologies of the time.  For example, the frame of   65 
widowhood has been produced by a patriarchal ideology which encompasses 
discourses of femininity, mourning and religion.  The Royal Warrant of 1916 frames 
widows within a strongly patriarchal ideology that insists on certain expectations of 
behaviour of widows as a condition for pension payment.  The frame of widowhood 
comprises interdiscursive lines between national identity and femininity, largely 
based on Victorian middle-class expectations.  Widows were being granted pensions 
on the basis of their husband’s war service and consequent death, thus were 
receiving money for their husband’s expected service to the country.  This forms an 
interdiscursive link to the middle-class expectation of women being dependant on a 
male breadwinner, whilst the actual amount paid to these women was based on the 
assumption that they would also be in paid employment as befits their position in 
society as working-class women.  The contrast between expected behavioural norms 
for middle-class women and those of working-class women reflects a narrow 
understanding of the lives of the working classes, particularly single women.  It 
could also be seen that the strict terms under which the Royal Warrant was 
dispensed on behavioural grounds to these women was actually an attempt to force 
these women to accept the behavioural norms of the middle classes.   
War widows were therefore framed by the interdiscursivity of the Royal 
Warrant’s terms.  They should be passive and sober, living a life which reflected the 
patriotic pride associated with reverence and respect for their dead war-hero 
husband’s memory.  Transgression, or even suspected transgression, from this 
frame, such as in Louisa’s case, could too easily result in the suspension of the 
widow’s pension by the Ministry.  Discourses of morality and national identity are 
thus producing a semantic frame of war widowhood.   
    
Speech acts, mitigation and intensification strategies 
 
Although the data selected for analysis in this study is entirely in a written or printed 
form, Austin’s (1962) work on speech acts will prove useful as part of the analysis. 
His work comes out of the philosophical study of linguistics in the 1960s, but has 
proved very useful in branches of critical discourse analysis.  Although Austin’s 
early work on speech act theory is helpful in the context of my own data, as we shall   66 
see it can be argued that some utterances can fall into more than one category.  In 
addition, Austin’s model cannot cope with some elements of spoken language such 
as backchannels and incomplete sentences.  However, the basic principles of speech 
act theory, as set out in Austin’s early work, can be applied to my written data to 
some effect. 
Performatives, as demonstrated by Austin, are the speech acts that people use 
to perform actions, actions which affect or change the world in some way.  This 
could be in a very minor way, such as one person offering to make a cup of tea for 
another person, or they may be more devastating, such as Britain declaring war on 
Germany in August, 1914.  Austin expanded on this with the requirement that 
felicity conditions must exist for a performative to be successful (1962: 14-15): 
 
Condition A:  i.  There must be conventional procedure having a conventional 
       effect; 
    ii.  The circumstances and persons must be appropriate. 
 
Condition B:  The procedure must be executed i. correctly, and ii. 
completely. 
 
Condition C:  i.  The persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and  
intentions, and 
ii.  if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties 
must do it.   
 
So, for Condition A, for example, in Britain, there is a requirement that a 
marriage can only be between a man and a woman
8, who are not disqualified from 
marrying for any reason, presenting themselves to an authorised person (minister of 
religion or civic registrar), in an authorised place, at an approved date and time, 
accompanied by at least two witnesses.  The actual performative speech acts contain 
the formulaic declarations which validate the marriage.  The second condition, that 
the ‘circumstances and persons must be appropriate’, is particularly relevant to my 
data as several of the widows in the case files I examined had to have their marriages 
annulled when it was later found that their husbands were bigamous.  In such cases, 
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these women would be subjected to rigorous investigation to establish whether or 
not they were aware of their new husbands’ existing marriages at the time of their 
own weddings.   
In relation to Austin’s Condition B, that a procedure must be executed 
correctly and completely, it is very clear from my data that this largely relates to 
officially documented evidence.  Margaret Aries’
9 husband Alfred, for example, died 
of malaria in 1928.  She was initially refused a war widow’s pension on the grounds 
that Alfred had not been pensioned for malaria, but for bronchitis, and that there was 
no documented evidence of him having contracted the disease, despite his war 
service in Cyprus and Egypt.  The remote likelihood of contracting malaria in inner-
city Glasgow was finally acknowledged by the Ministry of Pensions in 1930, but 
initially the lack of complete and correct documentary evidence would indicate that 
Austin’s felicity condition B was being employed by the Ministry to refuse a 
pension to his widow. 
  Austin’s Felicity Condition C is slightly more problematic to illustrate, but I 
would suggest that it is part of the State’s intention in drafting the Royal Warrant.  
As discussed previously, it is assumed that the widow will continue in that role of 
reverential mourning to her heroic husband.  The wording of the claim form makes 
this clear when it requires the widow to sign her name below the statement ‘I have 
continued a widow…’.  Her intention at this stage is assumed to be the continuance 
of this role, and the terms included under the Royal Warrant involve the widow 
complying with middle-class ideas as to the behaviour of a widow.   
  Certain kinds of speech acts, such as requests, warnings, promises, orders, 
etc can only be performed successfully, or to use Austin’s term felicitously, on the 
basis of recognised powers.  As Chilton and Schaffer (1997: 219) have observed, 
other speech acts ‘such as explicit or implicit claims to truthfulness, knowledge, or 
accurate assessment, depend partly on being empirically refutable in the light of 
events’.  In the case of my data and drawing on the Foucaultian notion of ‘truth’, the 
truthfulness of a widow’s assertion as to her own ‘good behaviour’ is only accepted 
as being admissible when supported by independent, State-approved agency reports, 
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such as police surveillance reports and Ministry of Pensions local office welfare 
visitor reports.  In such cases, the authority of the speaker vests the assertion with 
the appropriate felicity conditions. 
  Performative speech acts, therefore, could be said to require speaker 
authority and collaboration with the recipient/hearer, within a setting of appropriate 
felicity conditions.  This leads to another aspect of Austin’s speech act theory.  His 
three-fold distinction differentiates between the utterance of the words within a 
statement and the action it performs: the illocutionary force.  The three-fold 
distinction can be simplistically described as follows: 
 
Locutionary act  the actual words uttered/being written; 
Illocutionary force  the force or intention behind the words; 
Perlocutionary effect  the longer term effect of the illocution on the hearer or 
       reader. 
 
For example, the locutionary act of a widow writing ‘I am a war widow’, as 
found in many letters held in the National Archives, carries the illocutionary force of 
an assertion that the writer’s husband has died as a result of his war service.  In the 
context of a letter to the Ministry of Pensions, the desired or perlocutionary effect is 
that she claims a pension from the State.  This interpretation requires the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of the speech act as being a request for a pension built on the assertion 
that she is eligible for this.  Building on Austin’s work, Searle (1969) classified 
speech acts by grouping them into macro-classes as follows: 
 
Declarations    
These comprise the performatives that Austin had earlier identified, and can be 
termed as words and expressions which change the world by their very utterance.   
 
-  The Tribunal disallows this appeal. 
-  I pronounce you man and wife. 
-  It has been decided that she is unworthy of a grant from public funds…   69 
 
As previously discussed, some performatives carry more authority than 
others depending on felicity conditions and the authority of the speaker.  An 
interesting example from my own data concerns the youngest child of Mary 
Anderson
10.  Marys’ husband Frank had died in the influenza pandemic in March 
1919, before he was discharged from the army.  Their youngest child had been born 
in October 1918 and registered (as required under law) at that time as Kenneth.  It 
later transpired that Mary had decided to call him Frank, in memory of his father, 
and claimed a dependant’s pension for him under that name.  Ministry of Pensions 
enquiries revealed the child had been christened as Frank.  The dilemma arose in the 
Ministry as to which name the child should be referred to by them, seemingly the 
authority and felicity conditions of both State and church carrying equal weight.  It 
was eventually decided that he should be referred to by the name his mother chose to 
call him, thus vesting her with an apparently greater authority than either church or 
State.  His file, however, continued to carry both names in the format ‘Kenneth, 
known as Frank’. 
 
Representatives 
These are speech acts in which the speaker states what they believe to be the case, 
such as describing, claiming, insisting, predicting, and hypothesising.   
 
-  He died of chronic valve disease of the heart caused through the war. 
-  You had my husband to fight for king and country. 
 
Commissives 
These include speech acts in which the speaker commits themselves to future action, 
such as promising, vowing, offering, threatening, refusing, and volunteering. 
 
-  Any person knowingly making a false declaration will be liable to 
prosecution. 
                                                 
10 PIN26 17215 case file of Mary Anderson, widow of Frank Anderson.   70 
-  I undertake to furnish any further particulars in support of my claim that 
may be required by the Ministry of Pensions.  
(Widow’s pension application form from 1934) 
 
-  Your pension payments will cease at the end of three months from this 
date, unless, in the mean time, the father of your illegitimate child has 
ceased to reside at your house… 
 (PIN15 2604 copy of letter from Special Grants Committee to Sarah 
Finn, 10
th November, 1936) 
 
The modality of certainty in will in the first and third examples the authoritative 
nature of the State’s use of commissives, compared with the hedging of may in the 
second example which is written in the widow’s voice. 
 
Directives 
Here, the speaker is aiming to get someone else to do something, such as by 
commanding, suggesting, requesting, inviting, preventing and forbidding. 
 
-  You are authorised not to issue motherless rates in this case.  
-  Use the enclosed envelope to return this form. 
-  Right back soon. 
 
Expressives 
Speaker feelings are included in this group of speech acts, such as apologising, 
regretting, praising,  
 
-  I think you have mistaken me for someone else. 
-  It is regretted that no further action can be taken in the matter. 
-  I am appealing to you… 
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The use of expressive elements in a directive to form an indirect request, 
such as ‘I would greatly appreciate it if you send me my pension’ rather than the 
bald statement ‘Send me my pension’ carries the same illocutionary effect but in a 
less assertive, more mitigated form.  It is recognising power relations and degree of 
imposition, and can be seen as a strategy to minimise a possible face threatening act 
(Brown and Levinson, 1987), and possibly make the anonymous bureaucrat at the 
Ministry of Pensions look upon the request more favourably.  Such a strategy is a 
form of indirect speech act, as described by Searle (1969).  As Thomas (1995: 119) 
explains, indirectness occurs when ‘there is a mismatch between the expressed 
meaning and the implied meaning’.  In this way, the apparent surface meaning 
communicates a different meaning.  Thus, Florence Bayliss
11 uses the interrogative 
form ‘Could you not allow me £50?’ which functions as a request, in this case for 
the Ministry of Pensions to send her money to help alleviate her debts.     
The use of interrogative forms can be used as a hedging or, to use Reisigl and 
Wodak’s term (2001), mitigating strategy, where demands are rendered less 
assertive in seeming to allow the addressee the option of declining to comply.  
Similarly, as seen above, the representative you have mistaken me for someone else 
is prefixed by the expressive I think, which softens the force of act and carries the 
indirect meaning of insisting that a mistake has been made.  The expressive it is 
regretted prefixes the commissive no further action can be taken which is an 
indirect refusal.   
Most of the language we as adults use is indirect and: 
 
the classification of utterances in catagories of indirect and direct speech acts 
is not an easy task, because much of what we say operates on both levels, 
and utterances often have more than one of the macro-functions.  (Cutting, 
2002: 19) 
 
As Yule comments, ‘indirect speech acts are generally associated with great 
politeness in English than direct speech act’ (1996:56), where they carry a 
perception of lesser imposition.  Indirect speech acts are so closely associated with 
                                                 
11 PIN26 17294 Letter from Florence Bayliss to Ministry of Pensions, 8
th May 1931, Appendix 3, 
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politeness that directives are most often expressed as interrogatives than imperatives.  
In the context of my own data, where there is generally a social and geographical 
distance between the widow and her addressee at the Ministry of Pensions as well as 
a level of formality, the use of interrogatives as a marker of politeness is very 
common.  The level of formality that is found in the bureaucratic language which 
emanates from the Ministry of Pensions appears to be stylistic, and when used in 
interaction with the widows, would challenge Cutting’s assertion that ‘it is generally 
those of the less dominant role and so on who tend to use indirectness’ (2002: 20-
21).  In addition to the stylistic preferences and the lack of familiarity of the 
interactants, on the part of the widows there is the fact that they are appealing for 
financial assistance.  Other factors which can make speakers use indirect directives 
include discursive roles, age, gender, education and social class.  The more specific 
mitigating strategies that can be used in relation to different speech acts have been 
described by Reisigl and Wodak (2001), and from this I have extrapolated 
intensification strategies which relate more directly to my own data.   
 
Mitigation and intensification 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 83) suggest that mitigation and intensification strategies 
can combine analysis of speech act structure with ‘the analysis of the perspective, of 
the linguistic representation of social actors as well as with the analysis of 
presuppositions and implications’.  Various forms of hedging can be employed as 
mitigation strategies, as shown in the table below, including those which relate more 
to spoken than written interaction, given the low levels of literacy exhibited by some 
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Macro-mitigation 
(macro-strategies: mitigation in the matrix clause/sentence or in parenthesis) 
Categories  Forms/examples of realisation 
Forms indicating degrees of reservation: 
-  addressee-oriented 
 
-  speaker-orientated 
related to the importance/relevance of 
the following/previous part of 
discourse/text or related to the 
conversational organisation. 
 
Modal verbs + verbs of saying 










-  If you don’t mind…/unless I have 
misunderstood you…/unless I 
heard it incorrectly 
-  I’m not an expert, but… 





I would like to tell you something 
I think, we can do it over again… 
I guess, I suppose, I reckon, I gather 
(used parenthetically) 
 
It seems quite clear that (mitigation also 
by seem and quite) 
It appears that… (mitigation also by 
appear) 
 
I would like to say… 
Indirect micro-mitigation 
(micro-strategies: competition between the basis illocution and the realised 
illocution, ordered according to the strength of indirectness) 
Question instead of assertion 
-  Basic: question/realised: directive 
(especially together with 
negations) 
 
Assertion with we/one/it instead of 
directive with you 
 
Assertion with we/one/it instead of 
assertion with I 
 
Particles and adverbs in questions and 
directives 
 
Shouldn’t we go further? 
Can you shut the window, Robert? 
 
 
We have to consider recent 
developments in… 
It will be necessary to consider… 
We proposed the new strategy… 
One cannot carry on as usual after 
this… 
Surely you are not serious? 






There may be some points you didn’t 
mention before / a few weeks ago / in the 
past.   74 
Tag questions 
 

















It was because of the tension, wasn’t it? 
 
Fairly, pretty, quite, rather, somewhat, 
supposedly, perhaps, theoretically, 
technically, strictly speaking, just, 
possibly, probably, likely… 
 
Such a move might anger the people / it 
would be endangering relations with the 
people 
 
Not unlikely, not unhappy, not 
unreasonable… The relationship here is 
not unproblematic. 
 
Well…/yes uhm they don’t want ah to 
adapt themselves 
 
A, some, (or absence of)… 
Adapted from Reisigl and Wodak, 2001:84 
 
In contrast, intensification strategies can be used to strengthen or amplify the 
argument or point being made, as demonstrated by the categories and examples 
shown in the table below (adapted from Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). 
 
Macro-intensification 
(macro strategies; intensification in the matrix clause/sentence) 
Categories  Forms/examples of realisation 
Forms indicating degrees of certainty: 
-  addressee oriented 
 
-  speaker oriented 
(related to the importance/relevance of 
the following/previous part of 
discourse/text or related to the 
conversational organisation. 
 
Modal verbs + verbs of saying 
 





I want to say…I know this is so… 
 






I have to tell you… 
 
I know, I expect, we see 
 
We will send…/ we have decided…/ I 
will visit you…   75 
Indirect micro-intensification 
(micro-strategies: competition between the basic illocation and the realised 
illocation) 
Questions which act as response-
demanding utterances, with response 
agreement assumed 
 
Directive with ‘you’ 
 
 
Assertion with ‘I’ 
If you have claimed … then you must …/ 
How can I live on this? I need more 
money 
 
You need to…/ You must…/ You are 
required… 
 






Tag questions followed by assumed 
agreement (acts as formulation) 
 




You have claimed… 
 
He died in the war, didn’t he? So I 
should get a pension 
 
Definitely, extremely, very, actually, 
certainly, undoubtedly, most likely… 
 
The, these, those, my, your… 
 
In addition to these strategies, Reisigl and Wodak further suggest that the 
intertextual strategy of employing quotations can be used as either mitigation or 
intensification strategies.   
 
Membership catagorisation 
Within my own data, it is interesting to observe the way the State and society 
attempted to fit all widows into the subject position traditionally ascribed to them, a 
role which was formed out of a long tradition of older women, living a life of quiet 
reflection in honour of their deceased husbands.  Membership catagorisation 
analysis, as Baker (2000: 99) points out, can be useful in looking at the 
‘micropolitics of everyday and institutional life’ (ibid).  Drawing on Sacks (1992), 
this can be used to explore how we recognise and enact descriptions and draws on 
our cultural knowledge and relevance.  The various labels or, to use Sacks’ term, 
membership categorisation devices under which the women in my data are   76 
categorized provide useful insights into how they are represented in texts, 
particularly how they are positioned in relation to others.  
 





Relationship to state  Applicant 
Claimant 
Pensioner 
Relationship to family  Mother 
Guardian 
 
Here, the most commonly used, and most proliferous, are those in the category 
which places women in relationship with men through the use of categories which 
imply ‘a second term to a standard relational pair’ (Baker, 2000: 102).   Their 
relationship to the State is implied through categories which Baker points out are 
strongly suggestive of a client-professional relationship.  The last category here also 
follows Baker’s notion of there being a second term that is implied as a standard 
relational pair.  In fact, the label guardian is one which can be applied in the context 
of social welfare to any adult who has been given charge of children, generally on 
the authority of the courts, here acting on behalf of the Ministry of Pensions.  Like 
guardian, applicant, claimant and pensioner are all nominalisations.  As we shall 
see in the case studies, it is most frequently the Ministry of Pensions and associated 
bureaucratic agencies which employ nominalisations with these membership 
categorisation devices, increasing the impersonal register of their correspondence.  
The widows themselves, however, draw on membership categorisation devices 
which evoke more personal, familial categories, but in particular the evocation of the 
label war widow carries with it the connections with further individual categories 
such as ‘war’ and ‘social welfare’.  As Baker points out, ‘the hearing of the second 
term implied or suggested by the first is the joint activity of the speaker and a 
listener both using the resources of membership categorisation’ (2000: 102).  
However, as we shall see with particular reference to the frame of widowhood, there   77 
is a divergence of resources which leads to misunderstandings and 
miscommunication.  As Benwell and Stokoe have observed, this is largely owing to 
‘the common-sense, normative practice in which inferences and implications are 
generated and managed […], with regard to particular states of affairs or narrative 
accounts’ (2006: 66). 
 
Conclusion 
Critical discourse analysis provides a valuable framework for studying the language 
used by the various agencies involved in the construction and enactment of war 
widowhood.  Whilst the interpretative authority of CDA has been critiqued, and 
perceived shortcomings highlighted by Stubbs (1997) and Widdowson (1996), if the 
position of the researcher is made clear from the outset, this can go some way 
towards responding to the argument that ‘textual interpretations of critical linguists 
are politically rather than linguistically motivated’ (Stubbs, 1997: 102).  It is my 
position that CDA provides the tools for uncovering the underlying concerns of 
parsimony and gender which are generally masked by the dominant discourses of 
patriotism and morality.  I shall be attempting to chart changes in the wider social 
world during the half century that this thesis covers, showing how CDA can be used 
to chart changing sociocultural circumstances which are not reflected in legislation 
drawn up in 1916 on which widows of the First World War were obliged to appeal 
for State help.  Although subject to alteration in 1921
12, the main legislation relating 
to these women was not further amended to take account of wider social change.  I 
hope that the relationship between this wider social world and the unchanging 
legislation can be charted using the discourse-historical approach to CDA to show 
how society’s attitudes towards widows of men who died due to the First World War 
gradually ceased to be reflected in the official discourses of the first quarter of the 
20
th century.  
The norms of working-class life were often very different from those of 
middle classes, but it was this latter group that formulated regulations and 
                                                 
12 This was when the ‘seven year’ rule was removed, thus allowing widows to be granted a pension if 
their husband died more than seven years from receipt of his injury or discharge from the army.   78 
legislation.  This is something I shall explore in more detail in later sections of this 
thesis, particularly with reference to conceptions of motherhood.  The forms and 
other documentation that comprised the bureaucratic network of the Ministry of 
Pensions in relation to war widows constructed clients in terms of a potential set of 
common denominators (Sarangi and Slembrouck, 1996: 136), with expectations that 
were sometimes far removed from the realities of the women’s lives.   
   79 
 
Historical context 
   80 
This section will explore the historical context of the case studies that follow.  In 
particular, the formation of the discourses of nationalism, morality and social 
welfare will be discussed, looking at some of the main social and political impulses 
that contributed to their formation.  As discussed earlier, I am using the term 
discourse in the post-structuralist influenced linguistic sense of the broad 
constitutive systems of meaning, and the ‘knowledge and practices generally 
associated with a particular institution or group of institutions’ (Talbot, 1995: 43), 
with its broader implications as Fairclough (1992: 3) puts it, the ‘different ways of 
structuring areas of knowledge and social practice’.  In Fairclough’s interpretation, 
there is considerable overlap with the concept of ideology.  However, in CDA the 
Foucaultian model of discourse tends to be usefully understood as that which is able 
to carry ideology.  Discourses are produced and reproduced through use and, as 
Sunderland (2004: 7) has observed, they are not ahistorical.  Despite the productive 
nature of agency, ‘discourses almost always pre-exist individual speakers […] and 
speakers through their language and social actions constantly revise and re-produce 
these’ (ibid).  As we shall see in the case studies, the discourses drawn upon by the 
writers make links with older forms of practices and knowledge.  For example, the 
welfare reforms which typify the period of my data have their roots in the old Poor 
Law system which has an Elizabethan legislative heritage that also reflects a system 
of institutional care that dates back to the Roman Empire (Midwinter, 1994: 15).  In 
particular, my data gives an opportunity to examine the discourse of social welfare 
which developed over the course of the 20
th century in connection with the shifting 
relationship between State and citizens.  The discourses that are drawn upon are 
interwoven through a patriarchal ideology which developed through the 19
th century 
and see the patriarchal authority of the State play an increasingly dominant role in 
the lives of British citizens.   
  A large variety of documents will be used to explore the discourses of 
nationalism, social welfare and morality which form the basis of the case studies’ 
analysis.  For example, in addition to the internal ministry files of the Ministry of 
Pensions held at the National Archives, texts such as newspaper reports, 
contemporary novels and diaries, advertising and recruitment posters, political   81 
speeches from Hansard and other parliamentary records, as well as reports and other 
documentation relating to voluntary organisations will be used to illustrate and 
support the arguments made.  
This section will begin by concentrating on the historical context of women 
as carers, particularly how they came to be framed as such in the late 19
th and early 
20
th century.  This has a direct relationship with the case studies that will be follow 
this section.  In the case of Louisa Bayliss, her role as legal guardian to her children 
will be illuminated by reference to the wider social and legal context, looking at how 
the terms of the Royal Warrant of 1916 reflect the arguments relating to Social 
Darwinism and New Imperialism that were so much in evidence at the turn of the 
century.  The changing role of women as carers in the course of the first half of the 
20
th century reflected the social and political background of this time, particularly 
the role of women as carers during the war years.  The case study dealing with 
Florence Bayliss will be largely informed by this assumption of women as carers, 
particularly as an extension of their ‘war work’.  This leads into a more focused 
discussion in this section of the evolution of the war widows’ pension scheme, 
showing briefly how it evolved out of established charitable discourses.  As 
charitable discourses were largely based on the notion of the ‘deserving poor’, this is 
relevant to both case studies as we look at the continuation of attitudes which link 
morality with social welfare by exploring the articulation of such discourses in the 
papers held in archives of various charities as well as Ministry of Pension files.  
Finally, this section will look at the social construction of widowhood and how this 
is closely tied into speech and rituals that underpin the case studies which follow. 
 
The social and legal construction of women as carers 
 
As previously mentioned, the Janus-faced nature of British society in the inter-war 
years was looking backwards to the perceived certainties of an imperial past.  Traces 
of this conservative modernism can be seen in the main legislation that is relevant in 
my research.  Whilst the Royal Warrant of 1916 under which war widows were first 
granted a pension reflects a modernising trends in social welfare, it also draws   82 
interdiscursively on morality and social welfare from the 19
th century, as well as the 
heightened sense of British national identity which had developed over the latter part 
of the previous century.  This is linked with international rivalries in the late 19
th 
century that had been generated by the appearance of a powerful Germany on the 
continent and a dynamic America across the Atlantic.  
The heightened sense of national identity at the time of the war actually built 
upon existing discourses of nationalism.  Beginning in the 1890s, Britain had entered 
a new, more self-consciously imperial phase of colonial acquisition (Spiers, 1980).  
Placed on the defensive by the rise of the new global industrial powers, Britain had 
responded with an aggressive display of imperial might designed to contradict any 
notion of economic or military weakness.  Politicians, senior military men and 
businessmen had extolled the virtues of imperial power for national health, seeing in 
empire and imperial rule the means by which Britain was to preserve its 
international standing.  For example, advertisements from this period proclaim 
products with a national identity associated with imperial might for goods as humble 
as soap and boot polish as well as the newfangled electric lights.  Discourses of 
nationalism thus came to be employed in the pursuit of imperialistic and national 
glory as Britain strove to redefine itself in the early years of the 20
th century.   
 
Children as the future strength of the nation 
Although Britain’s population had grown dramatically in the late 19
th century, it was 
dwarfed by those of the United States and the continental powers, and its birth-rate 
had slowed considerably.  Fears of population decline added to concerns about the 
quality of the British population, especially in light of a growing awareness of the 
depth and degree of poverty, as unemployed rural workers were forced into the cities 
to look for work during the agricultural depression, and of the high levels of infant 
mortality that existed throughout the country.  Despite improvements in real wages 
enjoyed by those who had regular work, poverty levels increased during the 1880s 
and 1890s, and urbanisation made this poverty far more visible to the urban middle-
class voters than it had been when most people lived on the land.  Rowntree’s survey 
of the working classes in York in the late 19
th century, as well as the Fabian   83 
Women’s Group’s survey of working-class households in Lambeth early in the 20
th 
century are typical of the attention paid to urban poverty in this period.  Increasingly 
detailed government surveys, such as the censuses in the late 19
th century, showed 
that perhaps one third of all Britons lived below the poverty line.  Moreover, infant 
mortality rates were rising.  In England and Wales in the 1880s, 142 of every 1,000 
infants born died within their first year of life; the figure increased to 154 during the 
1890s, reaching 163 by 1899.
13   
  The existence of so much poverty, disease and death in the midst of so much 
modernity demanded explanation.  The print media helped spread this ‘moral panic’ 
through stories of ‘race degeneration’, their letter pages filled with alarming 
correspondence from doctors, scientists, politicians, churchmen and moralists who 
believed that cities depleted the health and vigour of the population, regarding them 
as ‘the graves of our race’ as the Dean of Canterbury put it in 1887 (cited in 
Kingsley-Kent, 1999: 236).  With imperialistic pomposity, it was decided that the 
solution lay in gathering up the remaining ‘unoccupied’ territories of the world and 
peopling them with Britons.  Behind this lay the potential that through acquisition, 
possession and rule of colonies overseas, Britain’s health could be maintained.  This 
‘New imperialism’ gained momentum from the social Darwinist theories that saw, in 
competition with the other European powers, the United States and Japan as the 
means by which to create a robust society of virile men and morally superior women 
(Anderson, 1983).  Kingsley-Kent cites a letter published in The Times in 1900 in 
which Lord Rosebury (leader of the Liberal Party) argues that:  
 
an empire such as ours requires as its first condition an Imperial Race – a 
race vigorous and industrious and intrepid.  Health of mind and body exalt a 
nation in the competition of the universe.  The survival of the fittest is an 
absolute truth of the conditions of the modern world. (1999:236) 
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This shows evidence of intertextuality with Darwinian theories of evolution 
(survival of the fittest
14) which can be socially engineered through selective breeding 
and spread of imperial ideology and rule, thus also proving to be interdiscursive in 
drawing on Darwinian, imperial and nationalistic discourses to enhance the 
‘common sense’ of this argument.  Without explicitly stating as much, it is the 
British imperial race that is being flagged, the writer employing existential 
presupposition (in the noun phrase an empire such as ours) in an example of what 
Billig (1995) terms ‘banal nationalism’.  This flagging continued in ever-more 
visible ways in the coming decade as the country prepared for the European conflict 
which finally turned into the First World War.  In the Foucaultian sense of ‘truth’, 
the notion of empire is unchallenged and assumed to be a positive force.  The well-
being of the nation, and the empire, is articulated through the anthropomorphic use 
of physical and moral well-being.  The existential presupposition of there being such 
a thing as an ‘imperial race’ carries with it undoubtedly masculine qualities of 
strength, diligence and bravery.   There is also the existential presupposition that 
there is such a thing as ‘the modern world’ which requires a level of physical and 
ideological engagement that only Britons (presumably male Britons) can provide. 
Such a presupposition neatly avoids any mention of the extreme poverty in which 
many imperial subjects lived throughout the empire. 
  On the very fringes of this ‘modern world’ were the working classes who 
were viewed as being the most degenerate.  They comprised the largest proportion of 
unemployed (or ‘work-shy’, as they were more commonly described by the middle-
class commentators who carried the Protestant work ethic to a zealous extreme) and 
women with illegitimate children (‘fallen women’, who were often forced to turn to 
the workhouse laying-in wards).  The genetic inheritance argument seemed to prove 
that the working classes were degenerate from one generation to the next.  As 
Skeggs comments, ‘using the language of eugenics, the working class were coded as 
atavistic and potentially dangerous and polluting’ (1997: 43).  This gave the State 
the excuse to intervene in the welfare of the working-class, and as we shall see, by 
                                                 
14 This phrase appears in the 1869 edition of On the Origin of Species, and is actually an attributed 
quotation used by Darwin of Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Biology (1865), although Darwin’s use 
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1914 this included in particular war widows and their children in a way which would 
have been unacceptable for middle-class families.  Thom points out that  
 
legislation in practice is powerfully influenced by class, since women of the 
working class have far more of their lives affected by both permissive 
legislation allowing local authorities or employers to provide protective 
officials (as in the factory inspectorate, health visitors and midwives) and in 
controlling their behaviour on the streets and in public places (as in public 
order legislation, policing practice and licensing of drink and 
entertainments).  (1998: 8) 
 
As we shall see shortly, the surveillance of war widows demonstrated the lack of 
trust the State placed in these women without husbands.   
  The Boer Wars at the turn of the century proved pivotal in the development 
of social welfare reforms in Britain.  Convinced by the ideology (and propaganda) of 
empire, the British were confident of their success and determined to teach the Boers 
a lesson about the power and glory of the British empire.  It was, therefore, a great 
shock to British politicians and the public when the army suffered a series of 
humiliating and embarrassing defeats in the first months of the war.  By late 1900, 
those losses had been reversed, but the defeat of the 45,000 Afrikaner guerrilla 
soldiers required an additional 18 months and 450,000 British soldiers (Pakenham, 
1979; Attridge, 2003). 
  In the process of recruiting those soldiers, British officials discovered that 
almost 40% of those who sought to enlist did not meet military standards of physical 
health.  They were too short, suffered from heart trouble or rheumatism, had weak 
lungs or flat feet.  The scrawny, stunted ‘New Town Type’ could not stand up to the 
rigours of physical training and war, and even many of those who passed through the 
initial screening had to leave the army later when their health failed.  In all, then, 
there emerged a near panic about ‘race degeneration’, ‘physical degeneration’ and 
‘deterioration’, adding to the existing moral panic over levels of urban poverty, all of 
which were linked to nationalism. 
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Women as carers 
Such was the concern about ‘racial deterioration’ on the well-being of the nation, the 
government set up several committees to examine causes and remedies, the most 
public of which placed women in caring roles.  In 1904, one of these, the Inter-
Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, was typical of many others in 
its stress on the ‘ignorance’ and ‘fecklessness’ of mothers as a factor in the physical 
decline of the population, blaming mothers for making their children sick.  Major 
General Maurice (in Davin, 1997: 99) suggested that Britons might learn from the 
Germans how to raise a ‘virile race, either of soldiers or of citizens’.  It is telling that 
the military category is given prime position in this statement, and again it is a 
masculine role that is identified as being in most important need of improvement, 
especially given that women were not ‘full citizens’ until they achieve equal suffrage 
rights in 1928.  Using German cultural references which would become abhorrent in 
ten years’ time, he went on to observe that the essential component in this proposed 
remedy was that ‘the attention of the mothers of a land should be mainly devoted to 
the three Ks – Kinder, Kuche, Kirche’ (ibid).  Despite lacking citizenship rights, 
women are thus to blame for race deterioration, and the assumption is that they were 
not devoting sufficient time and energy to raising their children and looking after 
their husbands.  In direct opposition to the increasing paid employment opportunities 
for women, the reiteration of the ‘two spheres’ ideology is being employed to place 
women back within the domestic sphere.  For example, to emphasise this, the 
government committees collectively proposed a series of reforms that would compel 
mothers to learn ‘mothercraft’ in order to improve the health and welfare of their 
children, and thus the health and welfare of the State, and synechdocally the nation 
(see also Davin, 1997 and Skeggs, 1997).  
  By the beginning of the 20
th century, married women of all social classes 
were generally expected to stay at home and look after their children.  One of the 
few exceptions was the Lancashire cotton industry, where married women 
commonly worked for wages which could be comparable with those of male factory 
workers.  This has been hard-won, partly through the unionisation of this group of 
workers throughout the late 19
th century.  As Liddington and Norris (2000) point out,   87 
this led to the development of a powerful women’s suffrage movement in this part of 
the country.  James (2000) has observed that, in her sample of data taken from the 
Ministry of Pension widows’ claim files held at the National Archives, the majority 
of pension appeals come from this area of the country.
15  This suggests that the 
heightened political awareness of women in these areas did give them the confidence 
to approach the State for financial help in the inter-war years.  However, elsewhere 
in the country it was common practice for married women to remain at home and 
look after their husband and children.  The 1911 census returns for County Durham 
reveal that, of all the women who stated they were in employment, only 17% were 
‘married or widowed’ (widows were not separated out until the 1921 census).  These 
women were largely employed in laundry and washing services, where they 
comprised 44% of that workforce, or as charwomen, where they comprised 74%.  
Such jobs would have presumably allowed women a certain level of autonomy and 
flexibility of working hours than could be found in other employment, thus ensuring 
they could continue to look after their own homes and families.  In the most 
common employment for women, domestic service, just 16% are recorded as being 
married or widowed.  The next most common occupations, dressmaking and 
millinery, had just 14.5% of employees who were not in this category.  So the vast 
majority of women were employed in traditional roles which involved some form of 
caring, whether that be in domestic services or garment manufacture. 
  A spate of child welfare provisions followed the government reports into 
child welfare, most of which were aimed at the surveillance and regulation of the 
working classes.  The 1908 Children Act brought together and expanded legislation 
which, during the 19
th century, had sought to redefine childhood in line with a new 
discourse which framed children as helpless innocents in need of protection.  This in 
turn brought the family under the wider patriarchal agency of the State.  In keeping 
with the often punitive tone and substance of the infant welfare movement, much of 
it directed at women, the Children Act identified and penalised for the first time the 
neglect of children by their parents.  Thus child welfare and legislation of care 
                                                 
15 Although as described in the Introduction here, these files are largely taken from the ‘London’ area, 
rather than provincial towns and rural areas which undoubtedly ameliorates James’s argument on this 
point.   88 
cannot be understood as simply meaning nurture, treatment or support, since it is 
also represents control, punishment and regulation.  In the Foucaultian sense of 
power, it is indeed ‘everywhere’ – in public and private, the lives of the population 
are being regulated with increasingly punitive measures, with women implicitly 
responsible for the moral and now physical well-being of their children.  Moral 
purity came to be considered as essential for social stability.  Extending this social 
stability to the empire, Skeggs has observed ‘the moral condition of the nation was 
seen to derive from the moral standards of woman; woman came to signify the 
success or failure of the colonial project’ (1997: 42).  As Williamson comments, in 
this way 
 
[w]omen, the guardians of ‘personal life’, become a kind of dumping ground 
for all the values society wants off its back but must be perceived to cherish: 
a function rather like a zoo, or nature reserve, whereby a culture can proudly 
proclaim its inclusion of precisely what it has excluded.  (1986: 106; 
emphasis in original) 
 
  Contrary to old liberal convictions that the individual should operate free of 
interference from, or compulsion by, the State, the British infant welfare movement 
of the early 20
th century made it obligatory that individuals – and in this case 
particular individuals: mothers – address and resolve national problems of public 
health, domestic politics and imperial and international conflict.  The raising of 
children now became a national obligation on the part of women rather than a moral 
or social duty, and if they did not perform this function adequately, the State would 
step in to insist that they do it better.  Almost wholly ignoring the environmental 
factors working-class families faced – poverty, overcrowding, unsanitary streets, 
water and sewage systems, pollution, epidemic and chronic disease
16 – the State 
conferred upon women who had no control over them the responsibility, but not the 
resources, to improve the stock of the nation.  In addition, operating according to a 
largely negative set of images of working-class women, State officials and voluntary 
agencies like the Charity Organisation Society turned to laws that coerced mothers 
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into providing a certain kind and level of care, rather than legislation designed to 
help them by providing the necessary means.  In effect, as Ross (1993:197) explains, 
a social worker at this time observed of the working-class mother that the child 
welfare movement expected that she become ‘the unpaid nursemaid of the State’.  
Discourses of morality and nationalism were underpinned by the ideologies of 
patriarchy and parsimony. 
One of the cornerstones of classical liberalism was the institution of 
marriage.  Domestic ideologies, upon which liberalism was based, infused marriage 
and motherhood with an element of the divine.  The integrity of family life and the 
guardianship of all the comforts and benefits to be accrued therefrom rested with the 
wife and mother who presided over them.  Marriage and motherhood were regarded 
as being the ‘natural’ goal and thus the crowning achievements of a woman’s life. 
The wife and mother was worshipped and exalted in Victorian literature; poets 
conferred upon her praise of the highest order.  The so-called ‘angel in the house’ 
enjoyed a degree of respect and adoration that was unrivalled amongst the positions 
open to women at this time.  Coventry Patmore wrote a series of poems titled ‘The 
Angel in the House’ in the middle of the 19
th century, celebrating an idealised 
married couple.  It gave its name to the ‘angel in the house’ imagery which 
reinforced the two spheres ideology in which the woman was respectably confined 
indoors, creating a domestic haven for her husband and a nurturing, Christian 
atmosphere in which to supervise the bringing up of their children.  The more 
detailed implications of this confinement of women will be looked at in relation to 
widowhood, below.  
This ideological positioning of women as carers caused problems early in the 
First World War when it was realised that women would need to be drafted into the 
munitions factories to replace the men who had left to join up.
17  Although many 
working-class women were already in paid employment before the war, these were 
largely jobs which were not required for the war effort.  Indeed, female 
unemployment increased in the first few months of the war as workers in the cotton 
industry were laid off and middle-class families elected to do the patriotic thing and 
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economise – by laying off thousands of domestic servants.  Although there were 
many women who were ready to work for the war effort, the trades in which they 
were skilled were not those which were required.  As a result, as Thom (1998: 32) 
points out ‘women were to volunteer as women, rather than on the basis of particular 
qualifications, whether of labour experience, age, marital status or education’. 
After initial resistance, both State and voluntary sector proactively sought 
women to take on traditionally male roles in industry.  Whilst middle- and upper-
class women were more likely to be found in the voluntary sector where the absence 
of wages would not be such a problem, it is estimated that by far the largest 
proportion of female working-class war workers were to be found in munitions 
work.
18  
The link between munitions workers and the trusted British Tommy was 
highlighted by the press at the time who also referred to them as ‘Tommy’s sister’.  
However, within this patriarchal ideology the subservient role of sister, a weaker 
female who needs protection by stronger male guardians, underpins the apparent 
appreciation of many male commentators of this time.  For example, Hall Caine’s 
‘tribute’ to Tommy’s sister places the emphasis on her caring, compassionate, 
emotional femininity in the final clause: 
 
Tommy’s sister in the munitions factories, like Tommy in the trenches, lives 
in the last moment, now joking, teasing, laughing and wriggling, and then 
fuming and flaming and weeping over her troubles as if the world were 
coming to an end. (1916: 70) 
 
The mass mobilisation of women workers gave rise to concerns about 
perceived moral laxness.  Surveillance of these women came in public in the form of 
women police officers, mainly middle-class women who carried special 
responsibility for female misdemeanours.
19  In the factories, other middle-class 
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female welfare workers were employed to follow up absenteeism as well as monitor 
the health and well-being of the employees.  Whilst as Grayzel (2002: 49) has 
argued the introduction of female welfare workers in factories was partly based on a 
deeper concern the nation’s future need for healthy citizens, it could also be argued 
that it reveals a lack of trust vested in working-class women, many of whom were 
single.  These duel concerns are mirrored in the terms of the Royal Warrant, and are 
also found in the longer-standing charitable works of the time, reflecting a 
paternalistic approach to women without a male head to their household.  This will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
Legislation was brought in aimed specifically at women, such as the 1916 
addition to the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) which limited public house 
opening times after Lloyd George had raised concerns over the potential 
drunkenness of female munitions workers.  Even in his later memoir of this time, 
Lloyd George continues to entwine discourses of morality with those of patriotism, 
claiming that the ‘first effect of the War was rather to increase the habit of excessive 
drinking, and, indeed, to raise it into a real menace to the nation’ (1936: 195).  Other 
elements of DORA carried strong links back to the much-hated Contagious Diseases 
Act which early feminists such as Josephine Butler had fought so hard to have 
repealed some half century before.
20  All of this reflects the State’s mistrust of 
women, particularly working-class women, in a country where much of the male 
population was away from the home, and hence from the role of patriarchal guardian 
of the household. 
In the final months of the war, thousands of female munitions workers were 
laid off as it became clear that an Allied victory was close at hand.  The Restoration 
of Pre-War Practices Act (1918) ensured that the vaguely temporary nature of much 
women’s war work was rendered legally so.  Under this Act, the male trade unionists 
laid claim to aircraft making, as it was related to engineering, and to the skilled 
technique of arc-welding, in the process excluding the women who had pioneered 
the development of these trades during the war.  Thom (1998: 190) reports that, by 
June 1919 the Ministry of Munitions had discharged 90% of its female war workers.  
                                                 
20 The Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864 and 1869 were eventually repealed in 1886.   92 
The reconstruction of a (mythical?) domestic idyll was put forward by campaigners 
for reform of the urban slums.  As Thom points out, ‘the fit occupation for women, 
in the context of demobilisation, was being presented as housekeeping both in their 
own homes and in society at large’ (1998: 178).  Retraining schemes set up by the 
Ministry of Labour sought to place women back in traditional roles.  This is clearly 
highlighted in one committee report from March 1919: 
 
Industrial training will for the present by confined to normal women’s trades, 
for example clothing manufacture, in the processes known as women’s 
processes before the war in which recent enquiry has shown there is a need 
for skilled workers and a good prospect of employment.
21 
 
Thus the ‘restoration of pre-war practices’ not only returned men to their 
traditional employment roles but also women to the pre-war status of carers and 
subservient employees.  It is also important to acknowledge that many of the jobs 
which had been done by women in the pre-war years had vanished.  Industries 
engaged in producing luxury items such as jewellery and lace traditionally employed 
large numbers of women.  The austerity of the war years led to the decline of these 
industries and they failed to recover afterwards.  In her autobiography of this period, 
Kathleen Dayus describes how she had worked throughout the war in Birmingham’s 
metal trades, where jewellery workshops were converted to uniform button-making.  
She writes that, by 1920, her well-paid factory work had dried up.  ‘Plenty of people 
were laid off and many girls, particularly married women who had found no 
difficulty in getting jobs in munitions and such like a year before, were now reduced 
to whatever odd jobs they could find’ (1985: 124).   Dayus’s recollections of 
working-class life in the Midlands mirrors that of the country overall where there 
was a particular impetus to return married women to the home, preferably to look 
after children who would be the country’s future.   
The government had seen the risk of demobilising a huge number of troops 
en masse.  Many troops had joined up ‘for the duration’, so were kept in the armed 
services for many months or even years after the end of the war.  In fact, the 
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government did not abolish conscription until April 1920.  Demobilisation was, 
therefore, a very slow process.  Many of those troops who had been promised ‘a land 
fit for heroes’ by Lloyd George, found that even after the prolonged delay in their 
release, their country had no work to offer them.  The personal columns of 
newspapers at this time record the sense of disillusionment, such as the following 
advertisement, found exactly a year after the Armistice: 
 
Ex-Artillery Major, reliable and trustworthy, age 24, single, just demobilized, 
offers his services anywhere in any capacity at any price.  Will any Patriot 
communicate: 
The Times, 11
th November, 1919. 
 
The demobilised serviceman here suggests that it is a prospective employer’s 
patriotic duty to employ him as someone who has so recently defended the country.  
Against such an appeal, the much-feted women war workers had very little chance 
of being given preferential treatment.  The newspapers which had feted the women 
war workers earlier rapidly reversed their editorial policy to the pre-war ideology 
which placed women firmly back in the domestic sphere.  There were frequent 
stories of former munitions workers queuing for unemployment benefit wearing the 
smart clothes their wartime wages had enabled them to buy.  The Daily Chronicle 
ran an article under the headline ‘Unemployed in Fur Coats’ (6
th December, 1918), 
contrasting these well-clad ‘girls’ with the demobilised heroes also queuing for dole.  
The government quickly responded to this negative reporting by matching the 
middle-class ‘problem’ of servant shortages with female unemployment.  Any 
woman who refused work would have her State benefit stopped.  Domestic service, 
with its long hours, low pay and often deplorable working conditions was probably 
one of the most hated types of employment for women, and they refused to go back 
in their thousands.   
Wages for women workers remained lower than those paid to men employed 
in comparable jobs.  For female workers, it seems there was a perception that 
widows were partly responsible for the lower wages, as is the case today with 
immigrant workers who are prepared to take on low-paid work.  This echoes 
Asquith’s reservations about ‘subsidising’ widows and suppressing wages, as voiced   94 
in the debates in November 1914 that will be discussed below.  There is an 
intertextual reference to this in a Labour Party report from 1923, commissioned in 
preparation for the Widowed Mothers’ Pensions Act.  In this report, Davies, a 
member of parliament in the first Labour administration, felt compelled to defend 
women against this perception.  He observed that from the 1911 census report for 
England and Wales ‘the percentage of widows occupied in industry is three times as 
great as the percentage of married women who are occupied’ (Davies, 1923: 7).  The 
problems women experienced in finding skilled employment were exacerbated for 
widows, who were traditionally older than their fellow female workers.  Rather than 
simply blaming widows for being most obviously responsible for lowering women’s 
wages by more willingly accepting such rates, Davies sought to explain the plight of 
the widow: 
 
Presumably, she has been out of the industrial world for some years, and has 
thus lost whatever skill she may have previously acquired.  She has no 
knowledge of how to obtain work of the types at which she is suited, nor of 
the worth of her labour.  And, for the sake of children waiting for food, she is 
prepared to accept whatever pay and conditions are offered.  Not only is her 
own supply price thus lowered, but her competition pulls down the wages of 
other women workers. (Davies, 1923: 8) 
 
The presupposition that the widow has children is used to draw on discourses 
of women as carers for the nation’s future, her self-sacrifice in willingly taking 
lower paid work is triggered by the prepositional phrase for the sake of the children.  
The widow is presented as being naïve and unworldly, unable to find better-paid 
work by her own active agency in being ignorant of her potential.  Although 
commencing with the hedge presumably, which in itself acts as a common sense 
assumption to engage the reader with agreement, the intensification of this point is 
made through the absence of other hedging: [she has] lost whatever skill; she has no 
knowledge.  The hedging that is employed is used to cast uncertainty as to her 
abilities: skills she may have previously acquired.  The women in this text are either 
naïve and unskilled, in need of the State’s patriarchal guidance, or else are rendered 
invisible as economic commodities.  However, despite the well-intentioned words of   95 
Davies, there is a strong underlying patriarchal ideology to support the case of the 
State knowing what is best for the widow.   
Elsewhere in society, the inter-war years saw a resurgence of the cult of the 
‘perfect housewife’, based on middle-class ideas.  New labour-saving devices for the 
home, such as electric washing machines and vacuum cleaners joined the earlier 
vogue for electric lighting.  New magazines such as Homes and Gardens (1919) and 
Good Housekeeping (1922) appeared on the market to help the middle-class woman 
achieve the ‘perfect home’.  In 1924, the Good Housekeeping Institute was 
established to test domestic appliances and other products new to the market, 
offering the housewife consumer ‘scientific’ guidance.  There was a movement 
promoted by the women’s magazines and advertisements of the period to encourage 
the housewife to think of herself as the ‘domestic expert’.
22  However, as Spring 
Rice’s survey (1930) of working-class wives shows, these women’s health had been 
worn away by continual pregnancies, poor diet and the sheer hard work of trying to 
run a household in buildings possibly condemned as slums years before.  Whilst life 
for the middle classes improved during the inter-war years, for working-class people 
it was demonstrably worse than in it had been during Victorian times.  It took 
another world war for the slum clearances to be effective and by that time the 
Welfare State had rescued many from extreme poverty.  
 
Charitable assistance and the foundations of State welfare: 
notions of the deserving and the undeserving poor. 
 
Upper- and middle-class women, often unmarried, had engaged in philanthropic 
works with ‘the poor’ for centuries.  Christian teaching about charitable giving has 
long motivated philanthropic work.  As Midwinter has commented, ‘alms-giving has 
also been utilised as a kind of afterlife insurance’ (1994:15) whereby the givers 
would have more than half an eye on their souls rather than the bodies of the 
recipients (ibid).  The increased awareness of the conditions of the urban poor in 
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Victorian Britain was largely owing to the efforts of social reform campaigners such 
as the Rowntree, Booth and the Fabian Society.  During the First World War, this 
philanthropic energy was channelled into organising countless new charities to raise 
money for just about every cause: the YMCA Hut Fund; the Birmingham Cripples; 
the Police Aided Association for Destitute Children; and the Blue Cross Fund 
(which declared its aim  ‘to help the wounded horses at the war’).  These were all 
what could be termed ‘deserving poor’.  This category was widely understood to 
mean those who were in financially straitened circumstances, but who were morally 
and materially not responsible for their perceived misfortune.  The dichotomy of the 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ would have a profound influence on the way war 
widows’ pensions legislation would be drawn up and implemented and, as we shall 
see in the case studies, is also part of the discourses the widows themselves draw 
upon. 
  The Charity Organisation Society (COS) was set up in 1869 to coordinate 
mainly London-based charities to make better use of their resources.  The principles 
governing who should be given charitable help, as promoted by the COS, were 
based on classic liberalism whereby self-dependence was encouraged only to those 
who were deemed capable of becoming self-supporting, a principle which still 
underpinned charitable work after the First World War in even the most tolerant of 
charities, such as the Emergency Help Committee of the British Red Cross and 
Order of St John.  As Thane has explained, the COS pioneered the practice of case-
work whereby enquiries were made as to the background of claimants.  The ‘worthy’ 
were given help in the form of money and equipment, and were assisted in finding 
work, but were under surveillance in the form of the apparently beneficent social 
work visitor who made frequent calls on the claimant.  Those whose condition was 
deemed to be ‘due to improvidence or thriftlessness and [for whom there was] no 
hope of being able to make him [sic] independent in the future’ (Thane, 1996: 22) 
were generally not considered eligible for charitable assistance.  Thus the COS ran 
on principles which were based around discourses of ‘worthy’ and ‘undeserving’ 
poor, which are linked closely with those of morality and eugenics (in that the poor 
were predestined to be irredeemably poor, and thus beyond moral salvation).  The   97 
COS seems to embody the description ‘the cold hand of charity’, which implies an 
unfeeling, begrudging administration of aid, an image which is called upon during 
parliamentary debates relating to war widows’ pensions, as discussed in the 
Introduction. 
Although the COS’s draconian principles were not widely adopted outside of 
London, they do reveal a more visible articulation of the discourses which underpin 
the majority of charitable and State policies for dealing with poverty.  Where the 
COS did have a longer lasting influence was in the systematic use of welfare 
visitors. 
In the late 19
th century, as Holden (2004) has shown, middle-class women 
began to formalise their roles as welfare visitors, and were presented as guardians of 
maternal, Christian identities.  As with the ‘lady visitors’ employed by the Ministry 
of Pensions, they are part of the wider network of surveillance which Foucault 
(1977) describes developing throughout the preceding century. 
Other researchers looking at widow’s pensions have looked in detail at the 
workings of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Families Association (Lomas, 1997, James, 
2000).  To review briefly this organisation’s relevance here, it is necessary to 
understand that the State pension scheme for war widows was based on the system 
which the SSFA had set up in 1885 to: 
 
help by a small allowance, where help is needed, and, as far as Funds will 
admit, first of all, married women [including widows], irrespective of their 
being on the strength or not; second, aged parents who have been dependent 
on their sons when at home; and, third, in finding suitable employment for 





Gildea, as founder and Chairman of the SSFA, is setting out the ‘deserving’ 
categories who could receive help from the charity, but mitigates this help by 
including the condition that it would be dependant on the charity’s own financial 
position.  Any excessive generosity is similarly mitigated by the premodification of 
allowance with small.  The Protestant work ethic is also clear here, where those 
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‘who are able and willing to help themselves’ are included as a separate category for 
assistance.  Hidden within this offer of help is the condition that it will be ‘where 
help is needed’, and it is the criteria on which this is based that links it so closely 
with the more general discourses of morality that prevailed in the middle classes at 
this time.  
The SSFA, with its network of local offices and ‘lady visitors’ who would 
personally look after individual families’ (Gildea, letter of 14
th March 1895), 
provided a ready-made arrangement for the State to link into on the outbreak of war.  
They readily continued their officious work ‘to bring sympathetic relief to the homes 
suddenly bereft of their breadwinners’ (Gildea, 1916: 179).  Gildea is positioning the 
SSFA as beneficent, patriarchal guardian of the deserving poor, although the actual 
people affected are absent in their synechdocal nominalisation as the homes.   It 
continued to administer pensions and separation allowances on the State’s behalf 
until 1916, when the Royal Warrant was finally implemented.  Its lady visitors were 
retained by the Ministry of Pensions, thus forming a continuity of intervention and 
surveillance.  The committee membership of the SSFA (which changed its name to 
the Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airman’s Families Association in 1919) contained many 
members who also served on other charitable committees, such as Lady Ampthill 
who served on the Emergency Help Committee of the British Red Cross and Order 
of St John, which will be discussed below.  This common membership, involving 
upper- and upper-middle-class men and women, provides a link between the State 
committees and the charitable organisations, where common attitudes relating to 
morality and social welfare meant there was little diversity in the terms under which 
help would be granted to those in need. 
Conceptions of what is right is negotiated through, and in opposition to, 
wider social and political norms and values, and in conjunction with, for example, 
counter discourses offered by family and alternative value system or habits of 
everyday life.  Social policy and the practices of welfare professionals are crucial to 
the legitimisation, surveillance and control of social welfare provision in both the 
formal, ‘public’ and informal, ‘private’ spheres.   99 
As will be discussed in more detail below, there was an assumption that 
women would act as unpaid carers for their disabled ex-servicemen husbands though 
the difficult inter-war years which included the Depression.
24  Increasing State 
intervention into the private family life in the inter-war years, superficially at least, 
served to improve the health of the population, such as found in the child welfare 
legislation.  However, the underlying surveillance this entailed served to monitor the 
health and living conditions of the population, leading to a heightened awareness of 
poverty.  Organisations such as the Co-operative Women’s Guild had campaigned 
since the early part of the century for maternity allowances to be paid directly to 
women, successfully getting maternity benefit included in the National Insurance 
Act of 1911, and within two years had the Act amended to allow this benefit to be 
paid directly to women.
25  They campaigned on issues which related to government 
and national concerns about racial deterioration.  After the war, they also took up the 
campaign for wider distribution of birth control information.  This concern with 
maternalist issues was coupled with an anti-militarist campaign which was 
characterised by the ‘white poppy’ crusade in the post-war years.   
After the Second World War, the Co-operative Women’s Guild again 
engaged in political lobbying in their objections to the apparent enforced 
dependency that was inherent in Beveridge’s proposals for the welfare reforms that 
resulted in the 1948 Welfare State.   
The Emergency Help Committee of the British Red Cross and Order of Saint 
John worked in cooperation with other charities to support ex-servicemen and their 
families after the war.  Reports of the Joint Committee show how they also worked 
in conjunction with other charities to help widows out of debts which were seen to 
have been incurred through no fault of their own.  For example, the 1930 report 
gives the following case study: 
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Late husband served in the Devon Regiment from August 1914 to July 1916 
and was pensioned 40% Synovitis Right Knee; died November 1929 in a 
Mental Hospital, leaving a non-pensionable widow.  The British Legion 
having made a loan to set the widow up in a drapery business, the 
Emergency Help Committee settled in full the considerable debts incurred on 




Like the State-funded war widows’ pension, the Joint Committee use the 
anonymous ex-serviceman’s implicitly good service (here, he is assumed to be one 
of the earliest volunteers, serving right through to the worst fighting of July 1916 at 
which point he sustained a pensionable injury), and the fact that his widow has 
already been deemed worthy of financial assistance from another charity (the British 
Legion) as supporting evidence for their own intervention.  This notion of 
‘worthiness’ is further enhanced by the assumption that the widow is self employed, 
putting the loan from the British Legion to effective use in setting up her own 
business.  Her independence of need from further charitable funding is carried in the 
final sentence where it is stated she is managing her business profitably.  The 
readership of this annual report would have been limited to the members of the 
executive committee of the British Red Cross and the Order of St John.  As with all 
the other case studies citied in each annual report, the Emergency Help Committee’s 
role as beneficent patriarchal guardian of the wives and dependants of ex-
servicemen is being highlighted, in this example through the intensifying adjective 
considerable to premodify debts, placing the Committee in the active agency role of 
settling these debts, rather than allocating this to the widow herself.   
The Emergency Help Committee continued its work through the Second 
World War, although in that conflict it was forced to change its terms of engagement 
in recognition of the wider contribution of women to that war effort.  For example, 
in 1942 Section 2 of Governing Principles was amended from ‘That the man did 
active War service’ to ‘That the applicant did War service’.  The gender neutral 
applicant recognises that not only were women involved in active service in this war 
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(as seen above, this was also the case for more than a million women in the First 
World War), but that women could have dependants.  This shows a shift in the 
patriarchal ideology whereby women could be acknowledged as the main 
breadwinner in a household by the middle of the century. 
 
Separation allowances and widows’ pensions 
In the first two decades of the 20
th century, the newfangled discourses of social 
welfare are linked into the charitable provision with which most Britons would have 
been very familiar.  As discussed above, for centuries a shifting system of charitable 
provision for the poor had been distributed largely to those who were classed as the 
‘deserving poor’.  By and large, this would include widows who were reduced to 
poverty after the death of their husbands and thus were (usually) regarded as being 
in this position through no fault of their own.  For younger widows with young 
families, this was often a very hard life as childcare commitments meant they were 
unable to go out to work.  Reliance on family for support was usually the first 
resource these women called upon, but most such woman quickly remarried.  Young 
widows were frequently the wives of soldiers, so would be associated with a 
garrison town or else ‘on the strength’ of the regiment.   The ‘on the strength’ 
system limited the number of men who were given official permission to marry by 
their commanding officer, and hence the number of wives who were allowed to 
follow their husbands around their postings.
27   This much-used military phrase 
indicates that these soldiers’ wives were the ‘strength’ and therefore a complement 
to the regiment, not a weakness to it, and as such were expected to carry out 
domestic tasks such as cooking, cleaning and laundry.  As Trustram (1984) has 
shown, most such women remarried with quite astonishing rapidity following the 
deaths of their husbands, some woman remarrying several times.  Of course, the 
haste with which such women remarried was most often explained as being out of 
necessity rather than any true attachment, but it is difficult to find any documented 
evidence of such hasty remarriages as being regarded as ‘indecent’ haste.  In a 
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strongly patriarchal society, it was expected that a woman should be looked after, 
materially as well as financially, by a male breadwinner.  However, this informal 
arrangement whereby a soldier’s widow would be taken on as the wife of another 
soldier worked effectively in the regular army where the proportion of servicemen to 
women was strictly regulated by the ‘on the strength’ system.  The army would 
generally tolerate these ‘on the strength’ wives, although as Trustram has observed, 
they occupied an ambivalent position which reflected contradictory attitudes: 
 
The wives’ morality was continually questioned – they were considered dirty 
and shiftless, a corrupting influence on the brave defenders of the Empire. 
Yet at the same time the women were useful to do the men’s washing and 
sewing and in their role as wife and mother they were idealised as a 
steadying, humanising influence on the licentious, drunken soldiery.  (1984: 
30) 
 
Thus by 1914 the regular soldier’s wife was already enshrined in army (and 
national) culture as someone who was untrustworthy, yet who should embody the 
‘angel of the house’ ideology that had risen to unprecedented heights in the latter 
half of the 19
th century.  The war widows’ pension system was devised along the 
lines of previous charitable provision which enshrined such ideologies.  That this 
notion of the army widow was based around the institution of the army rather than 
the civilian world would have a huge effect on the lives of men who had simply 
signed up ‘for the duration’.   
The existence of a volunteer rather than a conscript army in Britain in 1914 
had a significant impact upon the perception and kind of separation allowances 
granted.  As Grayzel (2002: 23) points out the British government viewed separation 
allowances as an aid to recruitment: with generous allowances, men could join up 
and feel confident that their families would not endure any financial or material 
harm whilst they were away fighting for ‘king and country’.  The living standard of 
soldiers’ and sailors’ families was maintained, at first, by a combination of private 
and public sources that granted payments to all wives, and through them, children.  
What makes this allowance so different from previous provision is that it was not   103 
means tested.  As the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, commented during one of the 
debates in November, 1914: 
 
We have no motive of any sort of kind for failure in liberality of generosity. 
On the contrary, our motive is the other way.  We want to get as many 
recruits as we can to the Colours, and therefore we, of all people in the 




This link between separation allowances and pension, and recruitment can be clearly 
seen also in the fact that the government issued propaganda posters designed to 
publicise the allowances available to families.  There was thus a strong emphasis on 
the State’s role as financial provider in the place of the absent husband, implicitly 
acting as moral as well as material guardian.  In the above extract of Asquith’s 
speech, we can also see him highlighting the British government’s (and hence 
metonymically the country’s) presumed moral superiority to that of other countries, 
implicitly the ‘enemy’ but also countries which were perceived to be threatening 
Britain’s place in the world. 
  Because the allowance was paid to a serviceman’s wife (or de facto wife) 
and was granted as a right based on his service to the nation, women could and 
would be disqualified if they failed to fulfil their duty to their husbands.  In this way, 
the State saw part of its role as being obliged to subject women to surveillance, 
making infidelity and misbehaviour grounds for the denial of this allowance (see 
also Pedersen, 1993).   
  However, in a startling piece of insight into the reality of working-class 
culture, separation allowances and pensions were ultimately granted to women who 
could prove their marriage or de facto marriage
29, most commonly through the 
serviceman stating on his enlistment papers that such a woman was financially 
supported by him.  Both sets of women were treated equally, the amount they were 
paid rising occasionally throughout the war and in the decades that followed, but 
                                                 
28 Parliamentary Debates, 5
th Series Vol LXXII (1914-1915) p30. 
29 My own research has shown that approximately half of the women who were married had actually 
given birth to their first child within the first nine months of their marriage.  However, out of the 200 
case files I have examined, I found very few cases of women claiming a pension without being 
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never reaching a level when they could live on this amount in comfort.  In keeping 
with Victorian self-help ideals, the allowance was set at a rate just above subsistence 
level in order to keep the widows of servicemen out of the workhouse, but assuming 
that they would have another source of income – primarily, a job of their own.  In 
1919, after much discussion, the amount was set at £1 a week for a childless widow 
under the age of 40, and remained at this level until 1967.
30  The arrival of universal 
welfare provision in Britain in 1948 saved many of these widows from abject 
poverty as their wage-earning capacities declined with age, but as we shall see in the 
case studies which follow this section, not all war widows were so lucky. 
  Again in the early debates on the pension legislation, Asquith had 
highlighted the expectation, indeed the presumption, that working-class women 
would be able to support themselves by going out to work.  He presents his 
argument for a minimum pension amount in terms of ‘fairness’ to other unpensioned 
female workers, doubtless bearing in mind the feminist calls for equality in the 
workplace. 
 
There is then the problem, the most serious problem of all, the problem of the 
childless widow, who is in most cases a young woman, a woman accustomed 
to work, a woman who, under normal conditions, would work and go to work 
after she was unfortunately deprived of the companionship and support of 
her husband […] You must consider, and you ought to consider, when you 
are dealing with a matter of this kind, the effect on the labour market, on the 
conditions of female labour in particular, and the standard of wages which 
women generally earn in this country.  You must consider the effect upon 
them of letting loose, in competition with their sister women, a number of 
these young widows highly subsidised by the State.
31 
 
In recognition of the realities of working-class life, Asquith assumes that all 
‘childless widows’ will be in paid employment.  In direct contradiction of the 
middle-class containment of the widow in the weeks and months immediately 
following her husband’s death (see Flanders, 2003), he assumes the working-class 
                                                 
30 It is useful to compare this with Spring Rice’s survey of working-class married women in 1939. 
This showed that almost half of these women had less that 4/- per person a week in housekeeping 
money and were in very poor health compared with that of the 17% who had 10/- or more per person. 
(Spring Rice, 1939) 
31 Parliamentary Debates, 5
th Series Vol LXVII (1941-15), p31.   105 
widow would not have such a period of closeted mourning when he employs the 
repetition of work: ‘would work and go to work after [her husband’s death]’.  
He presents the case for a widow’s pension as part of wider concerns about 
the economy in wartime, thus linking to discourses of patriotism in terms of what is 
good for the country.  He then draws on intertextual reference to pre-war concerns 
raised by feminist and other social campaigners for better wages for women, 
maintaining the earlier link to wider economic concerns but more specifically to 
female employment on a national level.  This carries the assumption that women’s 
wages are lower, the negative connotations triggered by the series of destructive 
images which follow in the final sentence here.  The responsibility for these negative 
actions is placed on the other members of parliament, who have ‘let loose’ 
pensioned widows on the employment market.  This triggers assumptions of 
negativity through lack of control, women who are also uninhibited by a patriarchal 
head to their household.   
Drawing on feminist discourses, he refers to sister women, but here employs 
this discourse to support his argument for a lower pension rate to reduce the risk of 
disruption to some assumed female sisterhood.  Asquith’s argument links this speech 
with that later made by Rhys Davies (above), although he used it to support the case 
for a widow’s pension, whereas Asquith had used the suppression of wages as an 
argument to reduce the amount paid to widows. 
This extract is immediately followed by Asquith’s warning that a ‘lavish’ 
pension would impose an ‘enormous burden’ on the ‘resources of this country’ for 
years to come’ (ibid).  Thus the long-term financial condition of the nation was 
coupled with recruitment concerns to underpin the legislation which was drafted, 
rather than an immediate concern with the social welfare of widows and dependants. 
  Whilst the ever-cautious Asquith employed first-wave feminist discourses as 
a weapon against women to cover up the underlying parsimonious ideology, Bonar 
Law employed discourses of nationalism to apparently support a more generous 
allowance.  In the presentation of the interim report of the Select Committee to 
parliament on 24
th February, 1915, he states: 
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I think we must realise, all of us, that on the whole allowances of all kinds 
which are made by the State are made in this spirit, which was the spirit of 
every member of the Committee, and which represents the spirit of the 
House of Commons and of the country, that however great may be the 
demands caused by the War on the financial resources of the country, the 
men who are giving up their lives in her service and their dependants come 
first, and that in what we give to them there must be no suggestion that we 
are not treating them really in a way that the heart and conscience of the 
country will regard as just and generous.
32 
 
Bonar Law interpolates the common opinion climatically, from the members of the 
Select Committee, to the House of Commons then to the country.  He frames the 
‘spirit’ of public funding of allowances as being in the national interest and by the 
nation.  The politicians’ part in ordering men to the front line to act as ‘cannon 
fodder’ is downplayed as the servicemen themselves are the active agents in the verb 
phrase giving up their lives.  Discourses of national identity are drawn upon to frame 
them as being willing to act on their country’s part, here personified as female so 
emphasising the need to be defended from enemy attack.  As Billig (1995: 58) points 
out, the love of the Ingroup provided the most important motivation for going to war 
in the 20
th century for Western nations, where ‘the willingness to die in the cause of 
the homeland precedes a motive to kill’ (ibid).  This homeland included the ‘defence 
of women and children, of family and honour’ (Grayzel, 2002: 9), as represented in 
recruitment posters and the wartime media.
33 
Bonar Law uses the inclusive pronoun we to continue the earlier 
interpellation of this view being that of ‘the country’.  Like Asquith, he employs 
multiple negation to intensify his point of rejecting the agentless ‘suggestion’ of a 
lack of generosity.  However, as van Dijk et al (1997: 173) point out, the use of 
‘apparent empathy’ can be employed to make decisions appear beneficial to 
Outgroup members.  Here, Bonar Law, although presenting a superficial case for 
unparalleled generosity of State-funded allowances, is setting this within an 
argumentative move where the State/country could be the victims in that there would 
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th Series Vol. LXVII (1914-1915), p70. 
33 The ‘Women of Britain’ poster discussed in the previous section of this thesis (p53) is an example 
of how this was employed in early recruitment posters in Britain.  Grayzel (2002) further shows that 
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be unlimited expenditure involved.  The ‘heart and conscience of the country’ could 
also be rendered less favourable towards unlimited expenditure by this implicit 
threat, and thus allow the State to impose strict terms under which the widow could 
be granted a pension.  Such terms could then be formulated as ‘just and generous’ to 
the country, rather than to the individual widow.  This is exactly what happened with 
the widows in question here, where their idea of ‘justice’ is less to do with the 
national debt than with personal debt.  
In keeping with the increasing State intervention into the family that had 
been such an important part of 19
th century imperial ideology, the war widows’ 
pension (under the Royal Warrant of 1916) was devised to confine the woman to the 
domestic role of idealised mother whilst refusing to pay her sufficient money to keep 
her within the home.  At around half the ‘minimum wage’ of £1 a week, the pension 
was actually devised to prevent anyone from relying entirely on the State for their 
livelihood, and took for granted the assumption that working-class women would be 
earning a living from some form of paid employment.  The payment was thus more 
of a token gesture, yet this token is one which the women themselves adopted as a 
badge of pride.  The large number of women who appealed for a pension reflects the 
attraction of the public status of ‘war widowhood’ that they aspired to in many 
cases, rather than the actual amount to afford financial security, as will be discussed 
in more detail shortly.  
  As discussed briefly above, widows of servicemen in the regular army tended 
to re-marry, more out of practical need than strong attachment.  However, this 
convention became an assumption that younger widows would remarry, and as such 
was built into the war widows’ pension scheme, whereby a widow would forfeit her 
pension on remarriage (and thus re-enter the patriarchal institution of marriage) in 
exchange for a one-off ‘gratuity’ amounting to a year’s pension payments.  The 
Depression of the 1920s and early 1930s meant that for many widows the war 
widows’ pension was the main source of income, in terms of financial contribution 
as well as being a regular, reliable contribution to the household income.  This 
resulted in many women having little choice but to cohabit because they would lose 
their war widows’ pension on remarriage.      108 
The discourses of morality which were built into the Royal Warrant included 
the image of a sober, discreet, grieving widow who would care for the children of 
the fallen hero.  These children were, unquestionably, of greater value to the 
country’s future, being of noble stock, their fathers having given their lives for king 
and country.  Many widows had their pensions suspended or withdrawn when they 
were adjudged to have failed to maintain the honoured memory of the ‘glorious 
dead’ who were immortalised in stone in just about every community in the country. 
It was the role of the Special Grants Committee of the Ministry of Pensions to 
handle such cases.   
  The Special Grants Committee was set up in 1916.  As Lomas (1997) 
explains, it had wide-ranging powers which could not be appealed against.
34  She 
states: 
 
It was able to pay alternative pensions, supplement pensions in cases of 
hardship, allow lump sum payments to cover emergencies, decide whether 
individual war widows were entitled to a pension or a gratuity, award extra 
allowances, pay education grants, remove children from the care of their 
mothers, arrange fostering and adoption for children in need of new homes, 
and to impose sanctions against war widows. (ibid, 1997: 89) 
 
These powers were imposed in three different ways. 
 
[Firstly, the SGC] had the power to administer pensions on behalf of any war 
widow whose payment should not be forfeited for a single lapse into 
misconduct provided that the misconduct had ceased.  Secondly, the 
Committee had the ultimate sanction of forfeiture of pension.  Thirdly, they 
[could] remove children from their mothers’ care and place them in the care 
of the Ministry of Pensions in cases where they are found to be suffering 
from neglect or want of proper care. (ibid) 
 
The ‘misconduct’ of which widows could be found guilty was largely based on 
middle-class ideals of passive and virtuous widowhood and motherhood
35.  As such, 
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drunkenness, cohabitation and the birth of illegitimate children could be used to 
punish the widow.   
The SGC comprised 15 members, mainly ex-military representatives, some 
of whom were also members of SSFA or the Royal Patriotic Fund, and others who 
were called upon for their experience of committee work, such as Poor Law 
Guardians.  As Lomas (1997: 87) has observed, ‘overall, the personnel and workings 
of the committee reflected male middle-class ideals and prejudices’.  Three female 
members were also appointed.  These were Mrs Shakespear, the Honorary Secretary 
of the Birmingham Local Committee (whom we shall come across again in the case 
studies which follow), Miss Kelly, who held the same position in Portsmouth Local 
Committee, and Mrs McKenna, who had already served on the Statutory Committee 
which looked into the formation of the war pensions’ scheme.  From evidence 
elsewhere in Ministry of Pensions files held in the National Archives, it appears Mrs 
McKenna
36 held strongly eugenisist views.  For example, in a letter dated 25
th 
February, 1918, she writes: 
 
There is one type of unmarried mother to whom, in no circumstances, should 
pension be payable.  I mean the mentally deficient woman, not sufficiently 
feeble-minded to be placed under control, who drifts from one workhouse to 
another, burdening the community with a succession of feebler minded 
children.  It would better for her to be exterminated than endowed.
37 
 
  McKenna is framing her argument within the parsimonious ideology of 
charitable social welfare which divided the poor into those who were deserving of 
                                                                                                                                         
35 Grayzel (2002:10) points out that this was one of the concepts employed by moral guardians at this 
time, citing the November 1914 edition of the newsletter of the British National Vigilance 
Association which reminded its readers that the serviceman ‘needed to take away as his last 
remembrance of the women and girls of England all that was pure and gentle and straight and true’. 
The terms of the Royal Warrant made this moral perception a legal obligation for war widows. 
36 There is a Mrs R. McKenna who served on the Joint Committee until her death in 1941.  Lomas 
suggests that the Mrs McKenna who served on the SGC could have been the wife of Reginald 
McKenna, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1915, also serving on the Select Committee on 
Naval and Military Services (Pensions and Grants).  Although there is no evidence to prove a link 
between the two, the overlap between different committee memberships would support the argument 
Lomas sets out, and the inclusion of the initial ‘R.’ in the Annual Reports for the Joint Committee 
would strengthen this claim. 
37 PIN 15/405, Mrs McKenna to Sir Matthew Nathan (later Chair of the SCG), 25
th February, 1918.  
She was writing in response to a request for comments on the proposed bill for the Endowment of 
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help and those who were undeserving.  The unquestioned assumption is that ‘feeble-
mindedness’ is inherited and, indeed, worsens with each generation, the view which 
had underpinned much of the social welfare legislation in the late 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries, and which went on to influence later legislation.  The strong eugenisist 
argument she presents culminates in the ultimate, violent sanction against the 
undeserving: extermination.  The lax sexual morality of unmarried mothers is 
assumed to result in large numbers of children who will require the beneficent 
support of the community (or, as in the case of the Endowment of Motherhood, more 
specifically the State).   
Negative attitudes towards one of the most defenceless groups in society, the 
unmarried mother who lacks education and self-resourcefulness, are evident in 
McKenna’s assumption that some form of control would be beneficial to them.  The 
precise nature of this ‘control’ is left unsaid, but would probably include some form 
of institutional care at a time when it was not uncommon for such women to be 
incarcerated in mental homes for years, often the rest of their lives.  As is clear from 
this letter, such treatment was presented as being beneficial to society as a whole.  
The woman is positioned as the active agent of this supposedly negative action, the 
negativity triggered by burdening which carries connotations of unwelcome 
encumbrances.  Furthermore, the choice of drifting is semantically linked with 
waywardness, aimlessness and a lack of control, linking back to the perception of a 
positive force of control in the preceding clause.  The final sentence cited here 
employs what Van Dijk et al (1997: 173) term ‘apparent empathy’, where the highly 
negative action of ‘extermination’ is used in an argumentative move that presents it 
as being beneficial to the woman.  Ultimately, the polarities of extermination or 
endowment are presented as the only two options.  The patriarchal and 
parsimoneous ideologies which are so strongly linked to discourses of social welfare 
are employed here in connection with national identity (following the older 
eugenicist arguments discussed earlier) and morality (it is unmarried women who 
are assumed here to the least deserving of State care). 
  Although McKenna is writing to Nathan before his appointment as chairman 
of the SGC in July 1919, she was to continue to serve on that committee under him   111 
for many years to come.  It would appear that her views were not so objectionable to 
him that he had her replaced.   
  As discussed above, the war widow’s pension could form a vital part of the 
household income.  If the Ministry of Pensions found that a widow was cohabiting, 
she would be confronted with stark choices.  She could give up her common-law 
husband absolutely and perhaps regain her pension after a period of proven ‘good 
behaviour’; marry and lose her pension
38; or carry on cohabiting and lose her 
pension irrevocably.  The terms under which a widow could have her pension 
reinstated appear draconian, designed to break up any cohabiting couple, irrespective 
of their commitment to one another.  The following is a letter
39 typical of those sent 
to widows who had been found cohabiting, although as we shall see in the case 
studies which follow, such letters do not appear to have been retained in the 
individual case files that form the main corpus of my data.  However, a brief 
exploration of one such letter from the SGC files, will show some of the 




  I am directed by the Ministry of Pensions to refer to the interviews 
which an officer of his department had with you recently in connection with 
the weekly payment of allowances made by the Ministry to you as the wife 
of William Thomas Finn.  In view of the facts elicited at the interview the 
Minister has decided that under the circumstances you are now living he will 
not be able to regard you as eligible to receive payment of allowances at 
present at issue.  I am accordingly, to inform you that payment will, 
therefore, cease at the end of three months from this date unless in the 
meantime, the father of your illegitimate child, Mr Reeves, has ceased to 
reside in your house, to have access thereto; and/or to associate with you in 
any way; or alternatively, that you have secured other accommodation in 
another district and to which Mr Reeves is not allowed access.  An envelope 
is enclosed and you are asked to give an immediate reply. 
 
                                                 
38 The Pension Issues Office was under instruction to refuse to pay a gratuity where a war widow was 
found to have been cohabiting prior to her remarriage.  PIN15 2604. 
39 PIN15 2604, letter from Doyle on behalf of the Special Grants Committee dated 10
th November, 
1936.  There is no extant case file for this widow, the letter presumably surviving in the SGC file as 
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Here, the widow is placed in the role of one who has been condemned by her own 
honesty in providing ‘facts’.  These ‘facts’ are responsible for the cessation of her 
pension rather than any human agency, and are presented as being the active force 
behind the decision to stop her pension, later euphemistically formulated as the 
circumstances.  There is an assumption of change in her circumstances, triggered by 
now living, suggesting that previously she had been conforming to some sort of 
moral code and was thus eligible for a war widow’s pension.  The pension itself is 
formulated in the noun phrase the weekly payment of allowances made by the 
Ministry, where weekly allowance semantically carries associations with 
housekeeping or pocket money that is discretionary rather than a pension which was 
connotations of a long-term commitment, placing the State in the role of beneficent 
but stern patriarch.  Here, it is the Ministry rather than the State or, as found in other 
letters, public funds which provide this, although by highlighting the Ministry’s role, 
there is still a hyponymic avoidance of the SGC’s role in stopping the pension.  The 
widow is named as the wife, not widow of the deceased serviceman, thus again 
invoking the State’s position as surrogate husband who acts as moral guardian.  I 
would also suggest that interview is a euphemism for the questioning and 
interrogation which the widow would have had to undergo to defend her position.   
  The bureaucrat who signs the letter employs the first person pronoun I to 
assume an active role passing on the information relating to the terms of her 
continuance of a pension, although the decision has in fact been made by the 
nameless Minister of Pensions on whose instructions Doyle is acting.  The use of 
therefore carries the assumption that there is an inevitability to the decision that has 
been reached.   
  The register of the public sphere in the form of the highly formal language of 
the Ministry of Penions’ letters includes the stylistic convention of a complimentary 
closure which places the writer in an apparently subservient position to the 
addressee: he is her ‘obedient servant’.  However, the underlying ideational message 
of the letter is directive rather than instructive. 
  The terms under which the widow’s pension can be continued are essentially 
ones which involve the break-up of her family.  She is placed in the passive role of   113 
being left by her common-law husband, who is identified only as ‘Mr Reeves’.  It is 
clear that this is a long-term relationship, as the condition that Reeves has ceased to 
reside in your house carries the assumption that he already lives there, so is more 
than an occasional visitor.  The widow is essentially being forced to isolate herself 
from the father of her child, although she is placed in the passive role where Reeves 
is the active agent in the requirement that he ceases associating and having access to 
her.  His rights as the father of the child are not considered relevant to the terms of 
the widow’s pension.  Evicting Reeves from the house (here labelled as her house) is 
one alternative, another being that the widow herself assumes an active role and 
moves away.  Her new home district, the conditions state, should be one to which 
‘Mr Reeves is not allowed access’.   There is no indication as to the active agent who 
will prevent Reeves obtaining access to the widow and their child, but is can be 
assumed that the widow will be self-governing to a certain extent and exclude him 
from her new home on the penalty of losing her pension.  Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how anyone could prevent Reeves from at least visiting the widow in a new area, 
unless some extensive surveillance system were in operation.  There are disturbing 
connotations of house arrest in these terms, when the ‘crime’ is simply one of 
cohabitation that the Royal Warrant accepted elsewhere in its acknowledgement of 
‘unmarried wives’ as being eligible for pension.  
  The final sentence of the letter operates as a directive, softened only slightly 
by the you are asked, where the indirect speech act request only partly disguises the 
demand.  Ultimately, widows found to be cohabiting were left with the almost 
impossible choice of losing their pension or else continuing cohabiting with a man 
who was not their husband.  Widows who chose the latter, in the hope of the man 
providing them with a stable family life, could also run the risk of that man 
abandoning them without legal redress.  In such cases, the widow’s war pension 
would not be resumed and they often ended up in the workhouse.  For example, 
Mabel Beadsworth’s
40 husband had been killed in action in 1915, leaving her a 
widow at the age of 25 with two children under the age of five.  An illegitimate child 
was born the following year, at which point her war widow’s pension was stopped.  
                                                 
40 PIN26 17296   114 
She continued cohabiting with at least two different men throughout the 1920s, but 
the last of these left her in 1930.  Destitute, she ended up in the workhouse from 
where she petitioned (unsuccessfully) for her war widow’s pension to be reinstated. 
The discourses of morality which are at play here will be explored in more detail in 
the first case study, where closer attention will be paid to the specific case of Louisa 
Bayliss.  
Despite the financial disadvantages of remarriage, the need for younger 
widows to remarry relatively quickly and thus restore the male head of household to 
their families remained as true for the wives of men who had joined up as part of 
Kitchener’s Army or later as conscripts as it had been for war widows in previous 
centuries (as discussed above).  In other cases, problems arose when pensioned war 
widows married ex-servicemen who were in receipt of a war disablement pension: in 
the event of such a serviceman’s death, his widow would not be eligible for a war 
widow’s pension as she had married him after he had been discharged from the 
army.  Countless numbers of widows suffered such a fate, much to their dismay, and 
it would doubtless have been particularly galling given that they had been 
encouraged by agencies such as the church and the media in particular to marry 
single disabled ex-servicemen.  These women were thus employed as unpaid carers 
for disabled ex-servicemen, but received no State help on their husband’s death.  
This will be explored in part in the second case study. 
The patriarchal nature of the legislation and of society in general underpins 
the data in this study.  In particular, the discourses of morality which have formed 
much of the social welfare changes and legislation discussed above are highly 
relevant to the discursive formation of widowhood, based in social convention, 
became enshrined in law under the Royal Warrant of 1916.   
 
The social construction of widowhood 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is an age-old tradition of widows being 
passive and closeted which stretches back to the Ancient world.  However, the 
degree of passivity has shifted over time.  As Yalom has argued, although fidelity to   115 
a dead husband was commended, there were actually laws in Roman times that 
‘penalized women under fifty who refused to remarry’ (2001: 40).  However, over 
time the period of ‘respectable mourning’ for widows (but not widowers, who were 
expected to remarry almost immediately) extended from ten months, to twelve 
months and then to two years (ibid).  This reflects the shift in society that we saw 
with reference to the semantic derogation of lexis used to refer to women (in the 
Introduction).  In fact, in extant Mediaeval records, there is frequent mention of 
widows in documentation relating to business, as they took over their dead 
husbands’ trades (Chandler, 1991).  This gives rise to the stereotype of the ‘merry 
widow’ who has the freedom to enjoy her dead husband’s money after his death, 
largely uninhibited by patriarchal authority.  The figure of the merry widow recurs 
throughout English literature.  Freed from the constraints of her marriage vows, 
Webster’s Duchess of Malfi is termed the ‘lusty widow’ by her brother as she seeks 
sexual fulfilment in other men.  In reality, perhaps most famously, in the 16
th century 
Bess of Hardwick inherited a large estate in Derbyshire on her husband’s death but 
enjoyed her widowhood by exhibiting a very public form of conspicuous 
consumption in building a massive new house to her own avant-garde design. 
  However, as society changed in the course of the Industrial Revolution and 
power shifted further away from the domestic (female) world to the public (male) 
domain, the expected role of the widow came to be framed as more passive 
embodiment, where she should avoid the attention of men and of any intimation of 
‘fun’.  Their sombre clothing would indicate to anyone that they should not be 
approached with a view to encouraging breaking these rules.  The widow was 
expected to be a repository of moral values, although such ‘worldly’ women without 
a male head to their household carried a perceived threat to patriarchal authority 
which led to innumerable details of etiquette.  Any woman who transgressed from 
her grieving status by being seen to enjoy herself in social circumstances laid herself 
open to criticism of being called ‘fast’ or ‘loose’, and when it came to framing the 
widow in the Royal Warrant of 1916, this could carry with it the more severe penalty 
of the pension being stopped.     116 
  The symbolic opposite of the glamorised ‘war bride’, the war widow 
occupies a position of pride above her fellow women.  In Derrida’s privileging of 
one term over its opposite in order to sustain hierarchical structures, the war widow 
appears to rank higher than other widows, courtesy of her husband.  The image of 
the solider was – and still is – glamorised, and this reflects on his wife or widow.  
Even in the very unglamorous world of trench warfare, the image of the solider 
remained noble and proud.  For some war widows, the reality of their predicament 
must have begun when their husbands’ possessions were returned to them.  In her 
diary, Vera Brittain recounts how the package of her dead fiancé’s clothing brought 
home to her the horror of trench warfare and made her realise he had really gone: 
 
Everything was damp and worn and simply caked in mud.  All the sepulchres 
and catacombs of Rome could not make me realise mortality and decay and 
corruption as vividly as did the smell of those clothes. 
41 
 
For working-class war widows, however, the immediacy of their loss may have been 
only one part of the problem, in that they had lost their main breadwinner as well as 
a husband.  As we shall see in the main case studies, widows claiming a war pension 
faced many obstacles as their status as war widow was questioned by Ministry.  For 
most women, the schematic frame of war widowhood they used entailed their 
husband dying as a result of the war, or more loosely, their ex-soldier husband 
dying.  For example, Lilian Armfield’s husband
42 had died of prostate cancer in 
1954, but had been in receipt of a war disability pension for neurasthenia which later 
developed into schizophrenia.  On being informed she was not eligible for a war 
widow’s pension, Lilian wrote ‘Why all this trouble about a widow’s pension – a 
war pensioners widow at that’ (emphasis in the original).  Here, like so many 
widows, Lilian is assuming that a war pension would transfer to her as a widow, the 
noun phrase a war widow’s pension being syntactically similar to war pensioner’s 
widow, but semantically and legally irreconcilable in the eyes of the State.  This 
frame of war widowhood extends in the post-war years to include the wife of just 
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about any man who had served in the First World War and is employed by the 
widows themselves in a relatively clear-cut way.  However, the frame employed by 
the Ministry of Pensions and as found in the terms of the Royal Warrant was much 
more complex. 
  The Ministry of Pensions file for Ellen Stock
43 shows how her husband 
Frederick had deserted her in 1900.  He was killed in action in 1917.  Ellen 
discovered he had married again under a different name in 1910.  Although by law 
Ellen was still married to her bigamist husband, the pension was not paid to her as 
she had not been named by Frederick as one of his dependants on enlistment.  A 
letter dated July 1918, almost a year after his death, informs Ellen of the Ministry of 
Pensions’ decision: 
 
I am directed by the Minister of Pensions to inform you that as you were not 
maintained by your husband the late M/205934 Private F. Adams, Army 
Service Corps, prior to his enlistment you are not eligible for the award of 
pension from the public funds. 
 
Ellen’s status as an ‘official’ widow is denied her.  In the summary of the 
correspondence within the file, the note ‘Nature of enquiry: widow states she is 
soldier’s legal wife’ has been altered by some Ministry of Pension bureaucrat to read 
‘woman states she is soldier’s legal wife’.  Even though Ellen could provide official 
documentation in the form of her marriage certificate, the discourse that prevailed 
was that of her husband’s declaration on enlisting, naming another woman as his 
wife.  Her status was decided by powerful patriarchal discourses: in the first 
instance, by her husband deserting her; in the second, by his neglect in naming her 
as his legal wife; and thirdly by the insistence of the Ministry of Pensions that her 
marriage certificate could not support her appeal.   This is qualified by prepositional 
phrase from public funds, which links Ellen’s appeal to discourses of social welfare 
and nationalism, concealing the underlying parsimonious ideology.
44   
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Committee which, in its 1924-1925 annual report states that ‘everything possible [be] done to ensure 
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  To summarise, the complex schematic frame under which the Ministry of 
Pensions determined who could claim a war widow’s pension included such factors 
as marriage having to have taken place before the soldier was discharged from 
military service.  Other widows found the terms of the Royal Warrant precluded 
them from being granted a war widow’s pension because their husband had died 
more than seven years from the date of his injury of date of discharge, although this 
rule was revoked in 1921.  The ‘seven year rule’ has been incorporated in the 1916 
Royal Warrant, reflecting the assumption that any claims would have been made by 
that time, based on experiences in the Boer Wars.  The First World War saw the 
emergence of new illnesses which had long-term effects, such as those experienced 
as a result of gassing or shell-shock.  The unexpected and unpredicted longevity of 
such illnesses meant that the finite nature of the provision proved unworkable by 
1921, however it still took many months to process claims made under the revised 
conditions of the Royal Warrant. During this time, many widows found that their 
pension applications were held up, leaving them with a greatly reduced income.  The 
Emergency Help Committee files record the extent of the aid which they provided to 
such widows at this time, but always on the understanding that, as far as possible, 
such financial aid would be treated as a loan to be repaid out of pension arrears.  In 
the post-war years, there are many cases of widows whose husbands had died of a 
condition which was not certifiably directly related to his war service.  As we shall 
see in the case study of Florence Bayliss, a combination of these factors caused great 
anxiety and financial hardship for many women.  So whilst the widows themselves 
used the general schematic frame of war widowhood as being that which required 
them to have been married to a serviceman or an ex-serviceman who had died, the 
more detailed schematic frame found in the Royal Warrant was far more 
complicated and, consequently, excluded many thousands of women from claiming 
a war widow’s pension.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
and fairness which links into the older charitable discourses of help on the basis of need, is one which 
the widows themselves draw upon in their letters of appeal.  As we shall see in the following case 
studies, although not explicitly linking this to justice for ‘the taxpayer’, Florence in particular draws 





th century provision of social welfare in the form of a pension for war 
widows in Britain had evolved in a society in which the dominant patriarchal 
ideology assumed that men had a responsibility to maintain their wives and that 
women were generally reliant on the income of others.  As Bland has pointed out, 
this was a largely middle-class view where ‘men were allocated to the public and 
political, [and] women to the private and domestic’ (1995: 88).  Lewis (1984: 113) 
comments that this two spheres ideology sanctifies the home as a refuge from the 
rapid economic, social and political changes, and as explained above, women were 
seen as the moral guardians of family life against the immorality of the market-
place.  The expectation that there would be a male head to the household to provide 
the family’s primary source of income was not confined to the middle classes.  
Wages of working-class men, set by middle-class employers, were assumed to be 
higher than for women.  Only in exceptional cases, such as the Lancashire cotton 
industry, were men and women’s wages comparable.
45  Lewis (1984: 49) points out 
that by the end of the 19
th century, the ability to maintain a wife had increasingly 
come to represent a measure of both masculine pride and working-class 
respectability, and, through a series of social legislation which prohibited women 
from traditional employment such as in the mines and factories as well as the infant 
welfare reform mentioned above, it became the norm that the wives of skilled 
workers should remain at home and look after the family rather than engage with 
paid employment.  The male trade unions movement in the late 19
th century 
supported this view, campaigning for higher wages for male employees on the basis 
that they had families to support, where patriarchal rule is common sense.   
The etiquette surrounding widows can be seen from a Foucaultian 
perspective as an aspect of institutional apparatus that includes dress regulations, 
morality and discourses that enclose widows.  The Royal Warrant of 1916 frames 
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widows according to Victorian, middle-class perceptions of morality.  As social 
welfare reforms came to be enshrined in State legislation in the early years of the 
20
th century, the discourses of morality and nationalism which were so apparent at 
this time sought to define women in line with largely middle-class ideals.  The 
heavily interdiscursive nature of the Royal Warrant draws on older discourses 
morality, heightened discourses of national identity and newfangled discourses of 
social welfare.  Charitable conventions, built on strongly Christian philanthropic 
works of the 19
th century, mark the terms of the Royal Warrant and its implication, 
not least by the use of charities such as the SSFA and Emergency Help Committee 
to assist in the administration of assistance to widows, but also because of the shared 
membership of committees that is found in both State and charitable organisations.  
Where the Royal Warrant differs from charitable assistance is in its explicit ties to 
the nation, its funds drawn from taxable public sources.  Although able to access a 
far greater ‘pot’ of money than that available to any charity at this time, the State 
sought to limit the nature of its assistance to widows by drawing on highly 
parsimonious ideology to underpin its decisions.  As we shall see in the case studies, 
the terms of the Royal Warrant carried a very narrow schematic frame of 
widowhood which was frequently at odds with that drawn upon by the widows 
themselves.  The underlying mistrust of the working classes in general and women 
without a male head to their household in particular is evident in the level of 
surveillance these women were subjected to, all under the vigilant bureaucratic gaze 
of the Special Grants Committee. 
  The case studies will also look in more detail at how widows were positioned 
as carers by the State, continuing the intervention in family life to ensure the 
regeneration of the race in the post-war yeas.  Conversely, the widows themselves 
came to draw on their role as carers of children (the nation’s future) and also the 
disabled servicemen, who are positioned as having given their health and ultimately 
their lives in defence of the nation.  As suggested here, remuneration for carers could 
be seen as an extension of women’s war work, particularly as the abiding image of 
women at war came to be reinforced as that of the nurse through the memoirs and   121 
novels published in the post-war years.
46  That so many widows took the 
unprecedented action of seeking remuneration (in the form of compensation or 
reimbursement) from the State for this latter caring role is something that will be 
explored in more detail in the case studies. 
 
                                                 




Case Study 1: Louisa Bayliss and ‘unruly’ widows 
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This section will employ discourse-historical analysis (Wodak, 2002) to explore 
discourses of morality, nationalism and social welfare in relation to British widows 
of the First World War who were granted war widow pensions on the basis of their 
husbands’ deaths whilst on active service. 
Building on previous sections, this analysis will focus on the case file of 
Louisa Bayliss
47 but will also draw on the case files of other widows, where 
relevant.  These additional files will provide evidence of the extensive surveillance 
to which women such as Louisa were subjected by the State in relation to their 
pensions.  As discussed previously, this surveillance could extend into all corners of 
a woman’s life.  Discourses of morality are particularly relevant in Louisa’s case, 
and it is her role as a widow and as a mother (both of which carried a pensionable 
allowance) that is open to surveillance.   
 
Data 
The case file of Louisa Bayliss has been selected on several grounds.  Firstly, she is 
a woman who was granted a pension during the war, her husband having been 
reported ‘missing in action’ in 1915.  This meant that there was no question as to her 
eligibility for a widow’s pension on the grounds of her husband’s death being caused 
by something unrelated to his war service.  Louisa is thus typical of the thousands of 
women who were widowed during the course of the war.  As we will later see in the 
case of Florence Bayliss, for the widows of men who died after the war the situation 
was considerably more complicated.  Secondly, Louisa is typical of many war 
widows in that she is relatively young at the time of her husband’s death (he was 
reported missing three months after her 34
th birthday), and has four children eligible 
for dependants’ pension allowances under the terms of the initial pension legislation: 
David (born 1907); William (born 1909); Edward Ted (born 1912) and the only girl 
in this group, Winifred (born January 1915).  Another child was born in December 
1917.  He crops up in several letters but is nameless and no other information is 
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available on file about him, although as we shall see, he plays a significant role in 
Louisa’s fate.   
Louisa’s file therefore presents a fairly typical example of a young widow 
who has been left with a large family of young children and who has been allotted a 
pension on the basis of her husband’s death whilst on active service.  What makes 
Louisa’s file more remarkable and therefore worthy of selection for more detailed 
analysis is the number of letters she herself writes.  Whilst it is apparent that not all 
of her correspondence is extant in this file, the large number of letters she wrote to 
the Ministry of Pensions over the period August 1919 to April 1921 is indeed 
unusual.  As we shall see, her persistence in writing one or two letters a month 
requesting pension payments is rewarded with a standardised letter which did not 
vary very much in all of this time, and did not engage with her main arguments.  
What Louisa’s letters do allow us to grasp is some indication of the life of a barely 
literate, working-class woman in the immediate aftermath of the First World War as 
she struggled to keep her family together.  She draws extensively on discourses of 
social welfare and nationalism to support her claims, countering the accusations of 
the Ministry of Pensions that she has behaved immorally (although as we shall see, 
close textual analysis reveals none of the letters ever expand on this, there are traces 
as to just what this immoral behaviour might have been in Louisa’s letters as well as 
those written by other more institutional voices).   
The case file contains a large amount of correspondence relating to Louisa 
and her children.  Whilst some of these letters and forms would have been seen by 
Louisa, such as copies of letters sent to her as well as application and declaration 
forms she has completed and returned to the Ministry of Pensions, many other 
documents exist that were not intended for her or for other non-Ministry readers.  
These include internal memos and correspondence summary sheets and letters 
between various pensions offices. There is also a letter from the Comrades of the 
Great War organisation written to the Ministry of Pensions in support of Louisa’s 
claim for reinstatement of her pension.  It is not clear whether or not Louisa would 
have been sent a copy of this letter, but its sympathetic tone does indicate that she 
was involved in its composition.     125 
  What is missing from the file is the undoubtedly extensive and detailed 
correspondence relating to the suspension of her pension.  In cases such as Louisa’s 
where the recipient was suspected of behaving in a way that could render their 
pension inadmissible, the case would be referred to the Special Grants Committee 
(the SGC).  As previously discussed, there are no extant files relating to this 
committee as far as individual cases go, although policy document files are in 
existence and give some idea as to the power of this agency.  For example, in 1921 it 
was determined that decisions by the SGC would not be subject to external scrutiny, 
even from other members of the Ministry of Pensions, in order to save paper. This 
led to the virtual autonomy of the SGC.  (This move also, perhaps, indicates 
something of the huge workload of the SGC as it oversaw the surveillance of 
pensioned war widows in the inter-war years.
48)  As we saw earlier, the papers which 
do exist relating to the working of SGC suggest an unsympathetic agency which 
would call women suspected of misdemeanours in for interview, at the end of which 
they would asked to sign a declaration which summarised their alleged misbehaviour 
and so compelled them to accept the decision of the SGC.  Louisa would 
undoubtedly have had to go through this process.  The ‘economy drive’ of the SGC 
might also explain why there are virtually no copies of any correspondence in her 
file from this agency, whilst her letters to the Ministry of Pensions appear to be 
virtually complete for the period under discussion here.  Indeed, there is nothing in 
her file which relates to Louisa herself from the time when her pension was resumed 
in June, 1921, until a rare memo from the SGC, dated October, 1927 announces the 
final forfeiture of her pension (although correspondence relating to her children does 
exist during and after this period).  The six-year gap could be explained by the 
absence of the vast majority of documentation from the SGC.    
One of the challenges of Louisa’s file has been the chaotic nature of its 
organisation.  Apparently merged from local and central files (but missing the SGC 
section), no attempt has been made to merge these documents chronologically.  
Some bureaucrat has at one point numbered some of the documents, particularly 
Louisa’s letters, for easier reference, but these do not necessarily follow 
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chronologically.  I have re-ordered the documents to follow in a chronological order 
as best I can, although in the case of Louisa’s letters, it has not been possible to date 
these other than from the ‘date received’ stamps on them.  In some cases, her letters 
have been passed from one department to another, each adding its own date stamp, 
in which case I have taken the earliest legible date as that which I shall refer to.   
  Louisa’s letters themselves present another challenge in that most of them 
are written on pieces of paper (half the size of a sheet of foolscap) folded into a four-
sided notelette and it is not always clear which side of the ‘page’ leads on from 
another.  Scanned copies of the originals can be found in the appendix.  Her 
idiosyncratic punctuation and grammar has not helped this ordering task, but I hope 
that the sense I have made out of her letters is reasonable and here present typed 
transcripts of them indicating where I believe clause boundaries fall.  Also highly 
idiosyncratic and sometimes difficult to read, I have retained Louisa’s original 
orthography (although this is not always clear from the photocopies, as she often 
wrote in pencil which has smudged or else not copied clearly).  Despite State-funded 
education being made compulsory in Britain under the 1870 Elementary Education 
Act, this was often negligently enforced by local education authorities.  This was 
usually the case in working-class families where children were expected, and indeed 
relied upon, to contribute towards the family income.  For girls, formal schooling 
was seen as less important than for their brothers.  Often, they would be required to 
stay at home and help with household chores, particularly in large families where 
they were depended upon to look after younger siblings.  It is therefore not 
surprising that someone of Louisa’s generation exhibits only basic literacy skills, 
largely relying on phonetic strategies which give her writing a marked regional 
accent, as well as a strong reliance on conventions of colloquial spoken dialect rather 
than formal written English that might be expected in correspondence with official 
agencies.  This lack of standardisation in her writing is one of the more appealing 
things about her file in that she really does appear to ‘speak’ out of the pages.  Her 
individuality shines through in what appears to be the authentic voice of a working-
class woman from the Midlands, and I hope to avoid being accused of the Li’l Abner 
syndrome (Preston, 1985) of appearing to treat her patronisingly.   127 
  So it is the typicality of Louisa’s case, coupled with the quantity and quality 
of the documents in her file that led me to select her for closer analysis.  Louisa’s 
scant awareness of many of the conventions of institutional letter-writing could 
perhaps be explained by the nature of her claim: the war widow’s pension scheme 
was probably the first time such a large number of working-class women had come 
into contact with a centralised bureaucratic organisation, the conventions of which 
had not then been widely and clearly established.  As we shall see, Louisa draws on 
much older discourses of social welfare than the ones under which her pension was 
issued.  The historical nature of discourses is very apparent in her claims for social 
welfare as she draws on charitable discourses with which she would have been 
familiar.  The official documents relating to Louisa, as with other war widows, 
reveal similar traces of older, charitable discourses, but also are forging new 
discourses of social welfare that are nevertheless tied by law into middle-class 
Victorian discourses of morality.  This brief period of time, when the British State 
sought to provide social welfare to its citizens on a mass scale never before 
encountered, contrasts with the diachronic nature of Florence’s correspondence 
explored in the next case study. 
 
Mother of the nation’s children: ‘An unsuitable guardian’ 
 
The exact reason why Louisa’s pension was stopped remains a mystery as the 
documents which would provide the key to this disclosure no longer exist.  
However, there are traces of the probable cause in the documents which will be 
discussed below.  Amongst these are correspondence dealing with Louisa’s role as a 
mother, a role which came under close surveillance by the State.  Unlike a widow’s 
pension, the dependants’ allowance paid in respect of the serviceman’s children was 
much less likely to be stopped.  As the future of the nation, children were supported 
financially by the State until they were deemed old enough to be self-supporting, 
usually at the age of 16.  
Throughout the course of the decade following her husband’s death, Louisa’s 
role as primary carer to her children was under close surveillance by the Ministry of   128 
Pensions and other agencies.  This section will look at the State’s intervention in the 
family life of widows, particularly the way in which the State acted as moral 
guardian in determining whether or not a woman was fit to look after her own 
children in much the same way as her own ‘worthiness’ to receive a widow’s 
pension.  As we have already seen, women’s social position and motherhood are 
commonly equated.  The legislation which was drafted by middle-class, Victorian 
men under the auspices of the Royal Warrant of 1916 is very closely tied into 
perceptions of morality, as discussed in the historical context section.  As Urwin 
(1985) has argued, over the course of the late 19
th and throughout most of the 20
th 
centuries, there was a steady expansion in women’s responsibilities which brought 
about the production of social and legal expectations about the maternal role.  
Indeed, 
 
this production has been supported both by the development and by the 
emergence of social regulatory apparatuses concerned with the well-being of 
children.  These apparatuses […] have contributed to the production of the 
modern family as a site for intervention and the reproduction of dominant 
ideologies.  (Unwin, 1985: 164) 
 
In Foucaultian terms, Donzelot (1979) has observed that this led to the development 
of practices of surveillance which were ostensibly concerned with identifying 
deviance and in the process constructed norms which became the basis for regulating 
the rest of the population.  As Urwin has expands, this strategy ‘involves not only 
the isolation of deviants but the introduction of forms of prevention which support 
particular orthodoxies and effectively “police” entire populations’ (1985: 165).  The 
power/knowledge relations in operation here can be investigated in the creation and 
regulation of practices.  Power can be understood in Foucaultian terms as not being 
possessed in a single individual, nor as something static.  Rather, power is shifting 
and fragmentary, its position and employment given in the apparatuses of regulation 
themselves.  In this way, widows and mothers possess limited power by virtue of 
having lost a husband or given birth to a child.  
   As we shall see below in the case of Louisa Bayliss, she is both widow and 
mother, yet the power she holds (in terms of obtaining money from the State and in   129 
the care of her children) is actually granted and withheld by the apparatus put in 
place by the State under the terms of the Royal Warrant.  As Walkerdine (1985: 220) 
has observed in relation to motherhood in general, ‘women have power only in so 
far as they are positioned as mothers in relation to certain practices concerning the 
regulation of children’.  The very practices of motherhood are regulated and 
constituted by the dominant ideas of child rearing prevalent at the beginning of the 
20
th century.  Women’s sexuality and their fitness to be mothers had become the 
object of what Walkerdine refers to as ‘interlocking apparatuses and technologies’ 
(1985: 209) from the 19
th century onwards, where ideologies of separate spheres for 
men and women defined women as passive, receptive and maternal against the 
active, reasoning male.  The Royal Warrant enshrined in law the expected behaviour 
of the woman, in terms of her social behaviour and her fitness to be a mother.  The 
education system, through various legislative measures, and a mother’s role were 
contrived to ‘produce citizens who would accept the moral order by choice and 
freewill’ (Walkerdine, 1995: 206), and in the case of a war widow, it was also a 
patriotic pride in the country for which one’s husband had died.  Gramscian 
hegemony was in operation in producing an acceptance of these moral and patriotic 
codes.  
As stated earlier, at the time of her husband’s death, Louisa had four children 
under the age of 16, all of whom were eligible for dependants’ pensions under the 
terms of the Pay Warrant (1915).  The eldest of these children, David, was seven at 
the time, and the youngest, Winifred, was eight months.  Louisa was awarded a 
pension of 22/6 a week, increasing to 25/- in July 1916 under the revised terms 
covering widows’ pensions and dependants’ allowances contained within the Royal 
Warrant (1916).   
  The earliest correspondence in Louisa’s file (21
st February, 1919) is a 
memorandum
49 from the Ministry of Pensions central office at Millbank to the ‘W. 
Branch’ which dealt exclusively with war widows’ pensions.  This memorandum is 
also the earliest extant document which refers to Louisa’s pension being suspended.  
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However, it is not just her pension that is open to question.  As the memorandum 
continues: 
   
[The Special Grants Committee] recommend however that payment of the 
pension for the children be made to Mrs. E.M.R. Shakespear
50, Hon. 
Secretary, Birmingham Local War Pensions Committee 159-161 Corporation 
Street, Birmingham, in trust for administration. 
  Pension is not issuable for a child born in December 1917 as it is 
illegitimate. 
 
As far as the State is concerned in Louisa’s case, it is the widow’s obligation 
to uphold the noble memory of her late husband by behaving in a way that complies 
with the image of the quiet, dutiful widow, corresponding to Victorian middle-class 
values.  Similarly, her role as mother is seen through the lens of such values.  As we 
shall see below, whilst the State regards ill-treatment and neglect as sufficient 
grounds to remove her children from her care, Louisa herself sees things in terms of 
the more immediate, day-to-day practicality of assessing her own financial ability to 
feed and clothe her children.  
  This granting of the widow’s pension contrasts with the ‘payment’ of the 
pension for the children.  At this stage, it was not considered reasonable to impose 
moral restrictions on the behaviour of minors
51, as they were under the care of a 
‘guardian’ who was nominally their mother but, as in Louisa’s children’s case, could 
be a more ‘responsible’ agency, such as the State (through the locally organised 
Citizens’ Committees of the Ministry of Pensions) or charitably organised 
orphanages.   
What is interesting to note in this particular memorandum is that Louisa is 
reported to have had another child, born in December 1917.  Throughout official 
correspondence relating to Louisa’s case, she is consistently credited as having four 
children under the age of 16, the youngest being Winifred who was born in 1915.  
This memorandum dismisses the child born in 1917 as being illegitimate, not even 
assigning a sex.  In Louisa’s own lengthy correspondence, she only mentions this 
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child once: in a letter dated 23
rd September 1920
52, she tries to defend this child (a 
boy) as belonging to her late husband (a biological impossibility, given his death in 
October 1915).  This child is invisible in the Ministry of Pension’s eyes, his place in 
the pensionable family ignored.  In most of Louisa’s letters, he is also not counted 
amongst her children.  She is apparently accepting the ‘rules’ which allowed 
pensions to be payable only in respect of children certified as being those of 
deceased soldiers
53, rather than part of the extant family unit.  The Royal Warrant 
only seems to have stepped into the role of patriarchal provider in a financial sense 
where there was documented evidence of a soldier’s support for a child (or intended 
support, in the case of the unborn child of whom he was the father), thus the family 
unit is very tightly defined in terms of the State’s willingness to support and indeed 
even acknowledge the presence of such children.  Like other widows, Louisa does 
not challenge this assumption of legitimacy, instead claiming at one point that her 
youngest child’s father is her dead husband.  Louisa is drawing on the power she has 
in her motherhood to claim an allowance for this child, but does not persist in this 
claim once it has been rejected.  This shows how she has recognised the power she 
has in her role as war widow and mother, although the effectiveness of this strategy 
is severely curtailed by the institutional power of the State. 
  A letter
54 to the Pension Issue Office from Mrs Shakespear, on 8
th April 1919 
reports:- 
  Mrs Bayliss has now placed all her 4 children under the care of my 
Committee as she does not feel capable of looking after them properly 
herself.  They will be removed from her guardianship on Monday next, April 
14
th and I shall be glad if you will now issue to me at the Motherless Rate 
(with arrears) for the 4 children, as up to the present we have only been 
receiving at the Ordinary Rate.  We have been administering for all 4 
children since the 28
th Feby. 
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documented such support on enlistment, then such a child would be in receipt of dependant’s 
allowance.  For example, this is found in several cases where a man had financially supported 
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Here, all her 4 children triggers the assumption that she has just four children, rather 
than the alternative choice of four of her children.  More accurately, rather than 
these being ‘Mrs Bayliss’s children’, it could have been clarified stating these were 
all Frank’s (known?) children.  Ideologically, Louisa is ascribed the role of mother 
to only ‘legitimate’ children in the eyes of the State.  She is placed in the active role 
of handing over these children to Mrs Shakespear’s care, her actions prompted 
apparently by her own reported admission of being incapable of ‘looking after them 
properly’.  The use of the mental process verb feel deprives Louisa of a verbal input 
to this action.  She appears compliant with the middle-class notion of what ‘proper’ 
care of a child should be, although no-where is this described in the extant 
documents held in her file, nor is there any information as to how her own 
guardianship of her children deviated from this standard.  The assumption is that the 
Citizens’ Committee, with its combination of the authority of State-sponsored and 
charitable resources is capable of providing a standard of care which the mother is 
not.  Here, the double-voicing in the text is working ideologically, taking as an 
unquestioned and unavoidable reality that the State is in a position to provide better 
childcare than the mother (see Fairclough, 2003: 58).  Louisa is seen to be acting in 
hegemonic accordance with this assumption. 
A letter
55 dated 12
th August, 1919, Mrs Shakespear offers a different 
perspective on the care of Louisa’s children. 
 
This widow still has the guardianship of her youngest child, Winnie, aged 4; 
the three boys have been committed to the guardianship of this Committee by 
an order of Court.  I shall be glad to have your permission to cease 
administering pension for the child Winnie, as our visitor, does not feel that 
any good is being done by her visits to the House.  Mrs Bayliss is still very 
unsatisfactory, and does not appear to be a suitable guardian for the child, but 
the Court could not prove any deliberate neglect or ill-treatment, and 
therefore could not see their way to transfer the Guardianship.  I shall be glad 
if you would allow separate ring paper
56 to be issued to Mrs Bayliss for this 
one child, leaving the other three under our care. 
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The use of passive voice gives the bureaucratic agent order of Court responsibility 
for the removal of the children from Louisa’s care to that of the Birmingham 
Citizens’ Committee.  Apart from the initial allotment of the care of the children to 
the noun phrase this widow on the first line, the nominalisation of guardianship goes 
on to be used in a way that removes traces of human agency, preserving an 
anonymity which is common throughout official documentation of this period 
(something we will see further evidence of in the following case study).  
Furthermore, this nominalisation shows the care of the children to be something 
material which can be exchanged between agencies, linking with economic 
discourses that will become more apparent later.  Louisa’s position is reduced to that 
of intransitive agent who has possession of this guardianship, although the use of the 
adverb still triggers the assumption that this is not something that is permanent and 
can therefore be changed.   
Mrs Shakespear is more tentative in her statement that Louisa ‘does not 
appear to be a suitable guardian’, where does not appear to be carries less force than 
other possible lexical choices such as is not.  The reason for this tentativeness 
becomes clear in the following clause: ‘but the Court could not prove any deliberate 
neglect or ill-treatment’.  Here, there is a presupposition that the Court has indeed 
been looking for deliberate neglect or ill-treatment.  It is assumed that such 
behaviour would have been sufficient to result in the removal of Winnie from her 
mother’s care.  The use of the legalistic prove implies that the weight of evidence 
was insufficient, although possible.  Again, the use of legalistic register occurs with 
the adjective deliberate, which leaves room for the possibility that there may be 
accidental neglect.  The coordinating conjunction but to begin this clause triggers the 
assumption that this is somehow disappointing in the mind of the writer, 
emphasising the underlying distrust of Louisa. 
  The final clause of this sentence again reveals an apparent desire to find fault 
with Louisa’s care.  The magistrates ‘could not see their way to transfer the 
Guardianship’ uses the macro intensification strategy of negation to trigger the 
presupposition that there was a way being sought, but could not be found.  The 
presupposition that there was a way to be sought highlights the link between the   134 
Courts and Citizens’ Committee on one side, and Louisa on the other.  The clausal 
conjunction therefore offers the final clause as the inevitable result of the preceding 
clause.  The weight of official and bureaucratic intervention into a widow’s life is 
clear in the litany of State-authorised agencies mentioned in this letter.   
  As will be discussed below, Louisa frequently wrote requesting her own 
pension, supplementing her argument on occasion with a brief narrative detailing the 
hardship experienced in looking after her daughter Winnie on the dependent’s 
pension of 6/- a week.  Her role as mother is drawn upon to frame her argument for a 
pension, linking interdiscursively with the increased State intervention aimed at 
women in the care of children, the nation’s future, in preceding quarter century.  For 
example, in a letter
57 received by the Ministry of Pension on 11
th December, 1919, 
Louisa writes: 
 
I gate know money at all honely 6 shillings a week fore Winine that Donte 
keep haire in Boots I donte know howe she live on that money the mix is 
Cale bread. 
 
Here, Louisa is using the presupposition that she is herself attempting to purchase 
food, but can only afford stale bread (cale bread), and that she is similarly unable to 
afford boots for Winnie.  Given the letter was written in December, there is an 
assumption that suitable winter footwear is a necessity.  Louisa is highlighting 
Winnie’s welfare and lack of money as the cause of material difficulty.  For Louisa, 
her power rests in her position as a mother.  In her appeal for help in providing for 
the material well-being of her children, Louisa is linking into the State’s assumed 
role as patriarchal provider of the means for such.   
With her frequent letters of appeal gaining only a standard, negative response 
from the Ministry of Pensions, Louisa took matters into her own hands utilising her 
‘power’ as a mother, and wrote in January 1920
58: 
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I ham gainge to hand my Little Girl over to my Father … Dear sir I cante 
lived on the hair whay donte you be so kinge and send me my Pension 
money 
 
Louisa’s choice of the metaphor can’t live on air is one which she employs 
frequently throughout her letters, but here is coherently linked to Winnie’s welfare.  
Again, Louisa’s frequently-used markers of deference dear sir and be so kind 
suggest she is aware of the distinction between a pension paid by rights and the more 
subjective nature of the war widow’s pension.  These markers of social deference as 
a premodification to a request both imply that Louisa is also aware of the power 
differences between herself and the anonymously addressed recipient at the Ministry 
of Pensions.  Despite the fact the Civil Service was started to employ women in far 
greater numbers during the war, Louisa’s letters never vary in her assumption that it 
is a male addressee, showing her (subconscious?) awareness of the gender 
imbalance. 
On the back of this letter, someone at the Ministry of Pensions has written 
the note:- ‘Widow wishes pension for child to be transferred.  LC sent to guardian 
for completion with VF13c. 24.1.20’.  Again, a mental process verb (wishes) is used 
by an official to reduce the power of Louisa’s voice, glossing over the underlying 
plea for help in the form of financial assistance which she believes she is entitled to, 
and help her out of the dire poverty where it is a real struggle to provide basics such 
as bread for herself and her family.  Louisa’s narrative emphasises the link into a 
patriarchal ideology where the State has assumed the role of husband as provider of 
financial support.  She is also drawing on discourses of poverty through specific 
mention of basic needs such as food and clothing. 
  The staff of Birmingham Citizens’ Committee would appear to have 
followed up the action instigated by Louisa with their own enquiries.  A 
memorandum
59 from this office to W Branch, dated 11
th March, 1920 reads:- 
 
The child Winifred is in the care of the mother, Mrs L. Bayliss, at the address 
given 25 Crt, 4 H. Clifton Rd.  It is not her house but she lives with her father 
John Watton, and 4 Gothic Terrace is the same address.  Motherless rate is 
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certainly not issuable for the child and the Guardianship is unsuitable.  The 
case has, however, been before the courts and though the Magistrates 
removed the boys from the care of their mother, they left her the girl. 
 
The use of definite descriptions of Winnie and Louisa (the child, the mother) further 
serve to depersonalise the memorandum, this premofication apparently deemed 
necessary for an understanding of the information.  The second sentence seems to 
offer the assumption that Louisa has given information to the contrary, that she is 
not living with her father and is thus suspected of being deceptive, reflecting a 
mistrust of the working classes in general and widows in particular.  However, 
reference to her previous extant correspondence reveals that this point about living 
with her father is one Louisa frequently makes, so has not in fact attempted to 
conceal.  It is only when financial consequences for the State are involved (here, the 
payment of the child’s allowance) that the bureaucrats choose to observe this 
information, Louisa’s plea for help being reformulated as an argument against her. 
The question of appropriate rates of pensionable pay is handled with a 
firmness that is startling in light of any extant documentation to the contrary.  In 
employing the intensifying adverb certainly to premodify the negative, the meaning 
is unambiguous.  Rather more puzzlingly, Mr Watton’s guardianship (implied as 
such through exophoric reference to previous texts, here rendered less clear by the 
use of nominalisation) is described as being ‘unsuitable’.  No grounds are offered as 
to this declaration in this memorandum nor in subsequent ones.  Only much later in 
the file is this expanded upon, where Mr Watton is described as being ‘an unsuitable 
person’
60 to act as Winnie’s guardian.  Up to that reference, the impersonal 
nominalisation guardianship had remained ambiguous as to whether it was Mr 
Watton who was unsuitable or the fact of the address being unsuitable.   
  The final sentence echoes that written by Mrs Shakespear in August, 1919 
(Document iv).  Again, the court/magistrates are the active agents.  Louisa’s sons are 
not named as such, but there is the assumption that ‘the boys’ referred to are David, 
Teddy and Willie.  The anaphoric reference they refers to the only active agents in 
this sentence: the magistrates.  Continuing the use of impersonal definite 
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descriptions which run throughout this letter, the girl is assumed to be Winnie.  The 
impersonal nature of the letter is enhanced by the final clause, in which Winnie is 
reduced to the status of a package, left carrying a less considerate connotation than 
remain, which would presume a continuation of care that is not apparent in left with 
its connotations of abandonment.  The State is here implicitly assuming its own 
guardianship as being more suitable than the children’s own grandfather.  ‘Two 
spheres’ ideology is also evident here as somehow the State is rendered more 
appropriate to care for the male children, presumably by admitting them to an 
orphanage where they would receive the beginnings of an apprenticeship, whilst the 
daughter, not much younger than her next eldest sibling, is allowed to remain with a 
woman whom the State has evidently tried to prove to be an unsuitable mother. 
Winnie’s well-being is thus implicitly regarded as being less important than that of 
her brothers.  
  In June 1919, a letter was sent to the Ministry of Pensions, purporting to be 
from Louisa.  However, this was not in her handwriting and contained none of her 
usual non-standard orthography. Written on a good quality, bond writing paper, very 
different to Louisa’s usual inexpensive, thin paper, this letter appears to have been 
the work of someone who is perhaps more aware of the semiotics of writing formal 
letters, where heavy gauge paper is generally regarded as a sign of respectability, 
formality and sobriety.  The letter
61, date-stamped 16
th June, 1919 actually contains 
the writing of three different people, all employing different formulations of the 
same argument, but it is only Louisa’s clearly identifiable voice (both in terms of 
handwriting and style) that adds more information to her claim. 
 
  [not in Louisa’s handwriting] 
Sir, 
Would you kindly forward to me my 2 childrens money as I have got them 
both at home again.  This is Edward Bayliss and Winifred Bayliss and oblige 
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  [Louisa’s handwriting] 
What you stoppinge my Husbands Money off me I habey gote Daivid and 
Wilie and Tedy and Winine to children by my Husband that all I Wante to 
Look after / they are say Whate they liked bute Me it Wonte do them any 
good to say a late 2 lies / I wish I was boye em to stope my money 
 
  [Ministry of Pensions note] 
  Widow taking charge of her two youngest children again. £6.3/ sent 
23.6.19 
 
Here, the unknown writer who appears to be taking on Louisa’s identity at the start 
of the letter includes some of the same politeness strategies that Louisa herself 
commonly uses, such as the Sir salutation and the deferential plea would you kindly 
forward….  This writer is framing the letter as an instruction but in using a question 
format is employing a positive politeness strategy.  Where this writer differs from 
Louisa is in the formulation of the pension, which here is referred to as my 2 
childrens money, whereas Louisa’s formulation of this overleaf again reinforces her 
belief that this money actually belongs to her husband: my husbands money.  The 
third reference to this, noted by the anonymous bureaucrat at the Ministry of 
Pensions, omits any reference of ownership or attribution, simply noting £6.3 sent.  
The reporting frame of this official’s brief note indicates the power of the institution 
over the voice of the claimant.  The use of again triggers the presupposition that 
both children have previously been in her care.  
Louisa’s contribution to this letter asks a direct question what you stoppinge 
my husbands money off me?, which seems to imply she is not aware of the reason 
why the Ministry has suspended her widow’s pension and thus implying her 
‘innocence’.  She goes on to present a case of need (which will be discussed in more 
detail below) that is based on the assumption that the children of a dead soldier 
receive a pension, and as she has four children.  She adds the further clarification 
that these are by my husband.  This could be to emphasise that they are the children 
of a soldier whom she still regards as her husband – and thus counteracts the 
accusation implicit in other letters that she has remarried.  To this opening response-
demanding utterance, Louisa supplies an answer to the unspoken accusation: ‘they 
are say Whate they liked bute Me it Wonte do them any good’.  She is countering   139 
the unspoken but expected response that her pension has been stopped because of 
her inappropriate behaviour.  She attributes this to unknown but malicious 
informants who would appear to have a personal vendetta against her which she 
seems to think is for their own gain: it won’t do them any good.  Again, Louisa is 
drawing upon the assumption that it is the State’s responsibility, as patriarchal 
guardian, to help her in her role as mother, but also accepts that it is the State’s role 
to act as moral guardian. 
It could also be that she is implicitly restricting her claim to these four 
children, not the son born in December 1917, so is appearing to be more reasonable 
in her claim for financial assistance.  She states the desire that all she wants to do is 
look after these children.  This links with the implicit assumption that she would use 
the pension money for other means than her children’s welfare.  A fear expressed in 
the early debates on the subject of widows’ pensions in 1914 centred around the 
politicians’ fears that a widows’ pension would simply subsidise young women to 
live a life of luxury at the expense of the State.  Although no-one could ever have 
been said to have become rich on the pension paid out to war widows (the rate of the 
pension had been decided to fall in line with the bare minimum on which someone 
could live just outside of poverty – and the workhouse)
62, the underlying fear of 
unworthiness to receive ‘public funds’ underpins the legislation and seems to have 
been adopted by Louisa in her correspondence.  She appears to be framing herself as 
one of the ‘deserving poor’ for whom the social welfare system was being 
developed. 
The argument relating to accusations against Louisa appears only in Louisa’s 
part of the letter.  The anonymous writer of the first section is simply concerned with 
the topic of Louisa’s resumption of care for the two youngest pensionable children.  
It is this topic alone that the Ministry of Pensions picks up on in the internal note: 
‘Widow taking charge of her two youngest children again’.  The use of progressive 
future tense indicates that Louisa has only very recently taken over the guardianship 
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of Teddy and Winnie.  The child born in 1917 is rendered invisible, the lack of 
additional premodification to youngest children triggering the assumption that she 
has no others who are younger. 
The naming of the children is also of interest here.  Although inconsistent in 
her spelling, Louisa always refers to these two children as Teddy/Tedy/Ted and 
Winnie/Winine.  Her naming practices for her children are not used by anyone else 
who writes about them, including here the anonymous first writer who uses their full 
first names, and the Ministry of Pensions official who (erroneously) refers to them as 
‘her two youngest children’.  Thus Louisa is drawing on her role as mother to 
employ the declarative speech act of renaming her children, although again her 
power as mother is strictly limited by the State in this respect, as all references made 
from that source employ the children’s ‘full’ names.  Unlike the example of Mary 
Anderson’s
63 child cited in the Theory and Methodology section (page 69), the 
widow’s preference here is not taken up by the bureaucrats, perhaps reflecting a lack 
of sympathy towards this more unruly widow than to the apparently compliant Mary 
Anderson. 
  Louisa’s war widow’s pension was restored by order of the SGC in April, 
1921.  There are no further letters in the file from Louisa herself, but her role as 
guardian to her children continued to be the subject of debate in official 
correspondence.   The Ministry of Pensions Central Issue Office wrote to the 
Birmingham office in November, 1922, giving details of the whereabouts of 
Louisa’s children:- 
 
You are informed that payment of pension in respect of the children William 
John and Edward Ted, is being made at Motherless rate in accordance with 
your instructions dated 22
nd June, 1921.  The child, Winifred Doris now has 
left her Mother’s care and has been admitted to Crowley’s Orphanage. […]  
 
From later correspondence, it is clear that Willie and Teddy had been 
apprenticed from around this time.  Unfortunately, the letter of 22
nd June referred to 
in the above document is no longer extant, but the mention of their pension being 
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administered under Motherless rate leads to the assumption that they were not living 
with Louisa.  It is likely that the boys had been apprenticed under some system 
which included accommodation, hence the Pension Office would pay the 
apprenticing agent the ‘motherless rate’ by way of board and lodgings.  Again, the 
fact that it is the boys who are apprenticed is evidence of a patriarchal ideology 
which expected men to go out and work in a ‘trade’ whilst working-class women 
were largely expected to undertake unskilled work (such as domestic service or 
unskilled factory work) prior to marriage.   
The change-of-state now has left triggers the presupposition that Winnie was 
living with Louisa until very recently.  Winnie is the active agent in leaving Louisa’s 
care of her own volition, which would be unlikely in that she would be seven years 
old at that time.  However, the intransitive verb leave minimises the impact of this 
action.  She is then subject to an agentless passive for the admission to the 
orphanage.  
  The Birmingham office’s reply to this
64, dated 10
th January, 1923, continues:- 
 
Re:-  Winifred BAYLISS, child of the late 
  No. 15900, Private, Frank Balyiss, Glos. 
 
Referring to previous correspondence on this case, by arrangement made 
with the mother the Institution were prepared to keep Winifred for 6/- per 
week […] 
 
The funding of Winnie’s care has been arranged ‘with’ contributions by both 
Louisa and the orphanage, placing them both in equal status of power.  However, 
Louisa is reduced to the definite description of the mother, whereas the orphanage 
has been given an initial capital to emphasise its official importance.  Where mother 
is written with an initial capital, as in the letter above (November, 1922), Louisa is 
there in a more important role grammatically as the recipient of an action.  The 
authority of the orphanage over Louisa is, however, emphasised by the choice of 
prepared, which implies an element of negotiated choice on this authority’s part.   
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Winnie is again given her more formal name which emphasises the distance 
between her mother’s informal relationship with her and that which is afforded to 
her by the official agencies administering her care.  The reference line to this letter 
explicitly states Winnie is the ‘child of the late…’.  This highlights the link between 
Winnie and her father which is the basis for which her allowance is paid, giving 
evidence of the patriarchal ideology which underpins the whole pensions system. 
  The last letter in Louisa’s file relates to Winnie’s removal from one 
orphanage to another in 1930.   
 
  Re: Winifred BAYLISS, child of the late 15900, 
Private, Frank BAYLISS, Gloucester Regiment. 
 
  With reference to our minute of 13
th February, 1923, and your reply 
thereto (copy attached) you are informed that family rate (at present 7s.6d.) is 
still in payment for the above-named child who is an inmate of Crowley’s 
Orphanage, Edgbaston, up to 13
th February, 1929.  She was then transferred 
to the Orphan House, Leominster, but it is now considered that the child 
should be in a Home for bigger girls and the Secretary has applied for her 
admission to the Home of Hope, Gloucester. 
 
The impression of Winnie as a material object being passed between 
guardians is continued here.  The second sentence begins with Winnie as the subject 
of the actions of unnamed others who organise her transfer to a different orphanage.  
Again, an agentless passive considers her placement and leads to the assumption that 
Winnie is now an older and ‘bigger’ person who is inappropriately placed in the 
Leominster orphanage.  An anonymous Secretary appears as active agent in the 
material action of applying for Winnie’s transfer to a more appropriate institution 
(alliteratively named ‘Home of Hope’, seemingly in an attempt to euphamise the 
institution’s role as orphanage). 
  This correspondence reveals the different attitudes towards the role of a 
mother.  The State, with its middle-class, Victorian ideals, is concerned with 
material processes.  These can be in the form of Louisa’s behaviour and its failure to 
meet their expected norms of moral behaviour, or can be in the form of presenting 
her children as various packages with price tags attached, bargaining counters in the 
State’s parsimonious battle to save money in the 1920s’ post-war austerity.  Louisa,   143 
on the other hand, regards her role as mother as the provider of material care in the 
form of food, clothing and shelter.  Without financial support from the State, she 
claims she is incapable of such care.  It is this inability to provide adequately for her 
children at this basic level that is her greatest concern.  This dilemma is perhaps 
what the magistrates saw when they were unable to find evidence of ‘deliberate
 ill-
treatment and neglect’.   
Patriarchal ideology underpins discourses of morality and social welfare 
which are in evidence in these letters which construct Louisa as an unfit mother.  
However, the State’s distrust of Louisa extended far beyond her role as mother.  
After most of her children had been removed from her care, she continued her 
struggle to support herself and Winnie, as we have seen.  As time went by, she 
adopted different strategies in launching her appeals, as we shall see shortly. 
 
An unruly widow: ‘To keep me all my life’ 
 
As discussed above, the first letter
65 on file relating directly to Louisa is dated 21
st 
February, 1919 from the Ministry of Pensions, alerting the Widows’ Branch of the 
SGC’s decision to ‘suspend’ her pension, framed as instructions for action.  
 
The Special Grants Committee have had under consideration the case of Mrs. 
Bayliss 4/159 Clifton Road, Aston, widow of the late No. 15900 Private F.H. 
Bayliss, Gloucestershire Regiment, and have decided that the pension 
granted to this widow in respect of her late husband should be suspended. 
   
The impersonal agency of the Special Grants Committee here appears as the 
theme of the opening sentence.  Louisa herself is missing as a person, replaced by 
the nominal phrase the case of Mrs Bayliss….  She is then referred to by her 
relationship to the dead serviceman, linking her to the State’s interest in her as a war 
widow rather than any other capacity.  This is further highlighted by the 
(unnecessary?) clarifying clause in which her pension is postmodified by the verb 
phrase granted to this widow in respect of her late husband.  Granted implies this is 
not a right, but more akin to an arbitrary favour, the State in the guise of the SGC 
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having the power to withdraw this favour at any time.  The prepositional phrase in 
respect of links semantically back to the notion that the pension is ‘respectful’ of a 
dead solider, and is so provided as a mark of value and gratitude.  The use of 
suspend follows a legalistic register (such as is found in ‘suspended sentence’), but 
carries the assumption that the pension is simply on hold, and may be reinstated at 
some point (presumably of the SGC’s volition).  These features serve to intensify the 
State’s view of the pension being provided as something that is earned, more of a 
favour than a right. 
  As discussed above, whilst this letter also mentions that the children’s 
pension allowances are still to be paid, the new information given is that this money 
should not go to Louisa, but to the secretary of the local War Pensions Committee.  
The final sentence of the letter provides a clue as to why Louisa’s pension has been 
stopped: she has had another child which cannot be that of her dead husband, so she 
must have been involved in some sort of sexual (and therefore immoral) relationship 
with a man who was not her husband.  This deviation from the expected behaviour 
of a State-funded war widow was unacceptable under the rules of the Royal Warrant.  
Based heavily on middle-class, Victorian ideals of women, irrespective of the norms 
of working-class life where extra-marital sexual relations were not unusual, such 
behaviour was regarded as being unacceptable to the point of the imposition of 
financial penalty.  With such a strong moral code underpinning early State-funded 
social welfare, the Ministry of Pensions could not be seen to be publicly condoning 
extra marital sexual relations, particularly those which resulted in the birth of a child 
to unmarried women.  Thus at a time when it would appear that Louisa needed 
financial help most, following the death of her husband, the birth of new baby and 
with five children under the age of 12 to support, she has her main source of income 
removed.   
  What seems likely is that, by 1919, the formal network of surveillance of 
widows had been established by the Ministry of Pensions.  As previously discussed, 
up until 1916, the SSFA had still been involved in the local provision of pensions, 
but their system had not been able to cope with the large increase in the number of 
‘cases’ for them to monitor via their network of ‘lady visitors’.  The formal   145 
arrangement of the Ministry of Pensions’ local offices would have given the State a 
higher profile in the provision of pensions on a national scale, where State-funded 
social welfare could be seen in action.  This might go some way to explaining why 
there is gap of 14 months between the birth of Louisa’s fifth child and the first 
official notification of this in her file (although investigations by the SGC are not 
extant, it is highly likely they would have acted quickly to ‘suspend’ Louisa’s 
pension on the grounds of inappropriate behaviour as part of their role in not 
condoning State subsidised immorality).  This letter, therefore, shows traces of the 
State’s position on social welfare which is closely related to morality, both 
discourses being employed here.   
  Louisa’s own letters of appeal contain very similar argument structures:-  
1.  The grounds to which she nearly always refers is that her husband has died; 
2.  The warrant of this being the undisputed fact that this was as a result of his 
war service; 
3.  The claim is that she is a war widow, and is therefore able to draw a pension.   
It is in the backing to her claims that she produces some variety.  The two 
main backings are,  
a.  Her own state of poverty;   
b.  It is the State’s patriotic duty to pay her the pension.   
These two backings in her consistent argument provide the main categories under 
which her letters will be discussed below.  Starting by looking at her plea for a 
pension which employs the backing that the pension is owed to her on a basis of 
need, her letters utilise discourses of social welfare and nationalism.  Secondly, she 
bases her appeal on the basis that the pension is owed to her as a right, evoking 
discourses of morality and social welfare.  These topi will be discussed in relation to 
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Pension on the basis of need:  ‘I can’t live on air’ 
 
As previously discussed, the Royal Warrant had been drafted partly out of a desire to 
save money in the long term, institutional care of destitute widows by preventing the 
potential future expense of workhouse accommodation whilst appearing to be 
beneficent and acting for the good of the nation.  In this rush to appear fair and equal 
in the distribution of pension payments, there was no means testing for a war 
widow’s pension.  It was set at a flat rate on a scale depending on a number of 
factors including the widow’s age, and for children the dependent’s pension was 
available at a flat rate.  
In common with most working-class widows whose letters form the basis of 
this corpus, Louisa often features the argument based around material needs.  This 
links into older more established and familiar discourses of means tested allowances. 
In a letter
66 dated by Louisa 27
th December, 1919, she pleads: 
 
Sir / I have gote a Bade Father to live with / he gainge to throwe me out is 
house bocose I cante Pay my longs money that ben fru to my Husband / Sir 
Could you Finde me something To do / I ham a War Widows / I gete know 
home to cauled my hone / No15900 Private Frank Bayliss 10 Gloucestershire 
Regiment WCB237. 
 
Dear sir / I till Bade I cante work fore my self […] 
 
Here, her argument to regain her pension payment is supported by her need for 
accommodation.  It appears she is living with her father but she claims he is going to 
throw her out as she is unable to pay him any lodging money, triggered by the 
assumption she has to be in his house for him to ‘throw her out’.  She draws on the 
notion of the State as surrogate husband in pointing out that her husband had 
previously paid for her lodgings.  Echoing the debates in parliament from six years 
previously, she highlights her fate as a destitute war widow without a home to call 
her own.  She is also implying a willingness to go out and work, thus linking into the 
ideology of the Protestant work ethic which underpinned much 19
th century 
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charitable provision and continued into 20
th century social welfare legislation.  In 
Louisa’s case, she pleads she is unable to work owing to ill health (‘I till Bade’), a 
factor which is highlighted in other letters in her file.   
  In one of the first letters
67 from Louisa herself (date-stamped 28
th August, 
1919), she requests her ring paper be reissued as she is only receiving a pension for 
Winnie. 
 
Dear Sir / I ham Sendinge this letter to you if you wood forde this Ringe 
Papper down soon you can / I havent hade heny money week fore aught 
houlding fore my Little Girl / I cante mabed you out / Wood you be so kinge 
forde my Ringe Papper down as Well soon you cane  / the Number the Ringe 
Papper is 237 / My Husband No 15900 Private Frank Bayliss 10 Battalion 
Gloucestershire Regiment / Dear Sir / I havente gote marrage not all / I ham a 
Widow / Wood you Please Sende me my Pensions money down soon you 
can 
 
This letter shows Louisa engaging in a conversational yet deferential style of writing 
that implicitly acknowledges the difference in power between herself and the 
bureaucrats.  The modality in her first clause appears to carry a certainty that her 
request will be acted upon, as she finishes it by employing a positive politeness 
strategy with the request that this be done ‘as soon as you can’.  She presents the 
argument that she has no money with the presupposition that this will be sufficient 
grounds for her pension to be reinstated.  Indeed, she uses a macro mitigation 
strategy to reduce the force of her expression of bewilderment that she can be in 
such a position when there is a certain income to be had from ‘her’ pension: I cante 
mabed you out implies that she is unaware of any circumstances under which her 
pension should have been stopped.  Perhaps in the hope that this is merely an 
administrative error, she helpfully includes reference to the ring paper number.  In 
what would become a feature of all of her letters, she also gives the full number, 
rank, name and regiment of her husband.  This is not as futile as it would first 
appear, as in her letters this tends to be one of the only elements which is deemed 
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important enough to be highlighted by the blue pencil of the bureaucrats at the 
Ministry of Pensions.   
  In my analysis of such documents throughout the corpus, this bureaucratic 
trace is consistently found. The serviceman’s details would be underlined along with 
any reference to a change of circumstance or other ‘fact’ deemed valid for attention.  
In Louisa’s letters, as seen in the appendix, little is underscored apart from Frank’s 
details, thus suggesting the main arguments she is making are not seen as valid by 
the Ministry of Pensions bureaucrats.  In fact, the few occasions when further 
underlining is evident, it is to Louisa’s detriment, whereby the document is 
effectively transformed from one that seeks to make a case for Louisa to regain her 
pension, to one that is designed to dismiss her account. 
To return to Louisa’s letter of 28
th August (Document xii), it could be 
assumed that she is writing to refute a claim that she has remarried (in which case 
her pension would have ceased anyway), triggered by the statement I havente gote 
marrage not all I ham a Widow, in which she presents herself as a widow and 
therefore presumably worthy of a State-funded pension.  As discussed above, the 
frame of motherhood is also used to appeal for a pension, whereby the assumption 
that it is the breadwinner’s role to provide for the family is passed to the patriarchal 
authority of the State.  It should also be noted that, although the children’s 
dependants’ allowances were not suspended during this period, they were often 
subject to administration orders where they would be held in trust by the local 
Pensions Officer (in this case, Mrs Shakespear), thus denying the mother the role of 
head of household and revealing the State’s lack of trust vested in women without a 
male head of household. 
  In this first letter, we see Louisa already regarding the widows’ pension as 
one that is hers by right as the widow of a dead soldier, but also she is linking this to 
older assumptions about such payments being given on the basis of need.  For 
Louisa, ‘need’ is the most important factor as she struggles to look after herself and 
her family, and it is this most pressing issue which continues as a theme throughout 
her letters.  She is not ‘failing’ in this traditional role of mother through any 
intentional fault of her own.  Quite the reverse; it is lack of (financial) resources that   149 
are causing her main difficulties.  Thus she employs the frame of motherhood to 
support her claim on the basis of need, and as we shall see below, the frame of 
widowhood which was written into the Royal Warrant is one with which she also 
comes to comply. 
Another widow, Mabel Beadsworth, whose case will be discussed in more 
detail below, was in a similar position to Louisa in that her pension had been stopped 
on the basis of ‘immoral’ behaviour.  Unlike Louisa, there is another letter in file 
much later from this widow which gives some idea of the possible fate of such 
women.  Some 15 years after her pensions had been stopped, in a letter
68 written 
from Fishpool Institution (the euphemistic re-naming of a workhouse near Bolton), 
Mabel pleads for a reinstatement of her pension.  Her letter carries the assumption 
that a reinstated pension would remove her from the workhouse, and draws 
intertextually on much older arguments relating to the State’s maintenance of war 
widows whereby the pension was partly intended to act as a means of keeping such 
women out of the workhouse system.  Hence her needs is here based not so much on 
the daily means of living, as Louisa’s is, but on the next level of need, that of 
freedom to maintain a level of independent living outside of the much-feared 
institution of the workhouse. 
 
Since my second child of my husband’s was 3 years of age, I have lived with 
a man named Dakin by whom I have had eight children who has now left me 
since March of last year, thus my reason for being in the institution, and am 
told by my solicitor where I have applied for a summons against this man, to 
apply to you for pension.  Kindly note I had not met the man Dakin until 
nearly three years after my husband’s second child was born […] I hope I 
have made my case quite clear to you, and hoping you will reconsider my 
Army pension, when I will promise I will not lose it again. 
  Believe me, 
    Yours respectfully, 
      Mabel Beadsworth 
 
The more complex details of the parentage of Mabel’s children will be discussed 
below, but here she presents herself as a women who has been mistreated by the 
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father of eight of her children in his abandonment of her.  She employs macro 
intensification strategies to present this abandonment as the reason for her presence 
in the workhouse (which she herself refers to euphemistically as ‘the institution’), 
that no alternative course of action is available is triggered by the use of thus.  The 
gap in the coherence of her argument here may hide a series of desperate 
misfortunes that lead her to take the drastic step of entering the workhouse, but is 
left implied by this coordinating conjunction.  She distances herself from the man 
with whom she has had a long-term relationship by referring to him only by his 
surname, also prefixing this by the man in order to mark the difference between him 
and my husband, her relationship to the latter being the grounds on which she is 
basing her plea for reinstatement of her pension.  Her repeated restatement of her 
children’s relationship with Beadsworth serves to further highlight her claim, 
drawing on the frame of motherhood which she stretches to include her children by 
Dakin by giving the exact number of children born to this father.   
  Mabel, like Louisa and many other widows, regards the war widows’ 
pension as being hers, triggered by the use of the personal possessive pronoun my.  
In Mabel’s case, she is also takes responsibility for having her pension stopped 
through the commissive speech act I promise I will not lose it again, where again 
acts as a trigger to enforce her role as the active agent responsible for the loss of the 
pension.  Mabel’s claim to truth is intensified by the complimentary close believe 
me, which precedes the conventional deference of yours respectfully.  Without the 
expected prefix of please, the phrase moves from a request to an instruction which, 
semantically, acts indirectly as an intensified plea, thus revealing Mabel’s 
recognition of linguistic strategies appropriate to such appeals. 
  One of the groundbreaking principles on which the Royal Warrant had been 
drawn up was that it was not means tested but, as seen above, many widows had 
very great need of this pension in order to maintain their material existence.  
Frequently, when widows’ appeals on the basis of material need were not answered 
by the Ministry, a different approach was used by widows, resulting in many of them 
resorting to the argument of it being the State’s moral obligation to support them. 
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Pension on the basis of moral obligation/right: ‘For king and 
country’ 
 
As previously mentioned, almost every letter Louisa sent to the Ministry of Pensions 
contained the name, rank, number and regiment details of her husband.  In so doing, 
she is reinforcing her claim to a pension by this invocation of her husband’s military 
details.  Although he had only been in the army for just over a year, these are the 
only identifying details she gives.  As described earlier, Louisa’s widow’s pension 
was distributed to her as soon as the Army Council had been satisfied as to Frank’s 
military service and presumed cause of death (‘missing in action’ was a frequently 
invoked euphemism to describe those unfortunate men who had been blown to 
pieces in the course of their active service), and Louisa had provided evidence of her 
association with Frank by producing her marriage certificate as well as her and the 
children’s birth certificates.
69  The blue ticks of the Ministry bureaucrats on records 
in her file indicate that all of these documents had been received and authenticated in 
the six months following Frank’s declared ‘missing in action’, this period being the 
time built into the pension system for administrative purposes.  Once her pension 
had been stopped, Louisa often invoked discourses of nationalism to support her 
plea for its reinstatement as part of her ‘right’ to a pension which she seems to 
regard as being in exchange for her husband.  In a letter
70 date-stamped 11
th 
December, 1919, Louisa writes:- 
 
Dear Sir / you hade my Husband to fighte fore Kinge and Country / I speted 
you to keep me all my life War Widow / Private Frank Bayliss 1590010 Batt 
Gloucrstershire Reg / From is wife L J Bayliss. 
 
Here, Louisa explicitly draws on the argument that the State should act as her 
guardian and provider of financial support in her husband’s absence, citing the 
State’s patriotic duty as the backing to her claim for a pension.  She is accepting the 
patriarchal role of the State to take over her husband’s role in a phrase that echoes 
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the marriage lines: ‘to keep me all my life’.  As Elshtain (1993) has observed, in 
times of war the motivation to join up is not primarily by hatred of the enemy, but by 
a willingness to die in the cause of the homeland.  This particular articulation of 
national identity is one which the British State drew upon during the First World 
War and is one which Louisa, and other widows, repeated in the years that followed. 
  The early recruitment posters to 
Kitchener’s Army had made the explicit link 
between monarchy and nation, often employing 
the highly alliterative phrase ‘fight for king and 
country’ (for example, see left
71) in expressing 
the idea of fighting for the defence of the 
homeland as the main motivation for joining 
up.  It is a phrase found in countless letters 
written by war widows to the Ministry of 
Pensions.  For example, Mary Rooney finished 
a letter appealing for an extension to her 
children’s pension with: ‘you will at least earn 
the gratitude of the widow of one who has made the supreme sacrifice for his King 
and Country’.
72  This phrase came to be one of the most common to be carved onto 
the community war memorials which sprang up around the country in the years 
immediately following the war, where they remain to this day with the addition of 
names from later conflicts for whom this overt patriotism was perhaps less relevant.  
The phrase appears in various texts throughout the war, such as found on post cards 
and even official Christmas cards.
73  In a letter
74 dated by Louisa herself as 27
th 
December, she repeats this argument:  ‘My Husband Done fore his Best fore his 
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kinge and Countery I think you aught to do something fore me’.  She has employed 
the rather more sophisticated rhetorical strategy of parallel structures to emphasise 
her argument and implicitly links her husband’s service to the State with the State’s 
obligation to her.  Her use of ought carries a modal obligation of greater certainty 
than alternatives such as could and might.   
  For Louisa and so many other widows in the post-war years, their evocation 
of patriotic phrases was no longer accepted as valid by the State, the order of 
discourse having shifted to be primarily one of morality rather than patriotism. 
  Louisa also frequently repeatedly refers to herself as ‘war widow’ or more 
simply as Frank’s ‘wife’.  In the case of the former, she is drawing on her schemata 
for the frame of war widow which includes the status and power that would be 
vested in such a position, the power to draw a pension, for example.  A war widow 
would also have been the one category of widow who was allocated a (financially) 
non-contributory State pension at this time, and thus is a position which carries with 
it a certain material benefit which would come to be held up as an example of a 
perfect model for a pension system when the widows’ pension scheme was 
developed by the first Labour administration in the mid 1920s.  In society in general, 
the frame of a war widow carried with it the hushed reverence and pride that would 
be ascribed to a woman whose husband had died in the service of ‘his’ country.  
Such power and status vested in the title of ‘war widow’ thus encompasses ideas of 
nationalism and social welfare, discourses that Louisa draws upon in her claims for 
the reinstatement of her pension.  This put war widows in the unexpected position of 
being envied by the unmarried women in the interwar years, whom Holden (2005) 
refers to as ‘imaginary widows’.  
  This passage from 11
th December (document v) also shows another common 
strategy used by Louisa in her letters: the use of a conversational style which makes 
her appeal personal to the nameless and unknown bureaucrat whom she is 
addressing.  In a society where face-to-face appeals for charitable assistance would 
have been common, this is not surprising. Her letters frequently employ the 
discourse marker dear sir, although it is not always clear if the second person 
pronoun is addressing an individual or an institution.  For example, in this passage it   154 
would appear that although she is appealing directly to the anonymous bureaucrat in 
her imploring dear sir, the you hade my Husband and I speted you to keep me are 
more likely an institutional you.  Earlier in the same letter, in the most frequent 
opening to all of her correspondence, Louisa writes: ‘Dear Sir Wood you Be so 
kinge and sende me mye Pension’.  Here, the second person pronoun appears to be 
directed towards the recipient as an individual.  In other letters, the appeal is more 
desperate as she demands ‘Sir howe wood you likede to go with out heny Diners on 
Sunday all the week Nothinge to live on’.
75  This apparent response-demanding 
utterance carries the assumption that it is Louisa herself who is living under such 
hardship, but also links into the British tradition of a ‘special’ meal on a Sunday 
which she herself is deprived of as she has not the money to spend even on bread for 
seven days a week.  Here as elsewhere, Louisa is drawing on more familiar 
encounters with authorities where meetings would be on a face-to-face basis, and so 
more personal, thus her attempt to find a common ground, a shared lifeworld, with 
her interlocutor is, perhaps, not surprising. 
  Like other widows, Louisa is persistent in her assumption that the pension is 
hers as a right.  Drawing on the frame of motherhood to support her argument, she is 
consistent in referring to it in the first person possessive article.  For example, as is 
found in the more or less standard opening to her letters as here in a letter
76 date-
stamped 4
th May, 1920: 
 
Dear Sir / Wood you Be so kinge and lete me have my Widows Pensions Pay 
/ I think Some Boday eles havinge My Pension Loance For speite my 
Husband left me is Pay to Pickup Every Week I Dont / I am left with 4 
children / I dont know What you gote to stope it for / from the forst temes 28 
last yeare in Mach last pay I hade / I haught to have it backe gen / Dear Sir / I 
done Nothinge fore you to stop my Widows Pensions launce / Private Frank 
Bayliss 10 Gloster 15900 WCB237 / from Mrs L Bayliss. 
 
She appears to be working on the assumption that an unidentified agency is paying 
the pension every week into some sort of holding fund, presumably basing this 
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assumption on the fact that her separation allowance was paid directly from her 
husband’s army wages to the local post office for her to collect, hence her comment 
‘my Husband left me is Pay to Pickup Every Week I Dont’.  The pension payments, 
although delivered in the same way as the separation allowance, were not held in 
trust in the event of a pension being suspended as Louisa’s had been.  However, this 
does not appear to have been explained to Louisa, or at least understood by her.  
Using argument structure, we can see that this results in the backing of unwarranted 
cessation of pension which she employs in addition to the more usual backing of 
poverty.  She again invokes the modality of greater obligation in claiming that she 
ought to have her pension reinstated, this reinstatement triggered by the use of again 
to carry the presupposition that she has had a pension at some time in the past.  The 
apparent assumption that the pension is actually a continuation of her husband’s 
army pay and is not, in fact, a State-funded pension, is clearly articulated in an 
undated letter (probably August, 1919
77) when Louisa formulates her usual request 
for reinstatement of her pension as ‘Please forde my Husband Money on be longe to 
him’.   
  Other factors are introduced here to reinforce Louisa’s arguments.  Part of 
the grounds for her argument are that she seems to believe someone else is unfairly 
collecting her pension.  Nowhere does she offer evidence of this, but seems to link it 
to the known fact that her separation allowance then her pension had been paid 
regularly, but had stopped.  The material nature of such a payment, to someone who 
is unfamiliar with the nature of social welfare funded by central government, quite 
logically must still exist, even when it doesn’t get paid every week.   
  There is apparent bafflement on the part of Louisa as to why this pension 
payment has ceased.  She pleads ‘I dont know What you gote to stope Widow 
pension money’, personalising her argument by expressing ignorance as to the cause 
of the State’s unfair actions.  Invoking the frame of motherhood, she states she has 
four children to look after, linking her argument for a pension on the basis of 
personal need with the need to provide materially for the children of a dead soldier.  
Again, the direct appeal to the anonymous bureaucrat at the Ministry of Pensions is 
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marked by the macro mitigation politeness strategy of deference in addressing this 
person by the formal letter writing salutation in a conversational style when she 
appears to answer the implied question: ‘Dear Sir I done Nothinge fore you to stop 
my Widows Pensions launce’.  Other letters repeat this sense of bewilderment: ‘I 
cante maked you out’ (28
th August, 1919
78); ‘I think you tuck me fore the raunge 
one’ (undated, but approximately early September, 1919).  This mental process verb 
think in this last example acts as a micro mitigation strategy, lessening the force of 
Louisa’s accusation of mistaken identity.   
  As mentioned above, the conversational style of Louisa’s letters makes 
personal appeals the basis of her argument.  Whilst she usually addresses the 
anonymous Ministry of Pensions bureaucrat as an individual, she also lays personal 
blame for her circumstances on this unknown individual.  In a letter
79 date-stamped 
9
th February, 1920, Louisa writes: 
 
all you fault I cante gete my proper food know money to lived on / Dear Sir / 
wood you be so kinge and let me have my Pensions money soon you cande / 
are you tryinge to trick me out of my Pensions Launce Course my Husband 
Gate killed at the Ware / Private Frank Bayliss 10 Glasters Sheres 15900  
 
Here, she makes a direct accusation of blame for her current state of poverty as 
being the ‘fault’ of the anonymous bureaucrat.  Immediately after this outburst, she 
resumes her usual deference with the well-worn request ‘Dear Sir would you be so 
kinge and let me my Pensions money soon you cande’, placing the power of the 
request back in the hands of the authorities.  However, this request is then followed 
by a question which makes another accusation, although here the use of the question 
form makes the accusation less forceful than the opening statement all you fault.  
The response-demanding ‘are you tryinge to trick me out of my Pension Launce’ is 
backed by the known facts of her husband’s war service, thus the tentative 
accusation is being reinforced by acknowledged fact to give it more weight.  As with 
most of Louisa’s arguments, the fact of her husband’s death whilst on active service 
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is regarded by her as her strongest bargaining tool.  Her argument about her current 
state of impoverishment being the responsibility of the State (synecdochally standing 
in for the nation) is emphasised by the stress placed on the usual warrant that her 
husband died during active service (‘my Husband Gate killed at the Ware’).  In this 
way, nationalism and social welfare are inextricably linked, along with Louisa’s 
view that it is the State’s moral obligation to give her money.  This letter ends with: 
‘from Mrs Balyiss War Widow I ham’.  The subverted syntax of the noun phrase she 
has chosen for herself emphasises her status as a war widow by placing it before the 
pronoun, making what would otherwise be an equal state subject more powerful. 
  Throughout Louisa’s letters, there is an underlying assumption that her 
pension payments can and will be reinstated as a result of her petitioning.  In a 
letter
80 date-stamped 1
st September, 1919, she gives quite specific instructions as to 
where her pension money should be paid, which carries the assumption that it will be 
paid in its frame of instruction: ‘my Ringe Papper is 237 / Will you Please to Sende 
it Aston Maner Post Office / Please Sende Soon you cane Fore me hand my Little 
Girl.’  Aston Manor Post Office would, indeed, have been the agency which would 
have paid out her weekly pension, but here Louisa shows an apparent confidence 
that, by including such details, her pension will appear where she has directed.  She 
continues this strategy almost a year later (in July, 1920
81) when, in the voice of her 
father
82, she writes that she ‘will draw the money on Monday’.   
   The precise reason Louisa’s widow’s pension was suspended in 1916 is one 
of the unspoken features of her case.  As discussed above, she sometimes refers to 
an exophoric, malicious entity who is passing on information about her to the 
Ministry of Pensions.  For example, the letter date-stamped 16 June, 1919 
(Document ix, discussed earlier), Louisa appears to be countering the unspoken but 
expected response that her pension has been stopped because of her inappropriate 
behaviour.  She attributes this accusation to unknown but malicious informants who 
would appear to have a personal vendetta against her which she seems to think is for 
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their own gain: ‘it won’t do them any good’.  The surveillance this implies will be 
discussed further shortly. 
  There are no letters in the file from Louisa following the reinstatement of her 
pension in 1921, but it is clear that she did remain under official surveillance.  A 
letter
83 from the local pensions office to the Ministry of Pensions in January 1923 
repeats Louisa’s own claims of ill health, but here presented by the Ministry officials 
themselves as being an essential factor in redirecting some of the family pension 
money to her: 
 
In view of the widow’s mental condition and inability to earn, it is 
felt that payment of the extra 5/- to her becomes in fact, a vital necessity. 
  It is, therefore, strongly recommended that payment of 6/- be 
continued to the Orphanage, and that payment of 22/2d. be paid to Mrs. 
Bayliss. 
 
The urgency expressed in the phrase a vital necessity, the intensifier emphasising the 
perceived need, is carried through in the following sentence with the premodification 
of recommend with strongly.  Unusually in correspondence from Ministry of 
Pensions bureaucrats, this letter expresses a sense of need rather than right in the 
administration of the pension.  The Ministry of Pension’s use of ‘need’ over-rides 
Louisa’s own use of this in her drawn out pleas on this claim grounding, once again 
showing the institutional power of the State over its citizens in the orders of 
discourse that are permitted.  Lengthy correspondence within the Ministry of 
Pensions proceeded to clarify the position and it was eventually decided that Louisa 
had no right to this extra 6/- under the terms of the Royal Warrant. 
 
Compliance with moral code: ‘Her moral character has been 
good.’ 
 
Whilst the precise nature of Louisa’s perceived misdemeanours which led to the 
initial suspension of her pension in March 1919 are unstated in the extant documents 
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in her file, it is clear that it was her moral behaviour which led to this initial 
suspension.  As discussed earlier, the letter from the Birmingham office of the 
Ministry of Pensions, dated 12
th August, 1919
84, declares: ‘Mrs Bayliss is still very 
unsatisfactory’.  The use of still triggers the assumption that this unsatisfactory 
behaviour has previously been known about and continues to the date of this letter. 
Evangelical beneficence is suggested in this letter where the writer uses indirect 
speech in giving the visitor’s report that she ‘does not feel that any good is being 
done by her visits to the House’.  This carries the assumption that the visitor would 
be ‘doing good’, probably by offering advice relating to childcare and general moral 
values, although to whose benefit is left unstated.  However, the visitor would have 
been part of the surveillance system set up initially by the SSFA, implicitly to report 
on any inappropriate or immoral behaviour on the part of the pensioned widow.  The 
public and parliamentary debates relating to the initial drafting of the Royal Warrant 
in 1914 hint at the mistrust of women.  Letters in The Times in early October 1914 
relating to the fear that soldiers’ wives would squander their separation allowances 
also formed part of the parliamentary debates the following month when widows’ 
pensions were first discussed.  The debates, as we saw earlier, carried the fear that 
these working-class women would (unacceptably) become State-subsidised ‘merry 
widows’ if no checks were built into the Warrant.  In light of this fear that women 
without a patriarchal head to the household who could manage their moral and 
financial existence, the pension rates were deliberately set at such a rate that 
anticipated such women would have another source of income so would not be 
languishing in State-subsidised luxury, or at least alcoholic inaebriation, as was 
frequently expressed by The Times letter-writers.   
  The moral standards which framed widows, including working-class war 
widows, included the expectation that they would adhere to behaviour which 
modelled passivity and sobriety.  Whilst such attributes were undoubtedly part of 
middle-class widowhood, the lifestyle of working-class women was often very 
different.  What is interesting to note is that there is a dawning acceptance of these 
middle-class standards of moral behaviour by the working-class widows, whose 
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private lives are being discussed in the public sphere.  Perhaps the realisation that 
they were the subject of surveillance and that their pensions depended on such 
morality led to compliance, at least on paper.  As Foucault pointed out in Discipline 
and Punish,  
 
In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen.  Their visibility assures 
the hold of the power that is exercised over them.  It is the fact of being 
constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the 
disciplined individual in his [sic] subjection. (1977: 187) 
 
The case files of other widows give an indication of the levels of surveillance these 
women were subject to.  To return to Mabel Beadsworth
85, her husband had been 
‘lost in action’ in May, 1915.  Mabel’s claim for a dependant’s pension for a 
daughter born in January 1916 aroused suspicions by unnamed bureaucrats at the 
Army Council (which administered war pensions until later in 1916, when the 
Ministry of Pensions was created) as her husband had not been home for leave since 
February, 1915.  The local office of the War Relief Committee (which preceded the 
Ministry of Pension) organised a police investigation into this matter.  In one letter, 
the local Army Council official writes: 
 
I am directed […] to request that you will be good enough to cause 
confidential enquiries to be made and a report to be furnished as to the truth 
of the allegation made concerning the parentage of the child (born the 2
nd 
January 1916) and as to the woman’s general character and conduct. […] 
This information is required to enable the Army Council to decide whether 
Mrs. Beadsworth is worthy of the Pension which has been awarded to her in 
respect of the above soldier [Pte Alexander Beadsworth].
86 
 
Here, the euphemism confidential enquiries masks the intrusive, indeed draconian 
nature of the surveillance under which widows were subjected.  Police involvement 
suggests this is a criminal activity and links with the legal register that is employed 
elsewhere in official documentation relating to pensions, such as commit, sanction, 
suspend, etc.  Indeed, in other letters it emerges that a high-ranking police officer (a 
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detective chief inspector) had visited Mabel at home to question her.  The high level 
of formality in this letter features a lack of human agency, where nominalisations 
such as the allegation and the parentage mask responsibility, and Mabel herself is 
reduced to the woman’s character.  Mabel’s ‘character’ is open to surveillance, 
discourses of morality being invoked in line with those of social welfare for which 
she has to prove herself ‘worthy’, rather than any argument of need.  Once more 
drawing on moral discourses which frame widowhood, the resultant police report 
records: 
 
She is a Barmaid and at the present time is employed at an Hotel here, but 
her general conduct is open to suspicion, although no recent complaints have 
been received here respecting her. 
 
Serving in a bar was regarded as a very unsuitable occupation for a 
‘respectable’ woman, and as we shall see later, this attitude relates to Louisa’s own 
negative comments about women who drink in bars.  There is no active agent 
assigned to the nominalised mental process verb suspicion, and the contrastive 
conjunction although leads to the presupposition that her behaviour has been the 
cause of moral concern in the past (triggered by recent and enforced by here, which 
suggests that complaints could have been received elsewhere).  
It is not just the State that is engaging in the surveillance of widows: it could 
come from neighbours and family as well.  Another letter in Mabel Beadsworth’s 
file is from her mother-in-law
87, who writes that Mabel ‘gave birth to a bastard 
child’.  At this time, bastard was still most commonly used in its legal sense (as in 
the Bastardy Orders which were issued to fathers of children who were born out of 
marriage in this period), but this letter is also carries highly negative connotations 
which are enforced by the following clause, which the writer presents as a response-
demanding utterance ‘do you not call that misconduct’.  Assuming agreement, she 
goes on to draw upon strongly moralistic discourses, and continues ‘it is a disgrace 
to the name of woman’.  Mrs Beadsworth senior is thus presenting herself as a moral 
guardian in line with the State’s expectations of the same. 
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  Another widow, Rosina Allen
88 aroused suspicion at the Ministry of 
Pensions when she re-married nine months after the death of her husband in 1934.  
In Rosina’s case, her neighbours were questioned by local Ministry of Pensions 
officials in an attempt to find out if her second husband had lived with her before 
they married.  An internal memorandum of 23
rd March, 1935 further reports that ‘the 
Superintendent of this Council Estate, whose office is situated quite close to 
[Rosina’s street], unofficially informed me that the woman was generally regarded 
as very respectable.’  It appears that the ‘unofficial’ surveillance emerges from the 
panopticon of the superintendant’s office and stretches into the unofficial network of 
neighbours, further supporting the Foucaultian notion of surveillance that underpins 
the discipline of morality to which the widows were subjected.   
  This euphemism of ‘confidential enquiries’ echoes the ‘unofficial 
information’ in letters relating to Mabel.  Fortunately for Rosina, these enquiries 
from unnamed neighbours are reassuring of her ‘respectable’ behaviour, ie her 
compliance with the middle-class code of morality for widows. 
  A more subtle level of surveillance was also employed, ostensibly to the 
widow’s benefit.  In particular, the moral surveillance extended to the husbands of 
widows who remarried.  Catherine Baillie’s
89 husband, John, had been killed in 
action in 1917, leaving her with five children under the age of 16.  She married again 
in 1920, receiving the ‘gratuity’ of a year’s pension to mark the end of her war 
widowhood status.  The dependants’ allowance for her children continued, as with 
the Royal Warrant policy of standing as provider in the place of their father.  It 
emerged that her second husband was, in fact, already married.  A letter from the 
Glasgow Local Committee to the Special Grants Committee relates the brief details 
of her situation: 
 
I have to inform you Mrs Baillie is in receipt of a pension for £1-9-6 on 
behalf of the children of the above named deceased soldier.  On the 7
th April 
1920, she married James Kearney.  She stayed with him just about six weeks 
and only discovered after that period, through the School Board Officer, that 
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he was a married man.  She took in his children, three in number.  Kearney’s 
legal wife has been away from him since November.
90 
 
Catherine is noticeably the active agent in most of this letter.  In particular, she is 
placed in the role of carer.  This is initially in the role of carer for her children from 
her first marriage where she is curiously absent from the explicit role of mother to 
the children, instead being merely the recipient of the State’s money which is clearly 
paid in their position as the children of a dead serviceman.  She is also somewhat 
vaguely placed as carer to her new husband’s children, the use of simple non-present 
tense leaving it unclear if this is something she is continuing to do.  Kearney’s first 
wife is also given an active role, euphemistically described as having ‘been away 
from him’.  There is a background assumption that Catherine’s second marriage took 
place to enlist her help as carer of Kearney’s children from his existing marriage.  
However, the news of this bigamous marriage is passed to Catherine, not through 
friends and relatives, but through the subtle surveillance of the school board officer.  
This illustrates the point made in the Historical Context section that the working 
classes, and mothers in particular, were subjected to surveillance through the social 
welfare reforms of the early 20
th century, particularly those directed explicitly 
towards children.  In Catherine’s case, this surveillance seems to have worked to her 
advantage as her pension was restored.  A letter from the SGC announced: 
 
The Special Grants Committee have decided that she may be regarded as 
worthy of resumption of her pension.
91 
 
  The collective agency of the SGC, although reinstating her pension, employ 
the hedge may to allow doubt to be possible in the future which a greater degree of 
certainty such as is would not have allowed.  There is also a level of arbitrariness in 
the choice of the mental process verb decide which is found in other letters from the 
SGC.  Catherine’s reinstatement of pension is articulated as being linked to her 
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moral behaviour, triggered by worthy, all underlining the power of the autonomous 
SCG.   
  In Mabel, Rosina and Catherine’s cases, we can see that the surveillance of 
widows extended to family, employers and neighbours, all of whom were expected 
to contribute to the official State surveillance.  In relation to Mabel and Rosina, there 
is little doubt that this is the sort of surveillance to which Louisa was subjected. 
  Louisa in particular presents a picture of herself which appears to be an 
attempt to comply with this morality within the frame of widowhood.  In a letter
92 
date-stamped 22
nd  January, 1920, she frames her appeal as a request: 
 
[…] Dear sir / I cante lived on the hair / whay donte you be so kinge and 
send me my Pension Money Dawn / Dear Sir / I nate marriage / I ham still a 
widow / I all kieep my selfe to selfe / I donte go out at night time / if havey 
halfe my Pension aboute £10,- week to bye me some food with / I donte 
draink bare liked some shouldrs wife in a bare shope / I donte have aute work 
pay / I note loakey / the others to gete heny think aut tell you a lie / I donte 
gete heny thnk to heat / I wish I gate a Good Friend to healp me / I go now 
bodary at all. 
 
Here, she presents her usual argument claim that she has material need for a pension, 
but uses the backing that she is complying with a standard of moral behaviour which 
she has presumably been accused of breaching, leading to her pension being 
stopped.  She asserts ‘I all kieep my selfe to selfe I donte go out at night time’.  The 
use of the intensification strategy of negation to enhance a positive feature continues 
as she uses the strategy of comparing her own behaviour with that of other soldiers’ 
wives.  This links into the moral panic about soldiers’ wives which Trustram (1984) 
commented on, and which again surfaced in relation to soldiers’ wives in Britain 
during the First World War.  Such distrust was a factor that contributed towards the 
more draconian measures in DORA against a backdrop of general mistrust of 
women without a male head of their household, whether these be simply women 
whose husbands were on active service, or women who had been widowed.   
Louisa is also drawing on discourses of social welfare whereby at this time 
demobbed soldiers were returning home to resume their pre-war jobs, putting many 
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women war workers out of a job.  As previously discussed, those women who had 
paid into the National Insurance scheme were not always eligible for unemployment 
benefit, as the legislation that had been formulated generally precluded women from 
this scheme unless they could prove they were unable to find work elsewhere.  It is 
against this background that Louisa is making her assertion that she ‘doente have 
aute work pay’, whilst at the same time it could also be read that she is emphasising 
her poverty in not having dole as a form of income, rather than presenting her own 
moral worthiness.  
  Louisa also appears to imply that unnamed ‘others’ only get State money by 
telling lies.  She is linking her argument into wider public concerns about the abuse 
of unemployment benefit to enhance her own argument, the shifting order of 
discourse is thus being recognised by her.  This links with a previous argument 
Louisa has used to claim a pension in a letter
93 earlier in the same month (date-
stamped 10
th January, 1920), where she appears to be offering the case of a widow 
who claims a pension for a baby that is not hers: 
 
nowe that widow gete hair money fore hair self and fore that babey donte be 
longe to her / she Pound of 28 Shilings fore haire self and Ten Shiling fore 
the Babey / that ise faire / me have Nothinge at all 
 
Here, Louisa is putting herself in the role of ‘informant’, a role she appears to so 
despise in other people.  The dishonesty which Louisa is accusing other, unnamed 
claimants of a widow’s pension contrasts with her own honesty which is emphasised 
by her inability to buy food for herself.   
Louisa’s letter ends on a plaintive note, where she declares she has nobody to 
help her.  It is possible that she is actually referring back to the Poor Law policy of 
forcing claimants to exhaust help from their family before resorting (and a very last 
resort!) to the Poor Law Guardians.   
This claim to a moral behaviour by Louisa is not considered relevant in the 
reformulation of her letter by the anonymous official at the Ministry of Pensions.  As 
we saw earlier, the opening of the letter had implied that Louisa could not afford to 
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look after Winnie so would be handing over her care to her grandfather.  The 
reformulation of this by an anonymous Ministry of Pensions bureaucrat does not 
reflect the desperation and lack of choice in her actions which Louisa’s letter 
indicates.  By declining to engage with Louisa’s more detailed discussion of her 
impoverished state where day-by-day existence is a struggle, the bureaucrat has 
chosen to reformulate Louisa’s narrative of poverty as something which can be made 
in line with the narrow terms of the Royal Warrant.  This emphasises the Ministry of 
Pension’s general refusal to engage with the needs of widows, concentrating instead 
on the financial implications for the State.   
  When Louisa’s letters to the Ministry of Pensions declaring her own 
improved behaviour did not receive anything other than the standard dismissive 
response, it seems she called on other resources.  In two letters
94, both in Louisa’s 
handwriting and both written in her own idiosyncratic style, it appears that it is her 
father’s voice that she is attempting to present (the letters are not signed under any 
name, this omission perhaps showing an awareness of the risk Louisa was running in 
writing these letters pretending to be someone else).  Other letters in the file show 
that Louisa was living with her father for most of the period of this case study, and 
indeed she had handed over the guardianship of her children to him, as discussed 
above.  Although her letters indicate that this was a difficult arrangement and the 
Ministry of Pensions had elsewhere decided that he was an ‘unsuitable guardian’ for 
the children, by June 1920 Louisa had resorted to invoking his voice as one of 
authority and trust.
95  His voice is being used not only to repeat Louisa’s habitual 
request for her pension to be resumed, but is also being used to vouch for her moral 
character.  In line with Louisa’s earlier letter (Appendix 2, document vi), there is a 
negation of ‘bad’ behaviour being used to back her claim for a pension as she draws 
on the frame of middle-class widowhood. 
 
Dear Sir / she ben good fore 5 month / she donte go out at night time / she 
donte drank bare know / she gived it up a longe wile / so will yu do some 
thinkg fore my daughter Louisa Jane Bayliss 
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The denial of drinking beer is apparently in response to an undocumented accusation 
that this is one of the reasons for her pension being withdrawn, and forms the 
backing of good behaviour that is part of her argument structure here.  That drinking 
beer had been the case is the past is clear from the temporal trigger now, emphasised 
by the following clause which assures the reader ‘she gived it up a longe wile’.  This 
apparent compliance with a moral standard of behaviour for pensioned widows 
shows acceptance of rules which were imposed under the terms of the Royal 
Warrant.  A month later (date-stamped 12
th June, 1920
96), Louisa again writes in her 
father’s voice, again invoking assurances that her behaviour has improved: ‘She 
kieep hair selfe to selfe she donte go out with heny body’.  This invokes the middle-
class frame of widowhood which carries the expectation that a widow should be 
cloistered, reflective and soberly respectful of her dead husband’s memory.  Added 
to this is the assurance ‘she still a widow wife and all shall be’ which carries an 
intertextual reference to the initial pension claim form where the widow’s signature 
is prefixed by the declaration ‘I have continued a widow’.  Here, as with other letters 
Louisa writes, there is an assumption that it is her duty as a pensioned widow to 
remain a living memorial to her dead husband.   
  In this second letter, the standard of her moral behaviour is reinforced as 
discourses of social welfare are drawn upon where her need of help is emphasised in 
a reporting frame which leaks into a negotiating frame. 
 
Sir I / ham very Sorry to tel you she cante work corse hair Harte is very Bade 
/ Could you lete have pay from the Pensions Ministry Grante / if honley a 
little it wood help My Daughter Bite to go one with / I cante kieep hair all the 
wile 
 
As with several of Louisa’s other letters, there is the implicit acceptance of the 
expectation that she should seek employment and be self sufficient, but she is 
prevented from doing so by her ill health, which provides a variation in her usual 
argument backing.  This is stated as part of an apology, where the macro mitigation 
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strategy which employs humility in making the request for a pension payment is 
emphasised by the regretful tone of ‘I ham very sorry to tel you’.  The imposition of 
the request is lessened further by the apparent negotiation that ‘honley a little’ 
money would help.  This links with a long-standing understanding of how charitable 
institutions would work on a system of need and negotiation, and shows a lack of 
understanding as to how the State would operate in such circumstances with its rigid 
scales of allowances.   
  This letter also implies that Louisa’s father has been looking after her 
financially and materially: ‘I cante kieep hair all the wile’.  Whilst the family would 
have been the first resort for those in need of assistance under the Poor Law, the 
State-funded pension scheme offered a different course of action.  This statement in 
the letter of July, 1920 (document xix) shows that Louisa had turned to her father as 
a provider of support once her widows’ pension had been withdrawn, but also 
indicates something of the problematic nature of this with the temporal constraint 
implied here being made to the Ministry of Pensions in an attempt to persuade them 
to reinstate her pension.  Louisa has passed from one paternal guardian (her 
husband) to another (her father), but is aware that the State can also stand in for her 
husband and provide her with some level of independence through the pension.  She 
is presenting this argument within the patriarchal ideology which also underpins the 
Royal Warrant.   
  A further indication of Louisa’s attempts at having her pension reinstated by 
drawing on the testimony of others is found in a letter of 21
st February, 1921
97 from 
the Birmingham office of the Comrades of the Great War.  This organisation had 
been set up shortly before this to assist the men who had been demobbed, but also is 
occasionally found to intervene on behalf of servicemen’s widows in communicating 
with the Ministry of Pensions.  Presenting Louisa’s argument for a pension to the 
Ministry, the writer can be seen to draw on the same discourses of morality and 
need, using argument backing of good behaviour and ill health as Louisa does 
elsewhere, but the letter also has similarities with the point of view presented by the 
Ministry. 
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Mrs Louisa Jane Bayliss aged 37, is the widow of the late no 15900 
Private Frank Bayliss, Gloucestershire Regiment.  She at present has no 
pension having forfeited the same in March 1916. [sic] 
She is in poor health physically and mentally. 
I believe that for some time past her moral character has been good 
and I submit that in this case a recommendation should be forwarded to the 
Superintendant Pension Issue Office, Ministry of Pensions, Widows & 
Dependents Division, 161 Great Portland Street, London, W.1., with a view 
to her pension being restored to her. 
 
Louisa is presented as being the active agent in the suspension of her pension, 
suggested by the use of forfeited.  This contrasts with Louisa’s own arguments in 
which the anonymous official at the Ministry of Pensions is blamed for the 
suspension of her pension.  Her argument for a pension on the basis of need is here 
presented as the factual certainty of her poor physical and mental health.  When it 
comes to a testimony as to her moral character, the writer is less certain.  The use of 
the mental process verb believe acts as a mitigating strategy and leaves the argument 
open to doubt and thus the writer free from blame should this be disproved.  Again, 
the use of recommend and the prepositional phrase with a view to both lessen the 
force of the argument for her pension being reinstated. 
  This series of letters shows that Louisa was actively seeking her pension 
reinstatement through the patriarchal voices that would appear to carry more 
authority than her own.  In employing the voices of her father and the Comrades of 
the Great War, her own voice is ultimately obscured by her own volition.  
Undoubtedly the standard letters sent by the Ministry of Pensions in response 
to Louisa’s regular correspondence in which she is informed that her case is under 
constant review do actually conceal more detailed surveillance.  The missing SGC 
documents may have indicated whether or not the Comrades of the Great War had 
any effect on their decision.  However, a letter to W Branch of the Ministry of 
Pensions from the SGC, dated 1
st June, 1921 declares: ‘the Special Grants 
Committee have decided that the widow’s pension should be re-issued with effect 
from 22
nd April, 1921’.  Here, the collective agency of the SGC are presented as the 
active agents in re-issuing Louisa’s pension.  The use of the mental process verb   170 
decided indicates a considered, informed decision being taken.  No grounds for this 
decision are mentioned in this letter.   
  The last letter in Louisa’s file relating to her rather than to any of her 
children is dated 3
rd October, 1927
98 from the SGC to the Ministry of Pensions and 
marks the final forfeiture of her pension.  Any human responsibility for this action is 
removed in the wording of the letter: ‘the Special Grants Committee have had under 
consideration the case of the above mentioned woman and have decided that the 
facts of the case are such as to call for the forfeiture of the widow’s pension’.  The 
collective agency of the SGC is presented as acting in response to the abstract noun 
the facts.  Louisa herself is no longer referred to as the widow, this status carrying 
with it an indication of possible future State benefit, instead using the more general 
noun phrase the above mentioned woman.  The memo continues: 
 
She should be informed that in view of her conduct it has been decided that 
she is unworthy of a grant from public funds, and that the pension cannot 
therefore be continued. 
 
Louisa is presented as the agent of her own downfall, although this is in the noun 
phrase ‘her conduct’ which is the cause of this forfeiture.  The underlying 
implication, supported by previous correspondence, is that it is her moral conduct 
that is being judged.  This is reinforced by the agentless decision that she is 
unworthy of a pension, and that this decision has been made for the public good.  
Thus discourses of nationalism, social welfare and morality are being employed to 
underpin the SGC’s decision to stop her pension payments.  There is certainty and 
inevitability attached to this decision, triggered by the modality of cannot and the 
causal connective therefore.  Louisa’s regular claims on the basis of ‘need’ make no 
mention of the newfangled social welfare under which her pension was devised, 
instead drawing on older discourses which were in the process of being overtaken. 
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Ministry of Pensions correspondence: the obedient servant? 
 
Before leaving this case, the Ministry of Pensions letters to Louisa herself, although 
concise and standardised in the main, bear some brief discussion as to their place in 
the discourses of widowhood at this time and provide a background to the next 
section of this thesis. 
The Ministry of Pensions occasionally responded to Louisa’s frequent letters 
of appeal.  Her argument structures based around need were never engaged with, the 




Re:15900, Private F. Bayliss, 
  Gloucestershire Regiment. 
 
In reply to your letter of the 20
th ultimo, I am directed by the Minister of 
Pensions to inform you that it has been decided that your pension shall 
remain suspended. 
 
I am, Madam, 
  Your obedient Servant, 
 
  [signed] L. M. Bostock 
for Director-General of Awards. 
 
The named bureaucrat here is deferring any responsibility for the decision to an 
unnamed higher authority.  Bostock is merely acting on the directions of the 
Minister of Pensions.  The authority of the Minister is greater than that of Bostock, 
who is acting on this person’s directions.  The decision for Louisa’s pension to 
remain suspended is not attributed to any active agent.  This would most likely have 
been a decision made by the SGC, but this agency does not appear in this letter, 
remaining a powerful, shadowy committee that had the power to inform and advise 
the Minister of Pensions on decisions on pension provision for individuals.  The 
irony of the formulaic salutation and complimentary close place the writer (here, 
Bostock) in a deferential role to Louisa, particularly in the formulaic assurance that 
he is her ‘obedient Servant’.  This contrasts markedly with the message of the letter   172 
where the writer is explicitly acting in obedience with the Minister of Pensions 
rather than Louisa, whose previous letters have consistently appealed for the 
reinstatement of her pension.  In relation to the barely literate Louisa, not familiar 
with these bureaucratic conventions, the Latinate ultimo would also probably have 
been beyond her understanding.  This formal language contrasts markedly with 
Louisa’s own conversational style. 





In reply to your letter of the 28
th ultimo, I am directed by the Minister 
of Pensions to inform you that your case has been carefully considered but it 
has been decided that your pension must remain suspended. 
 
I am, Madam, 
  Your obedient Servant, 
 
  [signed] M. L. Crossley 
for the Director of Awards. 
 
The opening formulation is identical to other letters, in that the bureaucrat is acting 
on the direction of the Minister of Pensions.  On the other hand, the letter goes on to 
imply that Louisa’s case has been reviewed with care and consideration, carefully 
premodifying considered which combine to produce an impression that her case 
might have been viewed favourably.  This is related to what Van Dijk et al term 
‘apparent empathy’ (1997: 173), whereby negative actions are made to appear to be 
softened in response to perceived face threatening acts, here with the widow’s case 
appearing to have been considered with a view to a positive outcome for her.  
However, any softening of the ministry’s position is immediately cancelled by the 
contrastive clause beginning but.  Again, nameless agencies are at work in making 
this decision and the use of the categorical certainty of must leaves no room for 




As custodians of the dead serviceman’s memory, the war widow had to live up to his 
sacrifice by her own exemplary behaviour in the eyes of the nation.  If she fell short 
of the high standards of moral behaviour the State had decided was appropriate, then 
her pension could be stopped.  This attitude continued to be uncritically displayed 
throughout the inter-war years, as we have seen.  Indeed, in the 1937 Annual Report 
of the Ministry of Pensions
99, this is made explicit: 
 
Continuance of the pension is […] reasonably made conditional on the 
circumstances and conduct of the pensioner continuing to justify such 
support by the State, acting as it does, in the place of the deceased husband. 
(1937: 21) 
 
The ‘reasons’ on which the terms of the Royal Warrant were based were, as we have 
seen, heavily influenced by discourses of morality grounded in middle-class, 19
th 
century patriarchal values.  The State’s position as stern, patriarchal guardian of the 
widow, entitled to oversee her behaviour as a husband might, is used to justify the 
intrusive surveillance to which these women were subjected.  If the State was to act 
as surrogate husband, then if the widow’s ‘circumstances and conduct’ were not 
what a husband would expect, the withdrawal of financial support could be part of 
the punitive measures the State saw fit to enforce. 
Without Louisa’s own letters, her voice is virtually absent from the official 
documentation.  Where she does appear, she has minimal impact and virtually no 
power over the circumstances in which she and her children find themselves.  This is 
despite her own attempts to invoke the somewhat limited powers she has in her role 
as war widow and mother.  Like other widows, Louisa is subject to practices of 
surveillance which, as Donzelot observed, are linked with identifying deviance and 
constructing norms.  She herself apparently accepts the norms expected of her as a 
widow and mother within a patriarchal ideology, attempting to employ discourses of 
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social welfare and motherhood herself to support her arguments for reinstatement of 
a pension.   
The consistent argument presented by Louisa varies only in its backing of 
poverty or State obligation.  Her use of pleas on the basis of need and right are not 
engaged with by the Ministry of Pensions in their letters to her.  Instead, the State’s 
bureaucrats focus on their perception of Louisa’s moral behaviour, in line with the 
terms of the Royal Warrant under which Louisa claims a pension, based on a 
schematic frame of widows as passive, sober, respectful and morally irreprehensible.  
It is interesting to note that Louisa seems to realise that this is the best backing for 
her arguments as time goes on, with the more frequent evocation of her own 
exemplary behaviour, often compared with that of other women, being cited in her 
later letters.  This engagement extends to the apparent impersonation of her father as 
a figure of male authority to vouch for her ‘improved’ behaviour.  In all the voices 
that appear in these letters, whether the institutional voices of the anonymous 
bureaucrats or the remarkable voice of Louisa herself, discourses of nationalism, 
morality and social welfare are evoked and appear inextricably linked.  Ultimately, 
and despite the number of letters of appeal written by Louisa, it is the impersonal 
voice of the Special Grants Committee that decides her fate with regard to her 
pension. 
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Case study 2: Florence Bayliss and 
‘disallowed’ widows 
   176 
Background to post-war claims for widows’ pensions 
This section will look at the case files of women who were not granted war widows’ 
pensions on the death of their ex-servicemen husbands in the decades following the 
First World War.  These files take up more than two thirds of the selection I have 
looked at in the National Archives and, as they cover more than half a century, offer 
the opportunity to explore the changing relationship between the State and British 
citizens as the welfare state developed over the course of the 20
th century.  In 
particular, Florence Bayliss’s file offers the chance to explore diachronically many 
common issues in more detail, so she will be the main focus of this case study.   
The hastily-drawn up Royal Warrant of 1916 was repeatedly revised in the 
years following the end of the war.  By 1919, the Ministry of Pensions was already 
dealing with women whose husbands had died after demobilisation in cases where 
the legislation made a decision unclear
100, particularly in the frame of war 
widowhood used by the State.  For example, the parliamentary debates of 1914 had 
established a time limit of seven years from date of injury or army discharge for a 
widow’s pension to be claimed.  Perhaps the most important revision to the Royal 
Warrant was the removal of this seven-year rule in 1921.  However, in the extant 
documentation held in PIN15, Mr Hore, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of 
Pensions, sought to retain this time limit with a view to reducing the State’s future 
financial burden: 
 
The degree of aggravation by war service in a given case may be quite small, 
and there may be no record of sickness for any substantial time between the 
date of discharge and of death, yet it is proposed to saddle the State with the 




In light of Foucault’s notion of ‘truth’, we can see here that Hore is highlighting the 
State’s position on documented evidence from authoritative, acknowledged sources, 
something which many widows would come up against in the course of the next few 
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101 PIN15/228 Widows’ Pensions, Art. 11 Royal Warrant.  Conditions of Entitlement and Eligibility.  
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decades.  The financial support of war widows is here perceived as an unwelcome 
burden, triggered by the verb saddle.  This leads to the desired positive response in 
the use of the response-demanding utterance at the end of this memorandum, 
emphasised by surely which carries commonsense agreement.  The seven-year rule 
was eventually abandoned in 1921, although the debate briefly discussed above does 
make it clear that the underlying parsimonious ideology was still very significant.  
However, my own data shows that widows were still successfully claiming a war 
widow’s pension as late as the 1950s
102, more than 30 years after the end of the First 
World War, on the grounds that a man had died of war wounds.  Such women had 
often acted as unpaid carers for men who had been injured in the war, these injuries 
often resulting in quite dreadful pain and suffering, not just for the man to 
experience but for his family to witness.  In addition to the physical pain and 
suffering, there was also the more pressing problem of reduced income, particularly 
in the late 1920s when the Western world was in the grip of an economic depression 
and employment was hard to come by for even the most fit of men. 
During the war, it had usually been clear which women could claim a 
widow’s pension and who couldn’t.  As we have seen, Louisa Bayliss had simply to 
complete a form and produce certain documentation to gain her pension following 
her husband’s reported death in 1915.  In the few cases where a pension was not 
quickly granted, it was usually owing to a dispute over the woman’s relationship to 
the deceased solider, particularly where they had not legally married.  However, 
after the war there was a huge increase in the number of women who claimed a war 
widow’s pension, which was largely unexpected and entirely unprecedented.  The 
Ministry of Pension files held at the National Archives, Kew reveal the stories of 
men who had been passed ‘A1’ fit and healthy on enlistment becoming the ‘broken 
men’ of the 1920s and 30s, men whose ill health was often attributable to their war 
service, but exacerbated by the poverty they found themselves in during the 
Depression.  This was a fact often recognised by family doctors, whose letters of 
support for a widow’s pension claim are found in some of the case files.  However, 
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even this authority was not recognised by the Ministry of Pensions bureaucrats who 
stuck rigidly to the terms of the Royal Warrant in declaring that death must be 
directly attributable to war service as detailed in their official records. 
Aside from physical disabilities caused by injuries sustained whilst on active 
service, chronic illnesses such as bronchitis, asthma and tuberculosis were some of 
the commonest complaints amongst veterans.   
Of the many newly-recognised medical conditions which resulted from the 
First World War, neurasthenia, or shell-shock, is probably one of the most infamous.  
It frequently appears in accounts of the conflict (such as Robert Graves’ Goodbye to 
All That (1929) and more recently in Pat Barker’s Regeneration trilogy (1991)), and 
is picked up in the innumerable novels for which the war forms a backdrop (such as 
Dorothy L. Sayers’ neurasthenic character Lord Peter Wimsey (1920s and 1930s), 
and is a theme returned to again in Barker’s contemporary novel, Another World 
(2001)).  Neurasthenia is commonly associated with nightmares and mental torment 
that lasted well beyond the serviceman’s return home.  This story is almost always 
told from the point of view of the man, leaving unwritten the story of their wives 
who faced years of caring for ex-servicemen, many tied to these men out of a sense 
of duty, when ‘escape’ from the marriage would have been unforgivable in the eyes 
of the world in general which would have seen such an action as running away from 
the responsibility of caring for a war hero.
103   To return to Lilian Armfield
104, who 
had been denied a pension following her husband’s death from prostate cancer, (is 
disability pension had been for schizophrenia following war-induced neurasthenia).  
Her letter of appeal to the Ministry of Pensions gives some indication of the long-
term effects of Stephen’s war service on the family: 
 
About the Widow’s Pension I am fighting for and am intitled to as other 
Widows draw it, remember I am a War Widows Pensioner.  I was left to fend 
for myself when my Husband entered the Mental Home for War Disablement 
20 years ago.  He was A1 and passed his test at Wolwich London for 2
nd Air 
Mechanics.  After a short time sent to Scapa Flow.  Came out of the hospital 
for home in 1918.  He was Pensioned.  His complaint (Acute Neurasthenia) 
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witch developed in mental illness.  His family Doctor now Dead sent him to 
the General Hospital Sheffield.  From there to the mental home.  He was in 
there till he died.  He had strange habits and loss of memory many times.  
This was all through his War Services.  Remember I lost my Breadwinner.  I 
have worked all through the War in a factory myself.  I have never drawn 
Sick pay or have I had Glasses.  Teeth I have paid for them out of my 
earnings.  The bit of money I saved I lived on when I gave up work […]
105 
 
Lilian is drawing on discourses of nationalism and social welfare to intensify her 
case for a war widow’s pension.  She also emphasises her own war service in the 
Second World War to enhance her presentation of self as a good, patriotic citizen, 
linking this to her husband’s First World War ‘service to his country’.  She 
highlights her husband’s good health on enlistment, demonstrating that he was 
mentally unwell to such a degree following his war service that he had to be 
admitted to a psychiatric hospital from 1935 onwards.  Lilian hints at the problems 
of caring for someone with neurasthenia, using the euphemism strange habits to 
avoid giving details that might be too personal or private, whilst at the same time 
attributing this to his war service, and thus synedochally to the State.  The details 
and register of Stephen’s fitness on enlistment are employed to increase the link 
between his health and Lilian’s claim for a pension.  She presents herself as 
someone who has not called on the State for support, despite the hardship incurred 
through her husband’s ill-health.  Drawing on the services available under social 
welfare reforms, such as sickness benefit, optical and dental treatment, she is 
attempting to demonstrate that she has not been a burden on the State, enhancing this 
‘model citizenship’ and thus worthiness by articulating it with the ill-health her 
husband suffered as a direct result of his war service.   
Lilian draws upon discourses of social welfare, presenting the State pension 
as something which is far preferable to charitable support.  In particular, she refers to 
‘National Assistance’, which was the replacement for the old Poor Law system.
106   
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106 The Local Government Act of 1929 disbanded Poor Law Unions and Boards of Guardians.  
Provision for the able-bodied was then provided by the newly-established Public Assistance 
Committees.  These retained many of the same personnel as before and often operated more 
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I was forced to get National Assistance witch I am glad of now. I am not 
proud of this. I would rather have my Widows Pension I am entitled to and 
get. […] All this is degrading to me as War Widow fighting for rights. […]  




The presupposition of stigma that lingered with this system is triggered by use of 
forced, and emphasised by the following phrase where now triggers the assumption 
that she was reluctant to accept it earlier.  Indeed, she goes on to declare ‘I am not 
proud of this’, preferring the social capital which a war widow’s pension would 
bring.  She clearly thinks that this pension is hers by right, using the personal 
possessive my to prefix it, and then underlines I am entitled to, adding emphasis to 
her point.  Women applying for a war widow’s pension appear to have regarded it as 
very much a badge of pride in the absence of any other form of public recognition 
for their loss.  Whilst the names of those servicemen who died after the war as a 
result of their injuries were added to public war memorials, those of whom death 
could not attributed directly to their war service were omitted.  Thus the refusal to 
grant a pension to Lilian and others would also be seen as a rejection of the validity 
of her husband’s war service, either carved in stone or in financial assistance to his 
widow as his living memorial. 
As we will see, for many women widowed after the war, the pension also 
seems to have been regarded as a form of financial recognition for their role as 
unpaid carers, or as some sort of compensation.  As discussed in more detail in the 
historical context section of this thesis (see page 88), in the post-war years, the high-
profile war-time recruitment of the volunteers to act as more conventional carers 
such as nurses at the same time as women for waged employment such as the 
reasonably well-paid factory work may have led to the conflation of the two, with 
the common perception that all ‘war work’ was remunerated.
108  This is coupled with 
increasing expectations of State support for those in need through a developing 
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welfare support system that was not means tested, such as those services cited above 
by Lilian Armfield.   
This belief in their own particular patriotic contribution seems to have led 
many war widows to see the nature of their relationship with the State in a very 
different light.  They were no longer simply the wives and mothers whose 
connection with the State was accomplished primarily via their relationship to a 
deceased serviceman, with all of his rights and citizenship status.  Instead, war 
widowhood seems to have prompted these women to go beyond their traditional 
dependant roles and discover a new status as independent claimants on the State.  
The National Council of Social Service undertook extensive research into the 
question of State provision for civilian widowhood in the run-up to the introduction 
of widows’ pensions in 1926.  In one of their earliest reports they observe that, for 
many women: 
 
[A widow’s] War pension […] is felt to have been earned as a right, and for 
service rendered to the State.  Indeed it is recognised that even when the 
pension has been granted the State is still the debtor, the State rather than the 
pensioner is under obligation. (1920: 17) 
 
The nominalisation of service leaves it unspecified just who has been of service to 
the State, blurring the distinction between the serviceman and his wife.  Thus in the 
public sphere, the State is placed in the position of seeming to continue to be in debt 
to the widows, continuing the perception of the ‘debt of gratitude’ that was 
expressed towards these citizens in the parliamentary debates of 1914.  However, as 
we have already seen in the case of Louisa Bayliss, the reality of this national 
obligation is couched in discourses of morality and the parsimony that is embedded 
in the discourses of social welfare excluded many more widows in the years 
following the end of the First World War. 
In the atmosphere of self-sacrifice that underlies their roles in the patriarchal 
ideology of this time, women seem to have accepted their continuing role as carers 
of disabled ex-servicemen husbands whilst they were alive.  In a mood doubtless 
typical of that voiced by Lloyd-George in his altruistic boast that the post-war State 
(and metonymically, the nation) would provide ‘homes fit for heroes’ to live in, the   182 
State’s recognition of responsibility came in the form of pensions paid on the basis 
of the serviceman’s documented disability. This appears to have been the root of the 
argument that widows later employed: the State had accepted financial responsibility 
for the wounded war hero, so it naturally followed that the State would look after the 
hero’s widow as surrogate husband.  Chronic ill-health was often the legacy of many 
men’s war service.  In particular, heart disease resulted in the early deaths of many 
men but left their widows ineligible for a war widows’ pension as such a condition 
was commonly undocumented during the period of active service, this 
documentation being the primary source of data accepted by appeals tribunals after 
the war.  In one unusually detailed file, there is a summary of an appeals hearing 
involving a widow named Amelia Adams.  Her husband, George, had died of 
coronary heart disease at the age of 47.  In the transcript of the appeal hearing, 
Amelia was asked if there was anything in her husband’s army service which could 
have caused his heart problem.  Her response is succinctly true: ‘the liability to get 
shot would upset anybody’.
109   Amelia’s lifeworld, common-sense assumption 
proved inadmissible as in the eyes of the State such ‘common sense’ was not 
documented in George’s medical file and so the order of discourse which prevails is 
that which is recorded in his official papers.   
The failure to acknowledge such lifeworld discourses is found in many other 
files.  In terms of intertextuality, direct quotations relating to lifeworld experiences 
can be used to ‘fulfil the function of expressing […] assertions without the speaker 
or writers having to take responsibility for the statement’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 
111) and can thus act as a mitigating strategy.  We will look at this in relation to 
intertextual quotations from Royal Warrant shortly.  The authority and respectability 
of the speaker, on the other hand, can be employed to intensify or validate a 
statement, as is often found in widows’ letters.  For example, Ada Broadbent 
employed this strategy in relation to her pension claim.  Her husband, John, had 
been pensioned for bronchitis resulting from exposure to gas during the war.  He 
died in 1920 of heart failure, which meant Ada was not entitled to a war widow’s 
pension under the terms of the Royal Warrant.  In 1938, following a publicised 
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revision of the pension scheme, she wrote to the Ministry of Pensions to see if she 
would be eligible.  In her letter, she writes: 
 
After the War, he was never the same, could not follow his work for long 
together and on one occasion when we were out shopping, he was taken ill in 
the market, a stallholder gave him a box to sit down and I got him water, and 
she asked me if he had been in the War, I said, yes, and she said poor fellow 
[…] Every-one who knew him said he died through War Service…
110 
 
Here, Ada is drawing on both direct ([the market stall holder] said poor fellow) and 
indirect (she asked me if he had been in the War) quotations from various 
eyewitnesses to support her claim for a pension based on her husband’s condition. 
Unfortunately for Ada, as with so many other widows, the undocumented or 
unrecognised testimonies they employ as intensifying strategies were not accepted as 
evidence in support of their pension claims.  The order of discourse that prevails is 
again the State’s documented medical record rather than the lifeworld experiences 
that Ada is able to provide.  
In the National Archives files, there are many cases of women claiming a 
widow’s pension in respect of a disabled ex-servicemen they had married after his 
discharge from military service, and as such would not be eligible for a war widow’s 
pension should he die of his disability.
111  The spirit of patriotism which encouraged 
such marriages started during the war itself and can be seen in accounts written at 
this time.  For example, Vera Brittain’s diaries and memoirs recall the death of her 
fiancé during the war, followed by that of another close male friend, and then relate 
how she returned to England from her VAD nursing post in Malta with the intention 
of marrying the blinded Victor Richardson, only for him too to die shortly after her 
return.  This feeling of patriotic duty towards those men who had been disabled by 
service to their country has also been explored by Kovan (1994), who describes the 
church-supported ‘marriage bureaus’ set up during the war itself to promote 
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marriages for those men who had been disabled.  This served the dual purpose of 
restoring to widows that role ascribed to them by society, and secondly, as Kovan 
states, these ‘wounded heroes’ would have their manliness restored (1994: 1189). 
Whilst these organisations were disbanded before the end of war following 
accusations of impropriety, the feeling of duty towards ex-servicemen persists 
throughout the inter-war years as newspapers and magazines urged single women 
(whether never-married or widowed) to marry the nation’s heroes.   
This promotion of marriage to disabled ex-servicemen concealed the fact that 
the position of war widow was narrowly defined to include only those women who 
had married before the man was discharged from the armed forces.  The painful 
truth of this was made clear to many a woman who had nursed her husband for 
years, only to find that on his death she was ineligible for a war widow’s pension as 
their marriage had taken place after his discharge from the armed forces and so she 
was not, in the State’s eyes, a ‘war widow’.
112 
Financial support from charities and the State was largely directed towards 
Lloyd-George’s heroes, the ex-servicemen, although the rules governing how much 
money could be paid out to those classed as ‘worthy’ ensured that no-one ever 
became rich from a State pension.  For ex-servicemen, the basic disability pension 
allowed existence just above the poverty line, preventing families from falling back 
on the Poor Law Guardians.  This ensured that, in the public sphere at least, the State 
gave the impression of being grateful for war services rendered, whilst the 
underlying parsimony meant that they were also keeping a potentially large number 
of citizens out of the more expensive Poor Law system. 
The State pension for widows and ex-servicemen could be supplemented by 
additional help from a myriad of charities, often mediated through central 
organisations such as the newly-formed British Legion or Comrades of the Great 
War.  The andocentric nature of State support is mirrored in that of the innumerable 
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charities
113, the needs of women and other dependants not being considered when 
looking at claims for aid for disabled ex-servicemen or their widows.  As late as 
1933, the Emergency Help Committee of the Joint Committee of the Order of St 
John and the British Red Cross notes in its annual report that only the families of 
those men who ‘did good, effective service in the Great War’ would be considered 
for charitable help.  Thus it was not the families’ needs that were paramount even in 
the eyes of charitable organisations, such was the perception of patriotic debt owed 
to the men who had fought in the First World War.  A previously discussed, 
elsewhere the Joint Committee policy clearly indicates that financial help would 
only be given to those widows who were most likely to receive a State war widow’s 
pension, and so would be in a position to repay all or part of the money ‘loaned’ to 
them by the charity.  Thus the discourses of morality and nationalism which were so 
strongly evident in the terms of the Royal Warrant were being repeated by even this 
most liberal of charities.  Underlying all of this is the parsimonious ideology that 
went largely unquestioned. 
From my own study of more than two hundred widows’ pensions files in the 
National Archives, I estimate that about two-thirds of these related to widows who 
were not eligible for a pension under the terms of the Royal Warrant.  As discussed 
above, this could be for any number of reasons, most commonly because there was 
insufficient evidence to support their claim that their husband had died as a direct 
result of his war service, as in Ada Broadbent’s claim.  Attention will now focus on 
one widow who was not eligible for a war pension under the terms of the Royal 
Warrant. 
 
Florence Bayliss: Pension disallowed 
 
Florence Bayliss’s husband, Walter, died at the age of 36 from a condition for which 
he had not received a disability pension.  The lack of acknowledged documentary 
evidence to support claims such as hers was very commonly the cause of lengthy 
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correspondence between widow and Ministry.  Florence, like many other widows, 
argues for a pension on the basis of being an unpaid carer for her disabled ex-soldier 
husband.  What is unusual about Florence is that she resumes her argument more 
than 30 years after her husband’s death by which time the welfare state had been 
well established.  We can also see evidence of what Fairclough (1989) refers to a 
conversationalisation appearing in the Ministry’s correspondence with Florence and 
so her file presents the opportunity to see how the State’s relationship with its 
citizens had changed from the post-war correspondence found in most other case 
files.  However, despite these fundamental changes in social welfare, we shall see 
that there is continuity in the arguments proffered by the State.  
Up to the end of the 1920s, the Ministry of Pensions was still using standard 
letters on pre-printed forms to communicate with widows wherever possible.  These 
forms, which left blank spaces appropriate for a highly limited set of noun phrases, 
do not allow the bureaucrats to engage in a more detailed discussion of the decision.  
Although revised in terms of format at intervals over the course of the decade, the 
pink copies of these forms appear in dozens of the files I looked at, each one 
heralding a negative decision for the widow.  
As we saw earlier in the case of Louisa Bayliss, the extant widows’ files are 
often a composite of a number of different files and are usually incomplete.  In 
Florence’s case, there is mention of her husband’s disability file, although nowhere 
in her own case file is there any documentation from this.  Where possible, I have 
tried to fill these gaps with reference to documents found in other widows’ files and 
where I can be fairly sure that such documents would have existed at some point in 
relation to the widows discussed in more detail here.  For example, following her 
husband’s death in December 1930, Florence claimed for a war widows’ pension.  
This appears to have been seen to merit further investigation as a letter to her in 
April, 1931 requests further details.
114  Whilst obviously not a standard letter relating 
to widows’ claims (as indicated by the pre-printed address of Sir/Madam) and the 
letter has been individualised in the hand-written questions, nevertheless the answers 
are constrained by the design of the form.  The questions all relate to Walter, 
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Florence’s husband, rather than herself, reflecting the close ties of the Royal Warrant 
to the serviceman rather than his widow’s needs.   
What is more interesting about this letter is that Florence has made use of the 
available white space left at the bottom of the form to present her argument for a 
pension.  Rather than responding to the request for ‘reference number quoted on 
previous correspondence’, she appears to have reformulated this as a very different 
question along the lines of ‘reference to any previous correspondence’.  Her 
response to this reformulation is to cite her husband’s letter in appeal for a disability 
pension, to which she adds a response to the anticipated ‘why was your husband’s 
pension not progressed’ with the explanation that he was too ill to take it further.  It 
is left to the Ministry bureaucrats to add requested reference number, using the left 
hand side of the page that appears implicitly reserved for their use. 
The medical boards Florence refers to were organised by the Ministry of 
Pensions to assess the degree of disablement for which an ex-serviceman could 
claim a pension.  There were several centres around the country, Florence here 
referring to the Preston centre closest to her Burnley home.  Reports found in 
National Archives files refer to other medical boards and show that these were not 
organised with the claimant’s needs in mind.  Irrespective of state of health, he 
would be required to attend such a board where civil servants and medical officials 
would examine him.  In one case found in the National Archives files
115, the 
Ministry representative on the board was in favour of adjourning when discussion on 
legal technicalities brought proceedings to a standstill.  It was only on the 
intervention of the medical representative that this adjournment was prevented and 
the claimant saved the expense and inconvenience of another hearing on a different 
day.  Thus it appears that the boards were routinely organised around the 
convenience of the bureaucrats, as indeed medical boards that are convened for 
disability benefits continue to be to this day.  Florence’s point about her bedridden 
husband being unable to attend his disability board hearing is, therefore, hardly 
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surprising as is the assumption that this inability meant his disability claim did not 
proceed. 
Although her claim was rejected, there is no record in her file of the actual 
decision, but it is certain that such a letter would have been sent to her.  Instead, 
below is a copy of the main part of the standard letter as found in countless other 
widows’ files. 
 
DECISION OF APPEAL (Disallowed). 
 (WIDOW OR DEPENDANT) 
The Appeal of 
………………………………………………………..……………. 
……………………………………………….………….. of the above-named 
man (deceased) has been duly heard by the Tribunal. 
 
The Tribunal finds that the appellant is ineligible for a pension 
under Article 11 of the Royal Warrant as the deceased
116 did not die 
within 7 years of the receipt of his wound or injury, or removal from 
duty, or termination of active service. 
 
  The Tribunal further finds, having regard to the terms of 
Article 17B, of the Royal Warrant, that the death of the late pensioner 
cannot be certified as wholly due to the nature or condition, as 
resulting from War Service, of the disability in respect of which 
pension or allowance was current at date of death. 
 
  The Tribunal disallows the appeal.
117 
 
The impersonal style of the form is enhanced by the use of noun phrases 
rather than actual names to refer to the widow and her husband.  In this particular 
appeal, the husband’s name appears only in the first line, after that he is referred to 
as the deceased and later as pensioner.  (In cases such as Florence’s, as the husband 
had not received a disability pension prior to his death, the second noun phrase 
would have indicated this by replacing pensioner with the deceased, no other noun 
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phrase available to maintain the coherence of the text.)  Elsewhere, the rigidity of 
this pre-printed form leaves no space for advice on further action to be offered and, 
of course, does not allow for the pension to be granted on the basis of a woman’s 
death.  Explicitly, the pension is being considered on the basis of the above-named 
man’s medical and service history.  It would take another World War before the 
physical contribution of women would be acknowledged to the point that 
dependants’ pensions could be granted under their name.  This form thus explicitly 
draws on the common-sense assumption that it would be a male combatant whose 
dependants needed a pension, firmly locating it within the patriarchal ideology that 
was so much a part of the drawing up of the war widows’ pension scheme.
118 
This standard letter does reveal one of the most troublesome elements of the 
Royal Warrant.  Article 17B required that death be wholly due to a man’s war 
service.  This adverb caused many widows to be denied pensions on the basis of 
their husbands’ deaths being caused only partly by their pensioned disability.  For 
example, Emily Boyce’s husband Harry died in 1937, however she was not granted 
a war widow’s pension as it was judged that his death had been only partly due to 
his pensioned disability.  Unusually, in Emily’s case file are the internal Ministry of 
Pensions notes of her appeal tribunal, including a transcription of part of these 
proceedings.  The Chair was a Mr Ashby from the Ministry of Pensions.  In the 
course of the discussion about Harry’s health, Ashby is cited as declaring: ‘We are 
again bothered by that blessed word “wholly”’.
119  This carries the assumption that 
this particular adverb has been the cause of dispute in the past, triggered by again, 
and the use of bothered carries connotations of troublesomeness, concern and worry.  
More interestingly, the mild expletive blessed has been left in the transcript and 
emphasises a sense of frustration at the too-rigid wording of the terms of the Royal 
Warrant.  The notes were probably only ever intended for an audience of Ministry 
civil servants, but to today’s wider readership provide a fascinating insight into the 
internal workings of the Ministry in the form of not-so-faceless bureaucrats for once. 
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The Royal Warrant was revised in 1938 to extend the terms to the cause of 
death being wholly or materially due, then again in 1945 to be mainly due to war 
service.  Each time, press coverage resulted in widows who had been denied a war 
widow’s pension writing to the Ministry in the hope that they would now qualify, 
but very rarely was the decision reversed.  For example, Annie Ballard’s husband 
had died in 1943 from bronchopneumonia, but on appealing again for a pension, the 
Ministry judged at the time that his death was unrelated to his pensioned condition 
of superative otitis media.  The Ministry’s response contains phrases which appear 
in many letters, including intertextual quotation from the revised Royal Warrant : 
 
…the fact that your husband was in receipt of pension does not of itself 
confer on you a right to pension.  The matter of a widow’s pension is an 
entirely new issue; and a grant could not be made to you unless your 
husband’s death was at least mainly due to the nature or condition of his 




The absence of any determiner before pension suggests that the Ministry of 
Pensions bureaucrat is employing a hedging strategy in not making reference to a 
specific pension that could be claimed.  This contrasts with the labelling of widow’s 
pension which carries the indefinite article a, this removing it from any explicit link 
with Annie that possessive pronouns would have indicated.  The assertion that a 
widow’s pension is an entirely new issue is somewhat misleading as the widow’s 
pension (as we shall see in the case of Florence) is actually closely tied to the 
husband’s eligibility for a pension.  Indeed, this Ministry letter goes on to make this 
link between widow’s pension and ex-serviceman’s pension explicit.  This second 
clause carries intertextual quotations of the wording of the Royal Warrant without 
actually disclosing this as the main source, showing that the cessation of the use of 
pre-printed forms in favour of apparently more individual letters is not as personal as 
it might appear.  Indeed, as we shall see in the more detailed study of Florence’s file, 
intertextual quotations from much earlier sources can be found in the 1968 
correspondence.   
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Pension as compensation: ‘This is not a begging letter’ 
 
The first letter from Florence in her case file is date-stamped 1
st May, 1931
121; nearly 
five months after her husband’s death in December 1930
122 but written within days 
of her responding to the Ministry’s questions, as we saw above.  In this letter, she 
employs the same general argument structure as most other widows whereby the 
grounds are that her husband died; the claim that she is therefore eligible for a 
widow’s pension; and the warrant is her husband’s war service.  The backing 
Florence uses is one that she has in common with many other widows, particularly 
Louisa: that she is faced with imminent poverty.  In Florence’s case, she adds a 
further claim to her argument as a bargaining tool: that a loan could be an alternative 
to a war widow’s pension. 
Florence actually addresses her letter to ‘Miss Bondfield’.  This is Margaret 
Bondfield, the Minister of Labour, who in 1929 had become the first woman to take 
up a seat in the Cabinet.  It is probably the publicity surrounding her appointment 
that drew Florence’s attention to her, as well as Bondfield’s high-profile 
involvement in women’s issues in the inter-war years, as she would not have had 
any ministerial responsibility for pensions and, as MP for Wallsend, was not 
Member of Parliament for Florence’s constituency in Burnley.  It seems Florence is 
attempting to draw on a feeling of sisterhood with one of the few female politicians 
at the time, a strategy which other researchers have commented on.
123  Florence’s use 
of emotive language and mental process verbs can also be seen as part of her 
strategy of attempting to appeal woman-to-woman, contrasting with what we saw 
earlier when Louisa eventually acknowledged the overwhelmingly patriarchal nature 
of the pension scheme and adopted ‘male’ voices to plead her case.   In Florence’s 
letter, her strategy of using an individual name continues in the conversational 
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elements of the letter, mixed with what appear to be carefully composed, more 
formal elements.   
It is clear from this letter that Florence’s most pressing need is financial, but 
she seems to be very aware that her appeal needs to be tactfully articulated.  To 
begin with her argument is made less direct by the opening sentence’s directive 
speech act (I wish you to read this letter through) being followed by an expressive 
speech act (as it is not a begging letter, for I feel sure you get plenty of them) which 
mitigates the request.  Florence employs the mental process verbs wish and feel to 
add to this effect.  Interestingly, she draws upon older charitable discourses which 
place the intended recipient, Bondfield, in the position of a charitable donor who 
receives numerous requests from the undeserving poor.  Florence attempts to retain a 
sense of dignity and pride by immediately negating the supposition that her letter 
would be dismissed as ‘begging’ and therefore unworthy of further perusal.  This 
fear of charity is one that appears in many widows’ letters.  For example, Annie 
Banks wrote to the Ministry of Pensions in 1929 following the death of her husband:  
‘I am in very straightened circumstances at the present time, and not wishing to 
appeal to charity, I am finding it very hard to continue.’
124  The rigorous system of 
means testing established by many charities as well as by the Poor Law Guardians, 
had long-since lodged fear of the stigma of charity in the minds of the working-class 
population.  More to the point, a State pension paid to a war widow carried with it a 
clear sign of payment made in respect of a man who had given his life for the 
country. For Florence as for the thousands of women who appealed for a pension 
after the war, as discussed above, it was also the matter of their personal suffering 
that they judged as being relevant. 
Florence emphasises her argument that her husband’s ill health was caused 
through his active service by stating that he had ‘Cronic valve disease of the heart 
caused through the war’, the absence of hedging expressing her conviction that 
Walter’s illness was directly attributable to his war service.  Her feeling of injustice 
is further highlighted by contrasting this with the conjunctive but to emphasise the 
that this was not pensioned, despite the clear worthiness of this.   
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[…] he died of Cronic valve Disease of the heart caused through the war, but 
he got no pension, he was able to work when he first came home with it but 
for the last 3 years he has suffered agony, and of course it meant losing a lot 
of wages, for he has never worked regular for 3 years prior to his death […] 
 
Florence employs a number of intensification strategies to argue her case here.  For 
example, she goes on to use a macro-intensification strategy to highlight his 
decreasing health by claiming he could work ‘when he first came home’.  The use of 
‘first came home’ leads to the assumption that this was a very short space of time, 
but it is clear from careful consideration of the chronology that he was actually 
working for eight years after his army discharge.  Florence’s narrative builds up to 
the cause of her poverty being decreased earnings in the last three years, something 
she attributes to her husband’s worsening health, as a further intensification strategy.  
Whilst she does not state that he was unemployed at the time, she leaves this as a 
presupposition when she writes ‘their was only my wages’, where only triggers the 
presupposition that there was just one wage coming into the house.  This gap in the 
narrative has to be filled by the reader.  The 1930s reader would doubtless have been 
very aware of the huge discrepancy between wages for men and for women and 
would thus have been assumed to understand the force of Florence’s argument about 
her impoverishment without need for further elaboration.  She employs the 
interpellatory intensifier marker of course to compel the reader to agree with her 
statement that ‘it meant losing a lot of wages’, which also reinforces the previously 
implied common sense background assumption that her husband’s job had been 
better paid than hers.   
The late 1920s and early 1930s was a period of economic depression in 
Western Europe.  Florence’s letter is written against this backdrop of widespread 
financial difficulties.  The records of the Joint Committee of the Order of St John 
and the British Red Cross show clearly that there was a huge increase in the number 
of appeals made by ex-servicemen, their widows and families for help at this time. 
Annual Reports of the Ministry of Pensions report similar increases in the number of 
pension applications, both for war disability pensions and for widows’ pensions.     194 
In her letter of 1
st May, 1931, Florence explicitly makes the link between war 
service and the State’s repayment for a loss of wages: ‘I was thinking for what he 
suffered through the war could you ask the government to help me with sum of 
money in part of wages what I lost through him having got no pension’.  Using the 
macro intensification strategy of employing a mental process verb, she is collocating 
her husband’s illness with her own on-going financial struggle, both being 
something for which the State is responsible, or at least capable of alleviating. 
Bondfield is here treated as someone who is separate from the State but could act as 
an advocate for Florence, emphasising her view of Bondfield as a sympathetic 
fellow woman, indicated by the personal request that she ‘ask the government’ for 
financial help on Florence’s behalf.  Her claim for financial help is also intensified 
by the way Florence presents herself as a nurse of a man whose health had 
deteriorated to the point where he could no longer go out to work.  She writes: ‘I did 
all I could to prolong his life’, here implying that her husband’s life was in danger 
and she carried out her duty as his carer to the best of her abilities.  This is turned 
into a bargaining tool to support her claim for financial help when she goes on to 
suggest that financial aid ‘would compensate us for what we all have suffered’, 
implying her husband’s suffering was shared by the family who were with him. 
Her argument of selflessness is enhanced by the strategy of using her 
family’s welfare as the greater benefactors of financial assistance, appealing to 
Bondfield’s maternal instinct, perhaps.  She ties discourses of social welfare into 
those of nationalism and patriotism in suggesting that the relief of her debts would 
enable her to raise her children ‘a cridit to there country’.  This reflects the argument 
put forward by Kovan (1994) who suggests that the children of war heroes were 
regarded as inheriting their fathers’ selflessness and sacrifice in aid of the greater 
good of the country.  This belief was also articulated in popular culture in this 
period, for example in Marie Stopes’ 1918 play, The Race: A New Play for Life.  In 
this play, Stopes’ main character sees conceiving the child of a serviceman as being 
a patriotic act, with motherhood as her national duty.  As Billig has pointed out, in 
modern warfare men have been called up to defend a way of life, their country and 
the country’s future (the children), and it is this discourse of patriotism that Florence   195 
is picking up on.  Florence is presumably including her children in her argument 
when she claims financial help to ‘compensate us for what we all have suffered’.  
The use of all triggers that assumption she is referring to more than just Florence 
and her husband, the others probably being her two children, although she does not 
give us any more information about them and so they remain virtually invisible.
125  
In abandoning her frame of motherhood in her claim, we can perhaps surmise that 
her children were older and therefore less dependant than Louisa’s. 
Most strongly in Florence’s letter is the underlying fear of debt.  She repeats 
several times the fact she is in debt, each time linking this to her husband’s ill-health 
and so implicitly intensifying her claim for a State pension.  In her carefully 
constructed narrative, she builds up to the story in chronological order from her 
husband’s war service, his subsequent ill health and his recent death to a more 
pressing matter: the debts incurred in the course of his illness to which has been 
added the funeral expenses.  She writes ‘now there is the funeral expences on the top 
of them [earlier debts] they all together amount to nearly £50’.  She does not employ 
overt intensifiers, but the idiom ‘on the top of’ carries a metaphor of daunting 
mountains of debt.  Whilst this is a lot of money to Florence, she carefully implies 
that this is actually very little in the great scale of government finances, using 
contrastive clauses joined by the contrastive conjunction but: ‘it is not much that I 
ask for, but it would be like a fortune to me’.  She is mitigating her request by 
assuming it would be a small amount to the reader, whom she has shifted to be in the 
institutional role of the State.  This is repeated later in the letter, where she frames 
her request as an ‘appeal’ which she distinguishes from the earlier-discounted 
‘begging’ by mitigating it as ‘no more than what will clear me’, thus presenting 
herself as being rational and lacking in self-indulgence.   
Seemingly aware of possible arguments against her appeal for a pension or 
other financial help, Florence offers an alternative claim that she presents as a 
reasoned argument.  Employing a macro mitigation strategy showing a degree of 
reservation in terms of addressee orientation, she writes ‘if they couldn’t give it [a 
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war widow’s pension] me’, the modality carried by could being less categorical than 
alternatives such as would, implying that the State has a choice but other factors may 
prevent them from granting the pension.  In an apparent attempt to negotiate some 
sort of loan, she uses a question form as a politeness strategy move to allow for 
possible rejection: ‘would they grant it me as a loan, with 5/- shillings a week 
knocked off my pension’.  This question is immediately followed by an expansion in 
the form of the second clause which provides details of the solution.  (Her use of the 
definite determiner here is confusing, but it is possible that Florence is here referring 
to an ordinary widow’s pension which was introduced in 1926.)  Again, she is 
addressing her remarks to Bondfield and appears hopeful that she will act on her 
behalf in passing these on to the relevant powerful agency which she identifies 
usually as ‘they’ but sometimes more explicitly as ‘the government’, thus is drawing 
on new discourses of social welfare whereby the State will step in to support the 
needy.   
Florence’s appeal on the basis of pressing financial need is similar to many 
others in my corpus.  For example, Ellen Bambrough
126, writing nearly ten years 
earlier, in her statement writes only: ‘I am a widow with 2 children since the death 
of my husband I have been left with nothing.’  Like Florence, her husband’s death 
had been classed as ‘not attributable’ to his war service (he had died after 
demobilisation, in the influenza pandemic at the end of the war, at the age of 33).  
The Ministry of Pensions’ reformulation of Ellen’s claim is simply ‘no evidence’, 
this referring to her husband’s medical history rather than her own circumstances of 
need for which she could doubtless provide ample evidence.   
Florence’s appeal for financial help is a mixture of claims grounded in her 
husband’s war service, her care for him and the consequent loss of earnings (so a 
form of remuneration), and ultimately her own very pressing present financial 
difficulties.  At various points in her letter, she resorts to highly personal appeals 
based on her current personal suffering and helplessness, for example ‘I don’t know 
which way to turn’, and later ‘I am nearly out of my mind’.  Again, macro 
intensification strategies are used employing mental process verbs.  The emphasis on 
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her current circumstances are so strongly expressed towards the end of this letter, it 
is clear that she was under great pressure to keep herself and her family together in 
the immediate aftermath of her husband’s death.  There is urgency in the postscript 
directives: ‘Please don’t delay.  Please put it through as early as possible as they are 
all troubling me for thier money’.  The repetition of please emphasises the 
underlying desperation.  The first sentence carries the assumption that help will be 
forthcoming, triggered by delay, the negation being used to expedite this help.  This 
plea is supported by the following sentence where it refers anaphorically to the 
hoped-for financial help, and they is an exophoric reference to the unnamed 
creditors, this perceived threat triggered by the choice of the verb troubling which 
carries a semantic link to worry, difficulty and unrest.  Thus Florence is framing 
herself as a carer on the part of the State, and as such she should receive 
compensation for the associated hardships.  The discourses of social welfare she 
employs also reflect the underlying parsimony of the legislation as she adopts 
financial discourses in an attempt to merge social welfare with older charitable 
discourses that would provide ‘loans’, as we saw in the case of the Joint Committee 
earlier.   
The Ministry of Pensions responded quickly to Florence’s letter, although it 
had initially been sent to the Ministry of Labour.  The memoranda which exist in 
Florence’s file
127 show her case was debated between bureaucrats, although there is 
nothing to suggest that Bondfield herself had any input.  As we have already seen in 
Louisa’s file, there is a lack of engagement with arguments based around poverty 
and need on the part of a widow, rather the discussion simply relates strictly to the 
grounds for a pension being granted.  In Florence’s case, this is exclusively based 
upon Walter’s record. 
 
In this O.S.Y. claim the widow wrote to the Minister of Labour and the letter 
was forwarded to this Department for consideration.  It is stated by the 
widow that death was due to Chr. Valvular Disease of the Heart.  As an 
O.S.Y. claim by the man in respect of heart trouble was rejected in April 
1930, should the claim be refused on ‘non pensioner grounds’, without 
submission to MS(1)?  
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In this first entry on the memorandum sheet, the writer states that the claim is 
there for consideration, the nominalised mental process verb carrying with it 
connotations of careful thought and deliberation rather than other more proactive 
choices such as action.  Florence is placed in the active role of provider of the claim 
on the grounds of her husband’s cause of death.  Interestingly, the bureaucrat here 
has repeated Florence’s own formulation of Walter’s cause of death which in itself is 
probably a formulation of the medical register of diagnosis found on his death 
certificate.  Florence’s claim is apparently supported by reference to some other 
document which no longer exists in her file: a documented appeal for a pension by 
Walter himself (traces of which are also found in the reference number written by 
the bureaucrats on document i. in Appendix 3).  In this case, the claim was made for 
‘heart trouble’, which does not carry the same authority as the medical register 
employed by Florence.  The agency to which Walter made his pension claim is left 
unnamed, as are the grounds on which this claim was not accepted.  The entry 
concludes with an interrogative form which apparently includes the preferred answer 
in the formulaic structure ‘non pensioner grounds’.  
The response comes from a bureaucrat called Mitchell
128, who echoes the 
‘non-pensioner grounds’ formulation.  This entry appears to be the work of someone 
who has greater authority than the unnamed awards officer of the first entry, 
indicated by the use of first person pronoun.   
 
I propose to reject forthwith on non-pensioner grounds adding that 
the husband’s case was specially considered last year by the Ministry who, 
after reviewing all the evidence, was unable to take any exceptional action in 
his favour.  No grounds are seen for departing from this decision, and the 
Ministry are unable to deal exceptionally with the widow’s claim. 
 
Mitchell puts himself in a position of power who has the authority to decline 
a pension claimant’s appeal.  The strength of this authority is also reinforced by the 
use of forthwith, which carries a mood of urgency.  The thoroughness of the basis of 
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the decision is emphasised by the prefixing of evidence with all, although as we later 
find out, there was evidence in his medical file which could have supported Walter’s 
claim at that point.  Mitchell continues to defer responsibility for this action (or lack 
of action) to the institutional agency of the Ministry, with unable carrying the 
assumption that the agency is prevented from acting by a lack of evidence rather 
than any institutional lack of will to act.   
The response
129 sent by the Ministry to Florence closely follows the wording 
found in the memoranda whilst adding more detail about Walter.  Florence’s appeal 
for a pension on the basis of need is not engaged with.  Instead, her appeal is 
formulated as being entirely on the basis of her husband’s death.  
 
  With reference to your recent letter, addressed to the Minister of 
Labour and relative to an application for pension in respect of the death of 
your husband, the late Walter Bayliss, No.264951, Private, Labour Corps, I 
have to inform you that as your husband was not in receipt of a disablement 
pension or allowance under the Royal Warrant at the time of his death, you 
are not eligible for the grant of a pension by reason of the provisions of 
Articles 17A and 17B of the Royal Warrant which apply in your case. 
 
 The initial first person pronoun in the following representative speech act 
would seem to imply personal responsibility and could be seen as evidence of 
emergent personalised bureaucratic strategies employed by the State, but in fact the 
writer is apparently acting on a higher authority, instructed by an unnamed agent to 
pass on the news of the rejection of the claim, and is acting in the same way as the 
complimentary closes previously discussed in bureaucratic correspondence sent to 
Louisa.  This is expanded upon at the end of this opening paragraph where the 
responsibility is allocated to the impersonal bureaucratic agency of the Royal 
Warrant.  This contrasts with the memoranda where it is clear that individual 
bureaucrats have made this decision based on their personal opinions.  Like the 
memorandum, bureaucratic traces are evident in the use of the official codes 
(Articles 17A and 17B) which are only partly clarified for Florence by the final 
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clause which carries the assumption that the Ministry of Pensions have carefully 
identified relevant legislation on Florence’s behalf. 
There is further use of first person pronouns later in this letter.   
 
I have to add that your husband’s case was specially considered last year by 
the Ministry, who, after reviewing all the evidence, were unable to take any 
exceptional action in his favour.  No grounds are seen for departing from this 
decision and the Ministry are unable to deal exceptionally with your claim.
130 
 
Although again employing first person pronouns, the impersonal institutional 
agency of the Ministry is given credit for the action of reviewing Walter’s case, the 
use of the adverb specially implying that this was an extraordinary move.  This 
impression of individual care and attention is further elaborated on by the 
prepositional phrase after reviewing all the evidence, which follows the wording of 
the internal memoranda discussed above.  The use of exceptional to prefix action 
serves to intensify the supposed special treatment Walter’s case was given. There is 
no active agent in the final sentence, although there is an expectation that it is still 
the bureaucrats at the Ministry that are responsible for such decision-making.  
Florence’s claim is thus linked inextricably with Walter’s failed claim, reflecting the 
‘non-pension grounds’ found in the memoranda.  The discourse of social welfare 
here is firmly anchored in the State’s obligation to the soldier rather than the widow 
as there is no engagement with Florence’s argument for a pension on the basis of 
need, nor mention of her suggestion of some sort of loan to help her out of her 
financial difficulties.   
In response to this, Florence writes back
131 to repeat her suggestion of a loan, 
this time avoiding mention of a State pension based on her attempt to gain the 
publicly acknowledged status of war widow.  She is engaging with the bureaucratic 
language of the Ministry’s letters in quoting back at them the reference number they 
have allocated to her claim.  She also echoes the opening clause of the Ministry’s 
letter which makes reference back to the preceding correspondence, drawing upon 
the formality of the standard letters sent out by the Ministry.   
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Whilst she maintains her argument grounds on the basis of her husband’s 
death, there is an additional argument that is more clearly presented which uses her 
debts as the grounds of her argument.  Here, the claim is for a loan, not a pension, 
and she employs the warrant that she is a good citizen who is not trying to take 
advantage of the government as benefactor.   
She is again using emotive language to present her appeal for financial help, 
and is drawing on the widening network of expectations of State social welfare 
which had appeared by the early 1930s.  The phrase to relieve my anxious mind 
draws on poetic language and possibly reflects the more educated, literate nature of 
Florence’s writing when compared with Louisa’s.  This is further shown in 
Florence’s attempt to negotiate a loan that would not be disadvantageous to the 
State. 
 
I have received your letter in answer to mine, and to relieve my anxious mind 
could you not allow me £50 pounds, and you take 5 Shillings per week off 
my pension until you have received it all back, the Goverment would lose 
nothing that way, and would take a load off my mind, as those who I owe it 
to are pressing me very hard, and I would managed with 5 Shillings a week 
less if all my Debts were cleared, I only ask for help, not for anything giving 
to me.  So please let me know as early as possible and oblige 
 
Florence uses an interrogative form to again appeal for a loan, this politeness 
strategy showing attention to the negative face of the anonymous bureaucrat in not 
imposing a demand on him.  There is an ambiguity in the use of the second person 
pronoun you, which seems to veer towards an institutional, generalised you to stand 
for the government although the highly personal nature of her plea indicates an 
expectation of a more personal relationship with the State.  She shows an awareness 
of the State’s responsibility to its citizens whilst also assuming a patriotic stance as 
one who will not be a burden on the country through draining State resources.  She 
draws upon the same discourses of self-help and the State’s ideological position of 
parsimony as we saw in the parliamentary debates of 1914 which helped form the 
Royal Warrant, and could thus be seen as attempting to align herself with the State’s 
ideological stance, as found in Helmer’s work on institutional storytelling (1993).    202 
Again, her argument repeats her assurance that a loan would not 
disadvantage the State, whilst there would be an advantage to herself in that her own 
mental troubles would be alleviated, using macro mitigation strategies that are 
addressee orientated.  She repeats her backing that the unnamed menace causing her 
such problems are (presumably) loan sharks: those who I owe it.  The intensification 
of her problem comes in the verb phrase pressing me very hard, where the action of 
retrieving the money she has borrowed is articulated as a physical force, further 
strengthened by the intensification very hard.  She frames herself as a responsible 
mother in offering certainty in her ability to manage her family and finances through 
the use of the modal would rather than the less certain alternatives might or could.  
In repeating her earlier request for a loan which is mitigated with the use of only, she 
follows this up with the assertion that it is not for herself that she requests the 
money.  In using the micro mitigation strategy of the negative structure, there is the 
assumption that other people might use the money for themselves in some 
inappropriately selfish way.  This echoes her earlier distancing of her own case 
being distinguished from the hypothetical ‘begging letters’ from those who are 
implicitly unworthy of help, and frames herself as being a responsible, deserving 
citizen.  
She finishes her letter with a conversational informality, starting with so, 
used here as a marker of consequential connection and implies that Florence is 
hopeful that her argument has been convincing enough to merit a positive response.  
To make sure of this, she concludes with the verb oblige, which is used to hasten a 
response whilst also indicating that this should be favourable.  Florence’s persisting 
sense of hope that the State will come to her aid reflects the underlying assumption 
that the State was morally responsible for the welfare of war widows, rather than 
drawing on the legal obligations that the State itself drew upon. 
The final letter in this sequence is in response to Florence’s of 8
th May.  It 
again includes elements that personalise it and engage with some of Florence’s 
concerns in a way that previous rigidly standard letters would not allow. 
The letter opens with a reformulation of Florence’s request for a loan, 
turning it back into the original appeal for a war widow’s pension.  Again, Walter is   203 
identified by his service details rather than any other indicators, emphasising his 
connection with the State and with the nation and less with Florence herself.   
 
  With reference to your letter dated 8
th May, 1931, respecting pension 
in connection with the death of your husband, the late Walter Bayliss, 
Private, No.264951, Labour Corps, I have to inform you that as previously 
notified the Royal Warrants administered by this Department do not permit 
of the grant of a pension in your case, and in these circumstances it is 
regretted that no further action can be taken in the matter.
132 
 
There is a reiteration of the Ministry’s position as being unchanged, triggered 
by the prepositional phrase as previously notified.  Again, the impersonal noun 
Royal Warrants is used as the active agent, removing any human agency from the 
denial of a pension.  Florence’s claim is rendered more personal by the labelling of it 
as being your case rather than alternatives along the lines of such cases.   
The use of the mental process verb regretted suggests that a more favourable 
decision could have been possible, and carries associations with apology and 
disappointment.  This is repeated in the use of regret in the final paragraph, where 
the writer actually gets around to engaging with Florence’s request for a loan.   
 
  I have also to inform you with regret, that there are no Funds at the 
disposal of this Ministry from which assistance could be granted you.
133 
 
The use of this prepositional phrase with regret goes some way towards 
softening the news that a loan is not forthcoming.  However, there is also an 
indication that financial help might be available elsewhere: it is simply that there is 
nothing at the disposal of the Ministry of Pensions.  The use of the modal verb could 
indicates that there is no obligation for any such funds to be made available to 
people such as Florence, and so the State is distanced from any responsibility for 
this. 
There are no further letters in Florence’s file until December, 1934.
134  
Seemingly abandoning her attempt to construct a sympathetic sisterhood with female 
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members of parliament, she has turned instead to her own MP, Vice-Admiral 
Gordon Campbell.  There is not a copy of his letter to the Minister for Pensions, 
Major Tryon, nor any paper trail to indicate how (or if) the case was reviewed, 
however there is a copy of Tryon’s private secretary’s response to Campbell.  In this 
letter between civil servant and member of parliament, Florence is rendered 
invisible, replaced by the noun phrase the case of Mrs Bayliss, the impersonal nature 
of this noun phrase emphasised by the use of which rather than the personal 
reference whom in the associated prepositional phrase.   
 
Major Tryon asks me to say that enquiries have been made in the case of 




There is a temporal vagueness as to when Florence’s claim had been looked 
into, perhaps disguising the fact that no fresh enquiries had been made at this time, 
something supported by the absence of any accompanying documentation.  That this 
is the case is demonstrated in the second paragraph where there is a clear indication 
that the only enquiries had been made at the time of Florence’s original appeal in 
1931.   
 
  Mr. Bayliss was never in receipt of a disablement pension, and his 
widow’s application failed primarily on that ground in view of the provision 
of the Ministry Royal Warrant.  The case was, however, considered on its 
merits, but it could not be certified that Mr. Bayliss’ death from valvular 
disease of the heart was either wholly or materially due to his war service.  
No exceptional action could therefore be taken on the widow’s behalf, and 
Major Tryon regrets that further action in the matter is not possible. 
 
Again, responsibility for the failure of Florence’s appeal is not given human 
agency, instead there is the institutional agency contained within the noun phrase the 
Ministry Royal Warrant.  In the second sentence, however triggers the 
presupposition that special attention was given to her appeal, juxtaposed against the 
second clause beginning with the contrastive conjunction but which heralds the 
negative element confirming the pension was not granted.  Here there is an element 
of doubt where the negation of certified leaves the possibility that there could be   205 
other evidence to support Florence’s claim, but that this is not documented and so is 
inadmissible in the eyes of the officials.  This second sentence also contains 
intertextual reference to the wording of the Royal Warrant, as we saw above.      
The Ministry is placed in the patriarchal role of helping Florence but being 
prevented from so doing by the terms of the Royal Warrant.  This willingness to help 
is triggered by the reference to action being taken on the widow’s behalf.  This is 
further emphasised by the use of regret in relation to Tryon’s apparent attempts at 
further action, triggering associated meanings of sorrow and apology.  The ‘facts’ of 
the case are thus being presented as preventing affirmative action in Florence’s 
favour, irrespective of any need she may have.  There is finality in the final sentence 
where further action is not possible, this lacking mitigation through temporal 
restriction such as ‘at this time’.  It seems any hope Florence might have had at this 
stage as been extinguished as there is no further correspondence in her file until the 
late 1960s. 
Before continuing to look at Florence’s case, it is also worth mentioning the 
personalisation and conversationalisation that will become more relevant in the 
following section.  As has been mentioned above, most widows in this period drew 
on older discourses of social welfare which relied on face-to-face interaction.  This 
may have led to the fact that many of them appeared to address the anonymous 
bureaucrats as individuals.  As we saw with Louisa earlier, her conversational style 
reflects her personalised appeals to the nameless addressees.  In return, however, the 
widows received impersonal, formal letters, typical of the public sphere and official 
world with which they were engaging for the first time in such numbers.  The 
correspondence from the Ministry were depersonalised to the extent that many of the 
letters, particularly in the early years of the Royal Warrant, were actually pre-printed 
forms which allowed for very little variation in message, reflecting Fairclough’s 
concept of discourse technologies (1989/2001).  Despite very personal appeals for 
help, such letters were apparently the most bureaucratically effective mode of 
communication, continuing well into the 1930s.  These pre-printed letters largely 
removed human agency from responsibility, especially negative actions such as the 
disallowed appeals and withdrawal of pensions.  As we have seen in correspondence   206 
addressed to Florence and others, even in the 1930s ‘the Royal Warrant’ is most 
commonly the active agent, where any is given.  However, from examination of the 
correspondence in Florence’s file, we can also see active human agency within the 
Ministry of Pensions in the memoranda for May, 1931.  Here, Mr Mitchell writes ‘I 
propose to reject forthwith…’.  So, deep within the bureaucratic structure, away 
from public gaze, we can see what was withheld from Florence, as from other 
widows: the actual name of the person who refused to grant the pension.  As we 
shall see, by the late 1960s there is a far greater level of visible human agency in the 
State’s dealings with its citizens.  However, traces of the older reticence to accept 
responsibility for negative actions continue. 
 
Post-war social welfare: ‘This country owes me a lot’ 
 
There is no other documentation extant in Florence’s file until January 1968.  The 
intervening 34 years had seen radical changes to social welfare provision in Britain.  
As previously mentioned, universal welfare provision had come into force in 1948, 
the National Health Service and Social Security implementing State-funded support 
for all citizens.  This legislation was in addition to the early attempts at social 
welfare provision from the beginning of the century, however the Royal Warrant of 
1916 (with subsequent amendments) remained the only means of State-funded war 
pension provision for widows of the First World War.  Other funds were available 
for distribution by the State, such as the remaining money held in the Royal Patriotic 
Fund
135, but it seems these tended to be allocated on moral grounds as can be seen 
from the case of Elizabeth Groake.  Elizabeth wrote to the Ministry of Social 
Security in 1962 stating that her war widow’s pension of 35/- a week was 
insufficient to maintain her in her old age.  A Ministry- appointed welfare officer 
visited her at home and sent a recommendation back, writing ‘I found Mrs Groake to 
be an extremely worthy type of widow and in this case welfare action is being taken 
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for additional assistance’.
136  It seems the older notion of moral propriety and 
deservingness, here formulated as an extremely worthy type, was still prevalent in 
welfare allocation many years after universal welfare provision had come into force 
in Britain. 
By 1968, universal State welfare provision was 20 years old but still being 
revised as different pre-1948 systems occasionally conflicted with post-1948 
provision.  Such a conflict of provision often occurred when they had been 
administered by different departments, such as unemployment benefit being under 
the umbrella of the Ministry of Labour and the long-standing old age pension under 
the Ministry of Pensions, both of these ministries merging post-1948 to become the 
Ministry of Social Services but each retaining its existing benefit structure.  Where 
discrepancies in benefit provision occurred, and they became public knowledge 
through wide media coverage, a ‘moral panic’ often resulted, fuelled by the media 
reports of an unnecessary and unfair drain on tax-payers’ money that clearly reflects 
the earlier debates in both public and private spheres that we saw above. 
The threat of the State (and thus the honest tax-payers) being taken 
advantage of by people who did not seem worthy of financial support has a long 
history and has been the subject of several moral panics.  As we saw earlier in the 
debates about widows’ pensions and separation allowances in 1914, many 
newspapers carried scare stories of women who, without a male head of the 
household, could not be trusted with an independent income.
137  One such letter from 
Canon EA Burroughs summed up some of the feeling against soldiers’ wives when 
he wrote in the Daily Express that ‘eighteen shillings a week and no husband were 
heaven to women who, once industrious and poor were now wealthy and idle’.
138  
Similar fears of women, in particular, being encouraged into idleness at the State’s, 
and hence the country’s, expense was also behind the media reporting of women 
claiming unemployment benefit in the years immediately following the First World 
War, as mentioned in Louisa’s case study.  In the early 21
st century, similar moral 
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panics erupt frequently, commonly in relation to asylum seekers claiming benefits, 
where the underlying concern remains that the unworthy are receiving financial 
benefits which ‘we’ as honest (white) British tax-payers have helped to fund.   
It seems such a moral panic about unworthy recipients of State funding 
appeared in the media in early 1968 where it was reported that some people were 
claiming both unemployment benefit and old age pension.  This prompted Florence 
to write to the Ministry
139 again.  Florence’s opening phrase
140 carries intertextual 
reference to an unspecified newspaper report, her use of the definite article (‘the two 
men …’) indicating that this is a specific case she is referring to.  Using macro 
intensification strategies, her sense of outrage is clear in her repetition of reck to 
describe her husband’s health on return from active service, the second use 
premodified by perfect to enhance the sense of totality of his condition.  She draws 
on her role as a mother to intensify her role as carer, linking this to the concept of a 
husband who gave his health for his country that is so often found in widows’ letters 
of appeal.  Florence here echoes the emphasis on her personal suffering that is found 
in her letters from 1931. 
She introduces details of her husband’s war service that did not appear in her 
earlier letters.  The nature of Walter’s war injuries is emphasised to highlight the 
claim that it was not only enemy fire which caused his wounds and eventual death, 
but also the rescue party’s misfortunes: 
 
[…] my Husband was wounded laying on a hill side waiting for an 
Ambulance, it came and toppled on the top of him, it affected his heart on the 
top of his wound’s, his Heart used to stop and start again, when he had an 
attack, he always fell on the floor, I never knew when I came home from 
work, I never new what I would find when I came home from work, would 
he be dead or alive […] 
 
Thus there is a two-fold demand for recognition: her husband was injured for his 
country and by his country, metonymically represented here by the ambulance.  The 
shift to the narrative of her own role as carer again focuses on her personal distress 
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in detailing the uncertainty and danger of her husband’s condition in relation to her 
own position.  As with the letters of 1931, Florence is using the assumption that the 
State should act as financial provider in recognition for the life of her husband, and 
to this she adds her own expectation of compensation for her own role as carer.  In 
using this macro intensification strategy, she emphasises her own self-sacrifice as 
giving her the authority to comment on the (unfair) benefit claims of others.  
In considerable detail, she accounts for her income at the time of Walter’s 
death, indicating that through such precision she had to make every penny count.  
This attention to finances is repeated at the end of the letter when she states that she 
had to pay for the funeral at a small amount per week, which links back to her letters 
of 1931 when she appealed for a loan to be paid back at five shillings a week, twice 
the amount she states here as being what she had to pay eventually.   
Florence’s attention to finance is a large part of what is behind her argument.  
To intensify her complaint of injustice, her minute finances and work record are 
juxtaposed with the thousands of pounds the State is alleged to have given people on 
the dole, with its connotations of idleness.  Employing argument structure, we can 
see that the grounds are provided in the opening phrase where she refers to the men 
who receive £3,000 a year on the dole, her claim being that this is unfair, supported 
by the warrant that her husband died because of his war service and she herself was 
left in a state of impoverishment.  It is clear she is not launching another appeal for a 
widows’ pension when she writes ‘I never got a war Widow’s Pension […] and it 
still rankle’s with me’.  Whilst she offers a great amount of detail about her own 
hardships, this is not framed as a request for a pension for herself.  It is interesting to 
note that Florence’s representation of her poverty is articulated through reference to 
not having a holiday, reflecting the post-war expectation of certain standards of 
living which are markedly different from the inter-war standards cited by Louisa 
when she appeals for help in acquiring more basic provisions such as food and 
clothing for her children. 
There appears to be a factual discrepancy in Florence’s statement that she 
wrote to Churchill as prime minister at the time of Walter’s death: Churchill did not 
become prime minister until 1940, and indeed was not even in government in 1931.    210 
However, this claim does suggest that Florence was pro-active enough to approach 
politicians as indeed she did in her letter to Margaret Bondfield.  In citing the 
support of her family doctor, she is also attempting to draw on the order of discourse 
that might be acceptable to the State.  That her appeal was ‘turned down flat’ is also 
clear from her file as she was not even allowed to engage with the formal tribunal 
process.  She offered evidence for this refusal for a pension on the basis that her 
husband was unable to go to the medical board for examination in the months before 
his death.  To return to the initial claim Florence made for pension in 1931, we can 
see that this is a point she had made before, although this is not acknowledged or 
mentioned elsewhere in the correspondence from the 1930s.  The assertion that it 
was Walter’s illness that prevented him from fully processing his disability pension 
claim is used by Florence to support her argument that she deserves a pension, both 
in 1931 and again in 1968.  Once more we can see that the order of discourse puts 
the widows in the least powerful position as the evidence they supply in support of 
their claims is ignored by the State. 
In contrast to her husband’s ill health and the lack of State-funded 
compensation for her carer role, Florence presents ‘these men’ as being able to 
‘draw both’.  By both, she is making exophoric reference to retirement pension and 
unemployment benefit.  She goes on to use the micro intensification strategy of 
employing a response-demanding utterance when she uses an interrogative structure 
‘when oh when will justice be done’ to carry the assumption that justice has not been 
done.  For Florence, ‘justice’ would appear to be the men’s pensions being stopped 
rather than her own claim for a war widow’s pension being accepted.  She is 
appealing for fairness and equality in benefit payments that draws on older 
discourses of social welfare where only the worthy were granted assistance, but here 
the basis is that they can be ‘worthy’ if they had paid taxes and continued to work, 
thus reflecting the development of social welfare discourses.  As with saw with 
Lilian Armfield earlier
141, Florence places herself in the role as one who is worthy, 
having earned a pension through her own employment, as well as being one who has 
suffered (and continues to suffer) through poverty caused by her husband’s early 
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death.  This death is framed firmly as the responsibility of the State, metonymically 
as part of the country, leading to Florence’s representative speech act that ‘this 
country owe’s me a lot’.  For Florence, the State and the country are one and the 
same. 
Her letter ends with a repeat of her opening expressive, employing mental 
process verbs here as a speaker-orientated in what would usually be seen as a 
mitigation strategy: ‘I think it is scandalous’.  This mirrors her opening expressive 
speech act carrying the mental process verb think to indicate that this is her personal 
opinion, then draws on the emotive adjective scandalous which carries connotations 
of immorality, shock and outrage.  However in the context of her letter, it is clearly 
the intensification strategy of one who is qualified to make such an opinion, 
particularly when she adds the vivid metaphor it makes my blood boil, which 
operates to intensify her expression of indignation.  There is a response-demanding 
utterance in so you could tell the state I was in, the addressee-orientated 
intensification strategy assuming that her representation of herself as someone who 
has suffered because of the State has been compelling.  She links with all this into a 
discourse of nationalism which assumes that the country is not going as well as it 
might, owing largely to unfair benefit claims, and it is the role of every righteous 
citizen (implicitly including herself) to police this.  
Interestingly, like Louisa nearly half a century earlier, Florence is using the 
strategy of off-setting her own exemplary behaviour, and therefore worthiness for 
State support, against the behaviour of others who do receive State support but are 
morally less worthy.  In Florence’s case, she is using the men who claim dole and 
retirement pension as the grounds of her argument rather than the backing Louisa 
utilises.  For Florence, the perceived unfairness of her own treatment when 
compared to that of others has been the incentive to write, but she does not use this 
to launch another appeal for pension for herself, rather to act in defence of other tax-
payers.  In Louisa’s case, the deployment of a morally less worthy other was used to 
support her own case for a pension.  I would argue that Florence is demonstrating a 
greater awareness of her role as a citizen than is found in earlier widows’ letters, 
reflecting developments in society in the course of the 20
th century.   212 
Before the Ministry of Pensions responded to Florence, there was an internal 
investigation into her case.  This appears to have been prompted by the 
misinterpretation of her argument as being one in which she claimed a pension for 
herself rather than for the cessation of a pension for others.  The Ministry 
bureaucrats had placed her letter in the genre of widows’ pension claims rather than 
Florence’s own intention of complaining about other people receiving State funds 
‘unfairly’.  This misinterpretation is clear from the reformulation of her argument in 
a memorandum dated 7
th February, which reads  
 
As her main complaint is that she did not get a war widow’s pension, you 
may wish to deal, please.
142 
 
Whilst there is no hedging to indicate uncertainty about the nature of 
Florence’s argument, there is hedging in the following directive you may wish to 
deal, reflecting institutional politeness practices rather than uncertainty.  The 
response to this from within the Ministry of Pensions again employs reformulation, 
reaching a summary that is in line with Florence’s argument, but again repeats the 
earlier reformulation that she is also claiming a war widow’s pension. 
 
  Mrs Bayliss seems to be complaining about men who retire on 
pension before the age of 65 and then claim unemployment benefit.  I believe 
that this question is at present being considered by N.I.A.C.  Have you a 
stock paragraph on this subject which could be included in the letter I 
propose to ask Blackpool Central Office to send to the widow about her 
claim to war widow’s pension, please
143 
 
This reformulation contains a number of hedges, perhaps to mitigate the fact that it 
is contradicting the earlier reformulation.  For example, seems triggers the 
assumption that this might not be the case, although this is the most likely 
interpretation of her argument.  To this, Cross adds other details which reformulate 
Florence’s letter further, where the more precise details of the benefits claimed by 
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the two men she mentions are given.  Here, there is an intertextual reference to the 
specific case Florence is citing and indicates that the Ministry are already aware of 
the argument grounds and claims of her complaint.  Hedging is again employed in 
the second sentence in the use of I believe, where the personal assertion of the writer 
is being softened as the indication that this case is already known by the Ministry is 
highlighted by the use of this question, referring anaphorically to the reformulation 
in the opening sentence.   
The bureaucrat ends the memo with a directive framed as a question, where 
there is an assumption that a ‘stock paragraph’ exists on this matter, indicating that 
this is a well-known complaint.  It also reveals something of the inner workings of 
the Ministry of Pensions in that, although letters would appear to be individually 
composed, there are traces of the system of standard letters and forms which were so 
common in the early years of the Ministry of Pensions as we saw previously.  
As mentioned above, the writer of this memo appears to be someone in a 
position of power as they are able to request letters to be sent out on their behalf.  
Cross again uses hedging in I propose to ask, although here it is less a marker of 
uncertainty as one of stylistic formality.  Ask is, presumably, interchangeable here 
with instruct.  The only area of the memorandum where Cross does not employ 
hedging in relation to Florence or their actions in response to her letter is in the final 
clause where it is assumed with certainty that Florence has actually claimed a war 
widow’s pension.   
The reformulation of Florence’s argument to be one in which she renewed 
her claim for a war widow’s pension led to considerable bureaucratic activity at the 
Ministry.  A longer memorandum from Cross, dated 5
th March
144, clearly shows that 
internal enquiries had been conducted into Florence’s supposed claim for a widow’s 
pension.  As with all widows’ pension claims, the actual circumstances of need 
Florence presented are not engaged with, something that is noteworthy given the 
background of the established universal welfare provision in Britain and the existing 
practice of additional help for other pensioned widows, as with Elizabeth Groake 
(page 206). 
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Cross again uses quite a marked amount of hedging, but here to indicate 
tentativeness which is hardly surprising given the half century between the evidence 
being collected and the summary Cross is writing.  Gaps in the records relating to 
Walter are clear in the certainty with which Cross writes in the opening paragraph 
that the ‘incapacity for which a claim was made is not known’, where the active 
agent who is deprived of this information is presumably Cross and, by the Ministry’s 
reach, all other bureaucrats.  However, it is not suggested here that Florence herself 
is contacted to provide additional information, thus the order of discourse which 
includes Florence is being rejected, as has been the case in most other widows’ 
records.   
Walter’s cause of death is again open to a different formulation.  In the 
second paragraph, this is noted as ‘chronic heart trouble’, which removes it from a 
medical register and thus becomes hearsay rather than medical fact.  The next 
formulation valvular disease of the heart is contained within a direct quotation from 
the letter discussed earlier sent to Campbell in 1934.  Here, Cross is accepting the 
statements of fact made in this letter as being authoritative, although as we saw 
earlier, there was nothing to indicate that further investigation has been carried out at 
that time.  Instead, this letter is acting as a substitute for medical opinion which 
might have served to support a claim for a war widow’s pension in 1968.  Again 
using hedging, Cross writes that ‘there is no evidence in the file’, the prepositional 
phrase triggering the assumption that there could be additional evidence elsewhere.  
This is prefixed by the contrastive conjunction but followed by although leading to 
the following clause where there is greater certainty in it is stated which introduces 
the authority of the 1934 letter to Campbell.  One reason for the hedging and 
reformulation of Walter’s medical condition in this letter could be that the writer is 
aware of the evidence which shows that Walter claimed for a chronic heart condition 
in December, 1929 and died of the same condition a year later, his claim for this 
having been rejected in March, 1930.  The underlying semantics of chronic indicate 
something long-standing, so is hardly likely to have developed to a level of fatality 
in the nine months between the claim being rejected in March, 1930 and his death in 
December of the same year.  Reference to Florence’s testimony on this point shows   215 
that the grounds on which Walter’s claim was rejected were not medical, but simply 
that he was too ill to make it to the medical board.  Again, the order of discourse 
including a widow’s testimony is not admissible, even in 1968. 
The intertextual quotation from the words of the Royal Warrant, that 
Walter’s death was neither ‘wholly or materially due to his war service’ is not 
attributed to this source (indeed, it comes form the 1938 revision rather than the 
1945 version, which amended this troublesome definition to materially due).  Given 
much of the controversy over this definition of eligibility that we have already seen 
from the Ministry bureaucrats in the 1920s and 30s, it might be regarded as 
surprising that these terms are not questioned.  As we shall see below, when Cross is 
attempting to distance herself from potentially controversial matters, there is no 
hesitation in employing quotation marks to deflect blame.  This would suggest that 
the impassioned debates about war widows’ pensions that we have seen elsewhere in 
this corpus had largely died down by the late 1960s, the problematic terms of 
eligibility no longer so widely articulated, particularly within the Ministry, and 
might also explain the use of the wording from the longer-standing 1938 amendment 
to the Royal Warrant. 
The final paragraph repeats the reformulation of Florence’s argument to be 
one of a pension claim: 
 
The widow has again raised the matter and we can now consider, but it 
seems unlikely that we shall be able to obtain fresh evidence.  There is, 
however, a mentioning of a Medical Board report dated 25.9.1917 (doc.14A 
in disability file) of a systolic murmur, i.e. “heart systolic murmur at apex.  
Not enlarged, has no dyspnoae on exertion”.   We would be glad of your 
opinion as to whether there was any significance in this in order to help us to 
decide whether to take the case further. 
 
  Cross uses hedging in seems as a stylistic feature to the representative 
speech act that an inclusive we (standing for the Ministry’s investigation 
bureaucrats) would be able to find additional supporting evidence for Florence’s 
claim.  This carries the background assumption that there is a willingness to obtain 
such evidence.  To emphasise this point, Cross does add some additional information 
in the form of a quotation from a medical report.  The use of a direct quotation here   216 
suggests that Cross is deferring judgement to another agency, in this case an army 
medical board from 1917, and is so avoiding any blame that may be levelled should 
this prove not to be the case.  Indeed, Cross defers judgement for this to another 
agency (identified here only by the code M4, presumably one of the medical 
advisors attached to the Department of Social Security), where your opinion carries 
less authority than instruction or direction, thus retaining ultimate power in the 
hands of the bureaucrats attached to Cross’s section. 
Further reformulation of Walter’s condition is found in the medical advisor’s 
memorandum of 8
th March, 1968.   
 
  The systolic murmur at the apex in 1917 may, or may not have been 
due to organic heart disease.  As he died from ? chronic valvular disease of 
the heart, under present standards, the case is worth investigation. 
  Advise obtaining all the pre and post service evidence available.
145 
 
The wording of the 1917 medical report, as cited by Cross in the preceding 
memorandum, is formulated here with the addition of the definite article to apex.  
Using a direct micro mitigation strategy, any opinion as to its significance is 
ameliorated by the hedge may or may not.  Walter’s condition is further 
reformulated here using a medical register as organic heart disease, indicating more 
detailed awareness of medical issues than is found in Cross’s correspondence.  There 
is again hedging in the use of a question mark to prefix the cause of death which 
Florence had quoted as being that on Walter’s death certificate, this indicating here 
that there is uncertainty or lack of commitment held in this diagnosis for the purpose 
of this correspondence.   
The attention paid to Florence’s perceived claim for a war widow’s pension 
does indicate that such a claim continued to be taken seriously, even half a century 
after the end of the War, with several detailed internal enquiries being made into her 
case.  However, the problem of her initial letter being misinterpreted eventually led 
to a letter from the Department of Social Security to Florence, which is striking in its 
new reformulation of her position, as well as in the level of personalisation and 
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conversationalisation (Fairclough, 1989) which contribute to ‘de-bureaucratisation’ 
(Sarangi and Slembrouck, 1996) when compared with the letters she was sent in the 
1930s.  At the same time, it contains intertextual links with these letters, particularly 
in the title of ‘controller’ assigned to the unnamed senior bureaucrat on whose behalf 
the letter has been sent. 
The reformulation of Florence’s argument to render it one of an appeal for a 
pension is taken one step further in that the opening sentence of this letter carries the 
presupposition that Walter had been in receipt of a disability pension: 
 
As your late husband was in receipt of a war disablement pension when he 
died, you may be eligible for a war widows pension.
146 
 
We can see there is an assurance of the fact in the representative that Walter ‘was in 
receipt of a war disablement pension when he died’, this being used as the condition 
under which Florence can claim a war widow’s pension.  Even with this level of 
misunderstanding, there is still hedging in the Ministry’s position to pay out a 
pension for her, triggered by ‘you may be eligible’, presumably as this would 
involve ‘new’ expenditure on the part of the State, and thus reveals traces of the 
underlying parsimony.   
The bureaucrat who has signed this letter, Billington, employs first person 
pronouns to add a level of conversationalisation to the letter, even going so far as to 
place themselves as the active agent who is offering friendly advice to Florence: 
 
I cannot say at the moment whether you are entitled to a war pension, but I 
suggest that you complete and return the enclosed form so that we can 
consider your entitlement.  An addressed label is also enclosed. 
 
If you need any assistance in completing the application form, please ask the 
local Ministry of Social Security office to help you.  You can get the address 
at any Post Office. 
 
This ‘friendly’ advice masks institutional hedging in the first extract, where the final 
decision will be made by anonymous bureaucrats (visible here only as an 
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institutional we) rather than the letter-writer in person.  Billington employs an FTA 
softening strategy in suggesting Florence complete the form rather than instructing 
her in a more demanding, face threatening way.  The final sentence of this extract 
indicates an implied question (‘where do I send my form?’) has been answered, 
again exhibiting a greater dialogic element of conversationalisation than is found in 
earlier letters.  This strategy is repeated in the second extract, where the need for 
assistance is anticipated and suggestions for where help can be found are made.  The 
second clause of this sentence is framed as a request, triggered by please, rather than 
a more assertive directive, adding to the level of conversationalisation. 
The final paragraph continues to list options for Florence, based upon social 
welfare schemes that were in operation prior to the full welfare state in 1948, 
whereby a widow could claim a widow’s pension but only if her husband had made 
contributions under the National Insurance Act (1911 and subsequent revisions).  Up 
to the 1940s, these were not compulsory payments and generally excluded the very 
low-paid, these exceptions acknowledged here by the hedge if: 
 
If your husband was insured under the National Insurance Acts and you are 
not already receiving a pension or allowance under these Acts, you should 
apply for National Insurance widows benefit on a form which you can get at 
your local Ministry of Social Security office.  It is advisable for you to do 
this even though you also claim a war widows pension. 
 
An absence of human agency in the final sentence, where advisable carries 
connotations of this being a sensible and prudent move, enhances the paternalistic 
presupposition that Florence has been imprudent in failing to apply for a widows’ 
pension under other legislation such as the National Insurance Acts.   
As we can see, the level of personalisation and conversationalisation is quite 
marked in this letter and is perhaps one of the earlier uses of this than the ones 
Fairclough cites in his own research on this subject.  However, despite the level of 
personalisation evident in the use of personal pronouns in this letter, there are many 
traces of bureaucratic language here.  The letter is headed with an instruction to 
respond quoting an otherwise meaningless reference.  The discourse technoligisation 
that is apparent in this particular text, explicitly in the reference to an enclosed claim   219 
form which contains notes to ‘explain the conditions for an award’.  This is also 
implicit in showing there are underlying bureaucratic links between the Ministry of 
Social Security and other State agencies such as the post office and local Social 
Security offices.  These are flagged as places where Florence can go for assistance, 
thus placing the State in the role of patriarchal guardian of the citizenry through a 
network of agencies.  Unlike the network of State agencies Louisa had been 
subjected to in the 1920s, agencies largely used for surveillance and control, the 
relationship between State and citizen in the latter part of the 20
th century is one 
which is presented as embodying the ideal of the post-war welfare state.  The 
underlying patriarchal ideology that underpins discourses of social welfare is clear 
here, as Florence is being told what is best for her, the assumption being that she 
does not know this for herself. 
Florence’s response to this combination of reformulation and patriarchal 
social welfare came in the form of the letter being returned to the Ministry with 
Florence’s writing taking up much of the available white space.
147  In appropriating 
the Ministry’s letter as her own, she is exerting power in some limited but dramatic 
way with her direct dialogic engagement.  This is not the first time Florence exerted 
some power over the limitations of the State’s correspondence to her: we saw her do 
something similar, in a less dramatic form, in her responses to the letter sent to her in 
April, 1931.  What is interesting here is that she is not engaging with the well-
intentioned Billington, whose letter carries a high level of personalisation.  She 
attempts to form no bond with Billington, as she had done in the letter to Margaret 
Bondfield.  Undoubtedly, this is because here Billington’s letter has caused Florence 
such anxiety and disquiet in its complete misunderstanding of her original intention 
in writing.  She has chosen to vent her fury on the whole State apparatus rather than 
the hapless Billington, despite the latter’s attempts at creating a personal linguistic 
relationship.   
In response to the opening paragraph of this letter of 1968, which carries the 
presupposition that Walter had been in receipt of a war disability pension, Florence 
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writes: ‘My Husband was not in Receipt of a war disablement Pension’ (the 
underling is Florence’s).  Here, she is drawing on intertextual references to the 
actual opening paragraph, underling was as she picks up on the factual certainty 
which is the trigger for this presupposition.  She quotes the rest of the clause in full, 
underlining the pension provision to emphasise her point that this is inaccurate, as 
indicated by her insertion of not to negate the erroneous truth of this letter’s 
assertion.  A line links this to her next comment, written vertically in the left hand 
margin: ‘They would not give me a war widow pension now it is too late’.  The 
exophoric they is probably the Ministry of Pensions, this being the agency 
empowered to provide her with a war widow’s pension at the time of her initial 
appeal in 1931, rather than at the named bureaucrat, Billington.   
In terms of her lexical choices, Florence uses give in preference to other 
options which might have been more in line with her earlier arguments relating to a 
pension earned on the basis of need or care, verbs such as award or grant, but this 
nevertheless implies an arbitrariness to the allocation of pensions that has been part 
of Florence’s, and so many other widows’, arguments elsewhere.  There is an 
ambiguity in her claim that ‘it is too late’, perhaps relating to her earlier point about 
the struggle she endured to bring up her family and looking after herself in the pre-
welfare state years.  Given that Florence is now an elderly lady, this is probably the 
underlying assumption to this point. 
Making use of the white space at the foot of the letter, in response to 
Billington’s final sentence, Florence writes: ‘And I had no war widows Pension only 
the ordinary pension’.  She has possibly read Billington’s letter where the use of the 
simple non-past verb claim in the final sentence leads to two different 
interpretations: that she is going to claim a war widow’s pension; or that she does 
claim a war widow’s pension.  Claim is also ambiguous in that it can carry the 
meaning of ask for, in line with the first interpretation, or receive, which would fit 
with the second.  Florence may have taken the second interpretation, which would 
explain her repudiation.  To continue the micro intensification strategies here, this is 
repeated below when she writes: ‘And I am not claiming at war widows Pension, but 
I am saw red when those 2 men drawing all that money every week and also   221 
Drawing Assistant’.  Florence again draws on violent metaphors to describe her 
emotions, here saw red, which is underlined to emphasise her anger and frustration 
previously articulated in her January, 1968 letter as makes my blood boil.  She 
repeats her own argument from January, citing ‘those 2 men’ as the grounds for her 
argument.  She emphasises the large amount of money they received in benefits by 
the use of macro-intensifying premodification all that and creates a sense of 
accumulation by the additive also.   
As discussed above, the status of war widow was one widows often sought as 
a mark of recognition for their husbands’ and their own heroic service to the nation.  
The amount of pension payable for a war widow and for an ‘ordinary’ widow were 
just about the same, so there is little benefit to claiming a war widow’s pension on 
financial grounds.  Here, Florence is also carrying this notion of the higher prestige 
awarded to a widow who was granted the status of a war widow through her 
pension, triggered by the use of only to prefix the ordinary pension.  Even half a 
century after the end of the First World War, Florence is drawing on it as a marker 
of her patriotism and moral worthiness for a war widow’s pension.  This is added to 
on the back of this letter
148 when Florence has written: ‘And will you please send the 
Card back with his Name and Number and Regiment on it, it is all I have of his 
papers, thank you’.  Here, Florence is requesting the return of Walter’s army warrant 
card which she had presumably forwarded to the Ministry for identification purposes 
in the recent past.  Her use of a request frame, carrying the polite complimentary 
close of thank you indicates that this is important to her, her pride in her husband’s 
army service linking to the underlying sense of patriotism and national identity that 
recurs throughout Florence’s letters, but are discourses that are no longer explicitly 
engaged with by the State. 
The final documents in Florence’s file comprise the draft response and the 
actual letter sent to her following her returned correspondence.  The final letter 
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contains more or less the same wording as the draft, so I shall quote the whole letter 
but draw attention to the changes from the draft where appropriate.
149 
Despite involvement in this section of the correspondence from an early 
stage, this is the only extant letter from Cross to Florence.  Unlike the letter from 
Billington, discussed above, Cross addresses Florence by her title and surname, 
indicating a polite formality which is nevertheless more personal than Billington’s, 
and indeed previous bureaucrats’ Madam.  As indicated earlier, this is perhaps 
owing to Cross’s higher position within the Ministry’s bureaucracy. 
The opening paragraph contains a formulation of Florence’s response that is 
likely to have been read by her with some frustration: ‘Thank you for your letter 
letting us know you do not wish to claim a war widows pension’.  Here, Florence’s 
furious argument is mitigated by its formulation as the mental process verb wish, 
carrying with it none of the anger and frustration apparent in her own presentation of 
her argument.  Like Louisa, she has been silenced by this mental process verb by 
institutional bureaucratic power.  The rest of the letter follows in a similar vein, 
down-playing Florence’s arguments through various mitigating strategies: 
 
Your remarks regarding people who retire from their normal occupation with 
a pension from their employer and then claim unemployment benefit have 
been noted.  At present, people in this position who are available for fresh 
work can qualify for unemployment benefit provided they satisfy all the 
usual conditions.  However, because of the concern felt about this problem, 
the Minister asked the National Insurance Advisory Committee to consider 
the whole question of unemployment benefit for occupational pensioners.  
The Minister has recently announced that she has received the Committee’s 
report and is studying its recommendations. 
 
The main body of the letter formulates Florence’s main argument about 
unworthy men claiming pension as remarks, which in itself is a rewording of the 
draft’s even less engaged you also mention.  Florence’s argument, she is assured, has 
been noted, which carries connotations of bureaucratic attention which is largely 
ineffective.  Cross goes on to set out details of the social welfare available to the 
people about whom Florence has complained, offering this as an assurance that it is 
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not illegal, although the prefixing of this sentence with the temporal prepositional 
phrase at present triggers the presupposition that this could change in time.  This is 
emphasised by the contrastive conjunction however in the following sentence, which 
sets up the expectation this could take place, given, the Minister’s active 
intervention.  Passive voice is used to remove human agency from the ‘concern’ 
expressed, with the terms under which people can claim a pension as well as 
unemployment benefit being formulated as this problem.  Active human agency is 
presented in the powerful authority of ‘the Minister’, and the abbreviation found 
elsewhere in internal memoranda NIAC is given in full as National Insurance 
Advisory Committee.  This attention to an external audience’s knowledge of the 
inner bureaucratic workings of the Ministry of Social Security is a further example 
of the increasing personalisation found in institutional letters to members of the 
public of this time, as we have seen.  The Minister is again the active agent in being 
seen as taking physical action in the final sentence, although the vague temporality 
of recently gives a less precise indication of time than the draft’s last few days 
triggers.  However, this change would indicate that the it has indeed been a very 
recent series of events, the change to recently perhaps being made as few days 
implies less than a week, which would be out of the timeframe of the letter being 
drafted and sent. 
Once again, the absence of any further correspondence in Florence’s case file 
indicates that she gave up her fight for ‘justice’ at this point.  As the correspondence 
from 1968 shows, social welfare in Britain had continued to develop not 
unproblematically.  Florence, as we have seen, continues to use explicitly discourses 
of morality and national identity to support her arguments.  However, although the 
legislation on which the Ministry draws is founded on these discourses, as we saw in 
Louisa’s case, it is clear now that in the order of discourses imposed by those in a 
position of power, social welfare takes precedence.  The ‘cradle-to-grave’ social 
welfare discourses post-1948 are found in both the internal memoranda and the 
letters sent to Florence.  Florence’s engagement with the State, half a century after 
the end of the First World War, serves to show how for such women discourses of 
social welfare continued to be bound up in discourses of morality and nationalism,   224 
and proved capable of producing impassioned arguments from citizens who had 
cause to feel disadvantaged by this progress.   
The changes in society are also reflected in the increased level of 
conversationalisation and personalisation found in the State’s letters to Florence at 
this time.  Where previously personal responsibility for actions had been limited by 
bureaucrats to internal memoranda, or at most to letters between people of relatively 
equal status (such as high-level civil servants and members of parliament, as we saw 
earlier), the level of conversationalisation and personalisation in letters to Florence is 
remarkable.  It is not simply a case of there being fewer claimants and therefore 
more time in which to respond to individuals.  As we have seen, ‘stock paragraphs’, 
or intertextual references, continue to be part of the correspondence.  However, the 
way in which it is presented to Florence is that her case has received exhaustive, 
special attention.  The bureaucrats of the late 1960s continue to employ hedging in 
their own responsibility, a mitigation strategy that sits oddly against their confident 
yet erroneous view that Florence is actually claiming a widow’s pension.  The 
reliance on existing files and correspondence as the authority on which decisions 
would be made shows that there is actually very little independent investigation 
going on in order to produce a favourable decision for Florence.  Her own testimony 
in her letters of 1968 receives the same level of attention as that written in 1931, but 
here with a lesser degree of understanding as to her underlying message.  Like 
thousands of widows whose unsuccessful appeals are held in the files of the National 
Archives, Florence is ultimately rendered silent by the institution of State 
bureaucracy.  Despite the well-meaning efforts of the Ministry of Social Security 
bureaucrats in 1968, like their predecessors in the 1930s they have been constrained 
by the terms of the Royal Warrant, built around discourses of morality and 
nationalism that are underpinned by parqsimony and a strongly patriarchal ideology 
of a different century. 
These problems serve to show how discourses of social welfare continued to 
be bound up in discourses of morality and nationalism for widows, proving to be 
capable of producing impassioned arguments from citizens who had cause to feel 
disadvantaged by this progress.   225 
 
Conclusion 
The Royal Warrant of 1916 continued to be enforced as the main pension provision 
for war widows, carrying with it the explicitly patriarchal ideology which fed into 
wider legislation relating to social welfare later in the century.  Discourses of social 
welfare can been seen to develop over the course of the 20
th century to involve 
greater expectations on the part of women, particularly in their role as carers which 
came to be seen as something which was remunerable by the State.  This links 
closely with discourses of patriotism as widows claimed pensions for looking after 
war heroes, arguing that they themselves were owed a war widow’s pension as a 
mixture of compensation and repayment for services rendered.  This links back to 
the war-time recruitment posters where women were presented in their role as 
carers, whether this be in the voluntary capacity of nurses or as factory workers who 
were ‘looking after’ men’s jobs whilst they went away to fight, as well as ensuring a 
regular supply of reliable equipment and munitions.
150  Older discourses of social 
welfare drew on charitable provision where means testing and moral worthiness 
were important criteria.  Like Louisa, Florence draws on examples of less worthy 
recipients of State benefit, although in Florence’s case she is not in the process of 
appealing for a pension for herself, instead appearing to require the State to act 
‘fairly’ to stop other people getting benefits.  This is a similar argument to ones we 
can find in the media today on an almost daily basis in connection to the ‘unworthy’ 
who claim State benefits.   
What is perhaps remarkable about the findings in this case study, is that half 
a century after the end of the First World War, widows were prepared to engage in 
correspondence on the matter of war pensions.  Equally, the State can be seen to take 
such correspondence seriously.  Even when misinterpreting the writer’s intention, as 
we have seen in Florence’s case, reasonable attempts are made to investigate the 
circumstances of the widows’ claims.  However, the ‘letter of law’ as set down in 
the 1916 Royal Warrant is partly at odds with the discourses of social welfare and 
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State’s responsibility to its citizens in the post-1948 welfare state in some ways 
(seen most clearly in the whole concept of ‘cradle to grave’ social welfare), but are 
heavily reliant on the Edwardian ideals behind this early social welfare legislation. 
The discourses of social welfare which are most apparent in the letters of 
1968, underpinned by ideologies of parsimony and patriarchy: it is the State’s duty 
to cut unnecessary expenditure; and the State knows best what is good for the 
population.  So, even after more than half a century since the Royal Warrant for 
Widows’ Pensions was drawn up, the same ideology continues to underpin changing 
discourses of social welfare and nationalism.   
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This study has conducted an analysis of war widowhood in relation to those British 
women whose husbands died as a result of the First World War.  As we have seen, 
war widowhood is bound up in discourses of morality and nationalism, in particular 
how these discourses are entwined with those of social welfare in Britain. 
In terms of the methodological lessons to emerge, Wodak’s model of 
historical-discourse analysis has been adapted here to focus more on intertextuality 
than genre in a way that retains her emphasis on a triangulatory approach to CDA.  
This has allowed a large corpus of data to be explored and, more importantly for the 
integrity of this data, the voices of the widows themselves have been heard.  In 
particular, this close linguistic analysis has proved invaluable in piecing together the 
narratives of the two widows whose claims formed the case studies.  The 
fragmentary nature of the texts contained ‘gaps’ which the discursive strategies 
within the historical-discourse analysis approach adopted here allowed us to fill to 
some extent, and offer a greater insight into the widows’ experiences.  In offering a 
significant development of previous research, this study has shown that the 
experience of war widowhood is entwined in the discourses of morality, social 
welfare and nationalism as these women sought to claim State-funded support for 
themselves and their families.  This analysis has revealed that, although there was no 
national, public voice for these widows, there were surprisingly close similarities in 
the arguments they presented to the State.  As was discussed with reference to 
Louisa and Florence, these were women who were prepared to challenge the State: 
in Louisa’s case, by sending dozens of letters to the Ministry of Pensions; in 
Florence’s, by continuing her argument over a period of 40 years.   
  Light’s (1991) ‘conservative modernism’, as mentioned in the Introduction to 
this study, is seen in the developing relationship between State and citizens in the 
inter-war years.  The modernising pressure to intervene more in the welfare of its 
citizens can be seen in the gesture of providing non-means-tested pensions for war 
widows.  However, as we have seen, this was heavily curtailed by the underpinning 
discourses of morality that were used to mask the parsimonious economic basis of 
this legislation.  Whilst the war widows were public, living symbols of the glorious 
dead of the ‘war to end all wars’, they were subjected to closer scrutiny than almost   229 
any other citizen as the State and the nation sought to preserve the hegemony of 
Victorian moral values. 
 
Widowhood, gender, morality and social welfare 
As we have seen, widowhood is bound up in discourses of morality and patriarichal 
ideology.  When this social position is recognised in terms of widows of men who 
died as a result of armed conflict, then war widowhood in the early 20
th century is 
also inextricably linked with discourses of nationhood and social welfare, used by 
the State to relate implicitly to parsimonious ideology.  The analysis of two different 
case studies has shown that the orders of discourses (Fairclough, 1989) shift over the 
course of the 20
th century, with social and legislative changes being reflected in the 
importance of certain discourses over others. 
  Financial necessity clearly represented one of the main driving forces behind 
the correspondence, as we saw in the cases of Louisa and Florence, who drew on 
discourses of charitable welfare in an often-futile engagement with State-funded 
social welfare reforms, regarding their lifeworld experiences as being more valuable 
than the institutional frame of reference (Sarangi and Slembrouck, 1996: 90). 
  The main findings of this thesis therefore relate to the shifting order of 
discourse in relation to nationalism, the underlying patriarchy that influenced the 
experience and representation of war widows, how widowhood and motherhood are 
articulated in relation to war widows, how the widows themselves came to regard 
the pension as some form of remuneration, and finally how this pension can be seen 
to demonstrate a shift in State bureaucracy and social control over time. 
 
Nationalism 
The order of discourse which saw the State employ patriotism as a call to arms 
during the war, demanding personal sacrifice in the public sphere for ‘king and 
country’ was quickly downplayed once the war ended.  What has been seen in the 
case studies is that widows continued to draw extensively on discourses of 
nationalism and patriotism in their claims for pension.  They make interdiscursive 
reference to discourses contrived at a time of heightened national identity during the   230 
war itself.  For example, as we have seen, there is a frequent evocation of the State’s 
war-time call to fight ‘for king and country’, even in widows’ letters that were 
written decades later.  In contrast, the State chose to ignore this evocation of 
physical patriotic indebtedness, calling instead on an evocation of nationalism that 
links with underlying parsimony, where there is a financial burden on the country 
that needs to be managed carefully rather than engaging with the physical sacrifice 
that the war required.  Florence attempted to engage with this, claiming a ‘loan’ 
from the State to assist with her debts, but she again was employing the argument 
backing that it was physical sacrifice in the service of the country that had led to this 
state of affairs to begin with.  Although the widows continued to draw on discourses 
of nationalism, this no longer connected with an approved discourse employed by 
the State.   
We saw a final demonstration of this patriotic pride in Florence’s last letter 
to the Ministry of Social Security in 1968 when, overleaf from her irate response to 
Billington’s letter, she adds a post-script requesting her husband’s service papers be 
returned to her.  These seem to be the last tangible link she has with his war-time 
service, her own status as war widow being denied by the State.  If we are to accept 
Billig’s (1995) point that national identity is heightened during war-time, then I 
would argue that this is only officially recognised in the public sphere.  It seems that, 
in the private sphere, for so many widows, residues of the First World War remain 
prominent in their own worldview. 
 
Patriarchy 
In terms of discourses of social welfare, it is clear that patriarchal ideology is at 
work.  On the part of the State, this patriarchy was usually employed to the 
detriment of the widows as they were open to unprecedented levels of surveillance 
when a very great distrust of them was enacted in the public and the private spheres.  
On the other hand, the widows themselves have been seen to evoke patriarchal 
ideology in their claims for social welfare payments, regarding the State as their 
means of protection from poverty.  However, as we have seen, the widows’   231 
evocation of patriarchy was largely ignored, the power of this discourse lying firmly 
in the hands of the State. 
  Discourses of morality and social welfare are inextricably linked within the 
provision of pensions for war widows by the State which, in the early 20
th century, 
was concerned not so much with the rights of the woman, but with the rights of her 
deceased husband.  The Royal Warrant ensured that widows had to be seen to 
deserve their pension on more than the grounds of their husband’s death in the 
service of ‘his’ country, thus the mistrust of women without husbands is articulated 
in the implementation of this legislation.   
This underlying patriarchy is clear through analysis of the presuppositions in 
Louisa’s letters.  We get a glimpse of a young woman whose behaviour did not 
comply with the State’s, and indeed society’s, perception of a ‘grieving widow’, but 
instead seems more like her unmarried ‘flapper’ counterpart at this time.  Louisa’s 
social role as a young woman is severely sanctioned by the State, who suspended her 
pension.  As we saw, she eventually conformed to being a ‘good’ widow, writing to 
the Ministry of Pensions that she no longer drank beer or went out in the company of 
men, and for a time was rewarded with the reinstatement of her pension.  Louisa 
eventually claimed the behaviour which is implicit within the discourses of morality 
the terms of the Royal Warrant required, showing hegemonic compliance and self 
governance.  However, the way in which her claim was made is particularly 
interesting as she clearly employs patriarchal voices in assuming that of her father 
and, later, calling on the official, authoritative patriarchal voice of the British Legion 
to present her argument.  Thus Louisa’s own voice is eventually lost under the 
patriarchal power that is called for by the State. 
Interestingly, in their correspondence with the Ministry of Pensions, war 
widows frequently demonstrate an assertiveness that indicated more than an 
awareness of their entitlement to pension provision under this legislation.  As we 
have seen, they also clearly demonstrated a strong sense of moral entitlement to 
support, looking to the State to provide this in a patriarchal ideology where the State 
took on the role of surrogate husbands.  This view of the State as beneficent   232 
patriarchal guardian contrasts with the State’s own view of this role which was far 
less beneficent. 
These letters should be seen in their broader social context.  Overall, the 
degree of mistrust with which these widows, largely working class, were viewed is 
remarkable.  We have seen their vulnerability to accusations of cohabitation, 
prostitution, child-neglect and drunkenness.  As we saw in the first case study, this 
surveillance came most commonly from the Local Pensions Office and its network 
of ‘visitors’, but also from neighbours, relatives and local government agencies 
which were otherwise not connected with the Ministry of Pensions.  All of these 
agents saw themselves as, in some way, responsible for the moral surveillance of 
widows and even the most gossipy reports appear to have been treated with some 
degree of seriousness.  This study has shown that the middle-class, Victorian 
morality which saw soldiers’ wives as immoral slatterns and Poor Law recipients 
(Trustram, 1984) led to attitudes which stigmatised the wives and widows of 
volunteers and conscripts in the First World War.  Drawing on the same moral 
framework, distrust of these women was undoubtedly increased by the fact that they 
were women without a male head of household to keep a close patriarchal watch on 
them.  The ideological positioning of women is clearly seen in the extant 
correspondence relating to war widows, where passive and dutiful behaviour is 
publicly rewarded by State pension. 
   
Eugenics and motherhood 
The moral surveillance of widows extended deep into the family unit, continuing the 
eugenics debate of the late 19
th century.  We have seen how widows were positioned 
as being responsible for the future of the nation by the care they gave to the children 
of the dead war heroes.  Their childcare skills carried financial penalties in the form 
of withdrawal of direct payment of children’s allowances should they be perceived 
as falling short of the State’s requirements.  Klett-Davies (1996: 7) has challenged 
the framing of lone motherhood in the 1990s in terms of an underclass, arguing 
instead that they do actually hold ‘quite traditional family values’.  We have seen the 
problematically-constructed Louisa exhibiting such values as she seeks to provide   233 
for her daughter Winnie, and elsewhere the extensive correspondence in her file 
reveals that her sons were all apprenticed, in contradiction to the amoral, work-shy 
values that are implicitly ascribed to their family unit.  Within the terms of Klett-
Davies’ argument, the discourses of morality that we have seen to be heavily 
influencing the legislation relating to war widows’ pensions in the early 20
th century 
continue to influence perceptions, if not the practice, of social welfare almost a 
hundred years later.   
The War Widow’s Pension, like other State financial benefits, often came to 
be a vital source of income for widows, particularly those with young families, and 
was often the most significant – and regular – contribution to the household income.  
Indeed, as we have seen in Louisa’s case, the seasonal privations experienced by the 
very poor in society acted as a spur to increased appeals, in her case when it came to 
requiring winter boots for her daughter.  That Louisa should appeal to the State for 
such material necessities is a clear link with the charitable assistance that was more 
familiar to British citizens at this time.  The social welfare reforms produced this 
new form of financial dependence that stimulated many such widows to forge a new 
and direct relationship with the State, even if the terms of State-funded social 
welfare were unclear to them.  
 
Social welfare as remuneration 
Another finding is that the frame of war widowhood is fairly static to the point of 
official legislative definition, disturbingly so given its basis in Victorian middle-
class ideology and the huge shifts in British society over the first half of the 20
th 
century, and this contrasts with the frame of social welfare which changes quite 
remarkably over this period.  From expectations of payments on a basis of means-
testing and moral worthiness, in keeping with older frames of charitable social 
welfare, the frame of social welfare after 1948 moves to be less dominantly one of 
moral worthiness, the universality of social welfare provision after this time drawing 
upon the assumption that help on the basis of need was a fundamental right rather 
than a means-tested favour.  This shift sees the framing of social welfare as being 
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health care and pensions), but also retains traces of a claim to moral worthiness 
(such as benefits through an inability to work) in societal attitudes, if not legislative 
practice.  This can be clearly seen in the Florence’s letters of 1968, where her 
complaint about undeserving recipients is not supported by her own moral 
worthiness, but by the fact she has been a good, tax-paying citizen.  Louisa’s 
framing of the same argument backing of unworthy others, however, highlights her 
own moral worthiness.  Thus we can see hegemonic acceptance of State parsimony 
on the part of its citizens increasing through the course of the 20
th century.  
Commonly-expressed fears and moral panics of ‘work-shy lay-abouts’ 
claiming unemployment benefit in the early 21
st century are very closely related to 
the public and parliamentary debates of the early 20
th century when contributory 
unemployment benefits were first introduced under the 1911 National Insurance Act. 
By the late 1960s, the Ministry’s correspondence no longer makes explicit reference 
to discourses of moral behaviour, as we saw in the correspondence relating to 
Louisa.  Given this emergence of moral frames in certain periods, it is, therefore, 
interesting to note that the legislation of the Royal Warrant of 1916 was formulated 
with widows framed as being worthy of pensions, whereas the parliamentary debates 
of 1914 framed widows as being in need of pensions. 
This distrust of widows can be linked with the moral discourses surrounding 
the long-standing notion of the ‘deserving poor’.  Whilst many widows wrote to the 
Ministry out of financial necessity, this is often coupled with the associated belief 
that they had earned some form of remuneration for their loss and, it was often 
argued, for the care they had given to their husbands prior to death.  There is a 
remarkable consistency in the widows’ calls for such remuneration, particularly as 
there was no precedent for such claims.  Whilst it is not possible to establish with 
certainty a reason for such a widespread attitude within the confines of this thesis, I 
would suggest that there was a public visibility in women as carers that greatly 
contributed to this perception.  For example, during the war itself, recruitment of 
women to the war effort was promoted with them as carers, whether this was as 
VADs or munitions workers.  This led to the belief that women could earn money in 
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the care of wounded ex-servicemen continued to carry a high profile with charitable 
organisations being set up to support these men and their carers.  Perhaps the role of 
the media in promoting the care of the returning heroes fed into the consciousness of 
the women whose disabled ex-servicemen husbands later died.   For women such as 
Florence Bayliss, who had lost their primary means of financial support as a direct 
result of the war (synecdochally associated with the government of the day), a war 
widow’s pension did not simply represent financial relief, but rather financial 
compensation for this loss, both fairly earned and rightfully possessed.   
Irrespective of the official social welfare legislation, the majority of these 
women did not think primarily in terms of the State’s relationship with its 
servicemen but rather in terms of their own personal sacrifice of a husband and a 
breadwinner.  The order of discourse shifted away from dominant nationalism to 
reveal the underlying parsimoneousness of social welfare provision.  As a result, the 
widows’ notion of entitlement was somewhat different to that of the Ministry of 
Pensions, as we saw in Florence’s case, where she presented an argument in which 
discourses of morality and social welfare are linked with those of nationalism. To 
reinforce Threadgold’s (1997) argument about the impact of social welfare on 
Habermas’s division of the public/private spheres, we can see explicit disclosure of 
private, lifeworld experiences as being an expected part of public, official 
discourses.    
    
Bureaucracy and social control 
The State’s bureaucratic intervention into the lives of war widows in its role as 
patriarchal guardian is part of the increased involvement of the State in the private 
lives of its citizens.  The war widows’ pension scheme was the first non-means 
tested, (financially) non-contributory allowance aimed directly towards women in 
Britain.  As we have seen, it emerged from long-standing philanthropic and 
charitable practices but was the first attempt at State funding in this way.  As such, 
all those who came into contact with it were drawing on older discourses of social 
welfare as they tackled this new-fangled system of State maintenance.  This required 
the official, public sphere to collide with the private sphere and the participants to   236 
develop ‘rules’ which are related to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘language games’ 
(1958) where they are employed in relation to understanding bureaucratic 
encounters.  As Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996: 37) argue, bureaucracy is all about 
submitting without restriction to a set of precise, arbitrary rules.  This can be linked 
to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus (1991), whereby access to certain life skills and 
knowledge (in the case of my data, knowledge of bureaucratic ‘rules’) is restricted 
and therefore not everyone is equally skillful at playing this game.  Whilst some of 
the rules, such as what would be counted as legitimate information and what would 
not, seem to relate more to the lifeworld experiences that the widows employ, the 
bureaucrats engaged with these selectively and usually only then to the detriment of 
the widows.  We saw this with Louisa when the care of her children only became an 
issue of engagement with the Ministry of Pensions when she transferred them to her 
father’s care after she herself had been unable to materially provide for them. 
The vast majority of the letters written by widows to the Ministry of 
Pensions demonstrate an awareness of the bureaucratic ‘rule’ that requires deference 
in terms of address, and conform to the preferred bureaucratic practice of providing 
husband’s name, number and regiment details on all correspondence.  However, the 
act of writing to the Ministry of Pensions to challenge their decisions is in itself an 
act of resistance, even though they write within the terms of the Ministry’s own 
language game.  For whatever reason, these women are refusing to accept the role of 
passive widow.     
It is also interesting to note that when the widows try to extend the terms of 
the ‘game’, one of the most noticeable features of their letters of appeal is that these 
personal statements are frequently addressed to the bureaucrats as individuals, even 
when no specific contact name is known.  As Sarangi and Slembrouck have 
observed, ‘perhaps clients demand that bureaucrats, even if they fail to grant an 
entitlement, recognise that the client’s lifeworld experience is more valuable than the 
institutional frame of reference’ (1996: 90).  In the case of the widows in this study, 
the lifeworld experiences of looking after children and general day-to-day living are 
most frequently cited as causing the greatest hardship.  Details of life, such as 
Louisa’s appeals for money to help buy food and clothing, and Florence’s plea of   237 
help with her husband’s funeral expenses, do not help their case as the pension was 
not awarded on the grounds of financial or material need.  As we have seen, the 
widows were entering into a frame of means-tested ‘need’ which would reflect the 
charitable provision of care that they were more familiar with.  Given the fact the 
war widows’ pension was the first such pension offered in Britain, then a fuzziness 
of understanding about the actual grounds on which help could be granted is 
understandable.   
Fairclough’s notion of orders of discourse, based on Foucault’s work on 
‘truth’, has been seen in that only certain versions of events and ‘expert knowledges’ 
are acceptable to those in authority.  The lifeworld experiences embodied in the 
sources of intertextuality so commonly used by the widows to strengthen their claim 
for pension were, as we have seen, not acceptable grounds for State help.  On the 
other hand, with reference to Fairclough’s notion of discourse technologisation, the 
bureaucratic language at an official level was initially constrained within the limits 
of pre-printed forms, later developing to more personalised letters which 
nevertheless drew heavily on intertextual references to these earlier texts which were 
unchallenged in their veracity. 
  Louisa’s engagement with the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Pensions is 
typical of other widows’ in that she regards the pension paid by the State as being 
hers by right.  Her letters frequently carry the question ‘why did you stop my 
money?’.  However, nowhere in her file is there a copy of a letter responding to this 
direct question.  The general reluctance of the Ministry of Pensions to clearly 
explain their reasoning behind pension decisions, at best citing the Royal Warrant as 
grounds for dismissal of applications, could be read in Sarangi and Slembrouck’s 
framework as the bureaucrats hiding behind legislation and choosing not to engage 
with certain arguments.  To add further to the distance from the lifeworld 
experiences the widows drew upon, the correspondence from the Ministry of 
Pensions draws extensively on the formal, legalistic language associated with the 
public sphere that often contrasts markedly with the conversational, private style of 
the widows’ letters.   238 
  This contrast between official, bureaucratic language and the conversational 
style used by many widows is undoubtedly partly due to the literacy skills at the 
disposal of the widows.  Although elementary education had been made compulsory 
in Britain in 1870, this was only occasionally rigorously imposed and had to be 
reinforced by further Acts towards the end of the 19
th century and into the early 20
th.  
Formal training in most State schools in the necessary literacy skills for dealing with 
bureaucrats was unheard of.  In fact, Louisa’s writing reveals basic literacy skills 
and little evidence of written literacy education (to the extent that she produced 
inconsistent spellings of her own children’s names).  The question arises as to 
whether her appeals might have received a more favourable response had they been 
written in a more erudite manner.  Even though I have spent quite a considerable 
amount of time trying to make sense of her letters, which employ regionally marked 
conversational style, frequent use of colloquial phrases and a highly idiosyncratic 
orthography, some passages still remain unclear.  It is unlikely that the staff at the 
Ministry of Pensions would have spent quite so much time and effort trying to read 
Louisa’s letters.  Many of her letters to the Ministry appear to have gone 
unanswered, and those which do elicit a response containing little evidence of 
engagement with the points she raises in her arguments, none of them engaging with 
intertextual quotations from Louisa’s letters, but with frequent quotation from the 
Royal Warrant to deny her payment.   
Ultimately it is the bureaucrats who have the power to award or withhold 
pensions.  As with Louisa, they also have the right to refuse to respond to letters 
from widows.  The huge asymmetry in power is clear here.  If a widow declined to 
respond to a request for information from the Ministry of Pensions, there could be 
serious outcome such as withdrawal of pension.  Without a nationally organised 
‘voice’ to act on the widows’ behalf, no such powerful sanction appears for the 
Ministry of Pensions bureaucrats when they fail to respond to Louisa’s request for a 
face to face meeting.  
  The ‘rules’ of this particular language game are heavily weighted against the 
widows in favour of the bureaucrats, which might be expected given that the ‘game’ 
had been fashioned by the bureaucrats themselves.  Both sets of participants were   239 
engaging with bureaucratic practices that were new, the very terms of the Royal 
Warrant under which the pension was issued being open to redefinition.  As we have 
seen, both the widows and the bureaucrats often resorted to interdiscursive 
references to older discourses of morality, social welfare and national identity to 
support their arguments.  In particular, the notion of the deserving poor recurs in the 
evocation of Victorian morality we have seen.   
In the diachronic analysis of the case of Florence Bayliss, the State’s 
relationship with citizens and claimants changed over this period.  The initial 
overloading of bureaucracy led to the development of the discourse technology of 
standard, multiple choice forms in the years around the First World War as the 
various ministries attempted to cope with the unprecedented volume of paperwork 
generated by pension claims.  This gave way to more individual letters towards the 
end of the 1920s.  There are traces of what Fairclough calls the 
‘conversationalisation’ of State bureaucracy from this period onwards, contributing 
to debureaucratisiation (Sarangi and Slembrouck, 1996).  However, widows’ appeals 
were no more likely to be successful.  Close analysis of the Ministry’s 1968 
correspondence show clear intertextual reference to much earlier sources which the 
bureaucrats regard as being legitimate, whilst Florence’s own intertextual references 




When combined with their sense of personal possession and the stark reality of 
financial necessity, this growing awareness of their new status as independent 
claimants on the State often prompted a significant change in attitude for the widows 
involved.  War widowhood encouraged many such women to intervene in the public 
sphere in their own interest.  Of the 200 pension case files examined in the course of 
this research, approximately two thirds contain some degree of correspondence 
between the widow and the State.  Whilst some of these letters relate to the relatively 
standard procedural matters such as requests for a child’s dependant’s allowance to 
be extended, a significant number contain far more detailed demands, often kept up   240 
long after the widow could realistically have hoped for compensatory financial 
assistance, as in Florence’s case.  In overcoming long-standing socialisation in 
political reticence and a limited education, widowhood had prompted these women 
to discover their own written voice and taught them to use it in order to negotiate the 
terms of their allowance, or even defend themselves against charges of immorality in 
the case of pension forfeiture.   
In the public sphere, such was the perceived success of the war widows’ 
pension scheme, it became a benchmark by which other legislation was devised.  
The Widows’ Pensions Act of 1926, although reliant on National Insurance 
contributions, had many links with the Royal Warrant of 1916.  One major 
difference is that it did not have an explicit moral agenda, perhaps due to the fact 
that it was funded directly out of National Insurance contributions rather than the 
mixture of funding sources that had been patched together in 1916 for the war 
widows’ pension.  The shift of widowhood from the private to the public sphere in 
the case of war widows would appear to be closely linked to the financial basis of 
the funding as well as to the patriotism that was its more public face. Because of this 
relative absence of a moral agenda in legislation for other widows, there was not the 
surveillance system in place to monitor them, although the health visiting scheme 
did intervene on the part of widows with younger families.  This reflects the State’s 
increasing intervention into the future wellbeing of children, synechdocally the 
nation.  However, in the public sphere, the war widows’ pension scheme was 
apparently envied by other citizens.  As Holden has shown, the scheme was used by 
other women to campaign for single women’s pensions in the inter-war years.  
Campaigning under slogans demanding ‘equality with widows’, this crusade was 
apparently only halted when the Second World War intervened.  
Gaps in the provision of social welfare were partly filled by a discourse of 
morality.  The notion of ‘deserving poor’ continues to be inextricably linked with 
discourses of social welfare.  Both Florence and Louisa claim that they are 
‘deserving’, in complying with the moral codes and patriotic actions of good 
citizens.  However, in Florence’s case, we also see her applying this idea of the 
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drawing a pension in the late 1960s.  Her sense of indignation is palpable in the 
furious scribbled response to the misrepresented letter the Ministry sent her in 
February, 1968.  She draws on discourses of patriotism to enhance her argument, 
directly refuting the political optimism of the 1960s, following on from Macmillan’s 
claim in 1957 that ‘most people have never had it so good’. 
The complex terms of the Royal Warrant emphasise the underlying 
expectation that war widows must be ‘respectable’ and conform to middle-class 
images and stereotypes into which authorities have traditionally cast widows.  This 
is most clearly seen in the public sphere, where war widowhood carries with it the 
expectation by the State and by society that these women should be passive, 
observant of patriarchal rule and morally worthy of pity.  This representation in the 
public sphere is markedly different from the experience in the private sphere that we 
have been able to explore through the case studies where endemic distrust of these 
widows led to unprecedented levels of surveillance of their private lives.  As we saw 
in the letters of Louisa Bayliss, she eventually sought to ‘round up a square peg’ (as 
Sarangi and Slembrouck (1994) have called it), in providing hegemonic compliance 
with the bureaucrats’ and society’s demands of moral behaviour.  Even today, many 
of the discourses of morality that have been shown to apply to war widows here 
continue to be embedded in the discourses of social welfare that surround single 
mothers, as Atkinson et al (1998) have shown in their research into single 
motherhood in the 1990s.  
  Critical discourse analysis has allowed us to see in this study that there is a 
clash of language use in the letters exchanged between the widows and the State.  
These letters show how the official language of the bureaucrats removes personal 
responsibility for negative actions on the part of the State through the use of passive 
voice and nominalisation, whilst the correspondence relating to the widows largely 
places them in an active position when the action carries negative consequences.  In 
addition, the conversational, largely informal style of the widows’ letters offers 
lifeworld experiences as evidence in support of their pension claims where they 
themselves are making personal appeals on the basis their own circumstances.     242 
  Although war widows’ pensions now are no longer regarded as being 
important in the public sphere (see Simon Hoggart’s comments in The Guardian, 
29
th July 2006, where he cites these along with conservatory planning applications as 
being harmless occupations for politicians), over the course of the last 90 years they 
have been the subject of much public debate.  Discourses of morality, nationhood 
and social welfare are clearly entwined, both in the public and private spheres, but as 
we have seen at different periods some of these discourses were given even more 
importance by the writer, depending on the effect they hoped to achieve.  These 
reflect wider changes in society, which CDA has helped to uncover through the 
linguistic analysis of the data within different social contexts, something other 
studies of war widows have previously not been able to demonstrate clearly.    
 